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Abstract 
Introduction 
Mood congruent interpretation biases are common amongst high trait 
anxious individuals.  Recent research (Hunter, Mackintosh & Eckstein, 2006; 
Vinnicombe, Mackintosh & Eckstein, 2006) showed that induced anxious mood lead 
to mood incongruent biases, which was interpreted as a mood repair process.  The 
dual-process model of mood regulation (Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2002) suggests that 
processing is initially mood congruent, switching to mood incongruent to attenuate 
mood states.  The effortful mood incongruent processing is hypothesised to break 
down in high trait anxious individuals.  A bi-directional relationship between mood 
and interpretation biases has yet to be explored within low and high anxious 
individuals. 
Experiment 1 
Induced positive (n=38) and anxious (n=35) moods decayed over time for 
low (n=41) and high (n=32) anxious participants.  Following the mood induction the 
ambiguous scenario method was used to measure interpretation biases.  A positive 
response bias was observed following the positive mood induction, although this did 
not maintain the positive mood.  For the negative mood induction, mood incongruent 
interpretation biases were observed which became increasingly positive over time.  
Low anxious participants also showed a more positive response bias. 
Experiment 2 
Induced positive (n=26) and anxious (n=24) moods decayed over time for 
both low (n=26) and high (n=24) trait anxious participants.  Participants undertook 
   xviii 
 
the same tasks as in experiment 1 under a cognitive load hypothesised to block 
effortful mood incongruent processing.  A positive response bias was observed after 
a positive mood induction but no biases were observed following an anxious mood 
induction.  There were no differences between high and low trait anxious 
participants. 
General Discussion 
Methodological issues limited the conclusions drawn.  However, the results 
appeared to support the dual-process models account of mood regulation as mood 
incongruent processing was observed following an anxious mood induction, and this 
process appeared to be blocked by a cognitive load.  Implications for future research 
were discussed. 
 
 
 
 1
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview of the Chapter and Study Aims 
 Anxiety is a common mental health problem affecting one in six adults in the 
United Kingdom (McIntosh et al., 2004).  It has been established that mood 
congruent interpretation biases are more common in anxious adults (Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1994).  Cognitive behavioural theories of anxiety disorders (Wells, 1999) 
predict that interpretation biases will play an important role in the predisposition to, 
precipitation and maintenance of anxiety, however the causal relationship between 
the two is still uncertain.  Failures in mood regulation have been hypothesised to 
have a causal effect on the development of anxiety disorders (Bradley, 1990) and 
cognitive behavioural interventions include elements focused at manipulating 
interpretation biases (Wells, 1999).  However, little research has been conducted 
with clinical populations to investigate how mood regulation strategies are 
maladaptive in anxiety disorders (Amstadter, 2007).  Information processing 
theories have proposed mechanisms by which interpretation biases may function to 
cause and maintain non-clinical anxiety (Dalgliesh, 2003), and theories regarding the 
regulation of mood also contain mechanisms by which mood precipitates changes in 
cognitive processing biases which in turn may operate to repair mood (e.g., Forgas, 
2000b).  Recent research (Hunter et al., 2006; Vinnicombe et al., 2006) found that 
individuals low in trait anxiety showed mood incongruent interpretation biases when 
exposed to anxiety provoking films.  It was hypothesised that the interpretation 
biases acted as part of a mood repair mechanism and the current study aims to 
replicate this work in order to further understand the potential mechanisms of action 
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of interpretation biases in relation to anxiety, and also to extend it to compare how 
the mechanism may differ in high and low trait anxious individuals.  Such an 
understanding would have importance in the development of interventions focused 
on individuals with clinical anxiety disorders. 
 Firstly a definition of anxiety and the differences between mood and emotion 
will be discussed in section 1.2.  This will be followed by an explanation of the 
importance of investigating phenomena associated with anxiety in section 1.3.  In 
section 1.4 three conflicting theories regarding the regulation of mood will be 
presented, along with a critical review of the evidence in support of each.  After this 
the evidence for interpretation biases in anxious populations and the effects of 
interpretation biases on mood and vice versa will be presented in section 1.5.  An 
evaluation of this research will follow, along with its clinical importance, aims and 
hypotheses in section 1.6.  
1.2 What is Anxiety? 
Anxiety has been defined as “a feeling of worry, nervousness, or unease, 
typically about an imminent event or something with an uncertain outcome” 
(Anxiety, 2009).  State anxiety is a reaction to a current or imminent threat, whereas 
trait anxiety is an individual’s predisposition to experiencing state anxiety 
(Spielberger, 1983).    Cognitive theories of anxiety (Wells, 1997) have proposed 
four elements to anxiety, including worry, emotional arousal, physical arousal and 
behavioural change (e.g., checking behaviours in obsessive compulsive disorder). 
Anxiety can be described as an emotion or a mood.  Emotions tend to be 
related to a specific event, are focused on a specific object such as another person, 
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tend to come on quickly and dissipate quickly, and are relatively intense (Parkinson, 
Totterdell, Briner & Reynolds, 1996).  Moods tend to be more related to one’s 
internal world, coming on gradually, persisting for several hours or days, with less 
intensity than emotions (Parkinson et al., 1996).  Whilst there are differences 
between moods and emotions, it has been shown that they are also related, with 
emotional reactions often resulting in a congruent mood change following the 
emotion-causing event (Isen, 1984).  The mood regulation models discussed later in 
this chapter can be applied to both, although some may have more relevance to 
moods (Power & Dalgliesh, 1997) and others to emotions (Bower, 1991).  The terms 
mood and emotion may be used interchangeably in the current study, although the 
focus is predominantly on mood, as it is the ability to repair persistent and 
debilitating moods that is clinically significant due to their relationship to a person’s 
internal world.  
Research involving mood as a factor was undertaken for many years under 
the assumption that affect, including both moods and emotions (Blechman, 1990), 
was a bipolar construct, differing in valence at each end of the scale, for example 
happiness and unhappiness (Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998).  Other research has 
investigated the possibility that positive and negative moods (labelled positive and 
negative affect, PA and NA in this research) could be conceptualized as more 
independent, unipolar constructs (Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988).  Proponents of 
the bipolar view argued that PA and NA appeared as independent factors, but could 
be shown to be dependent and related when measurement error was controlled 
(Green, Goldman, & Salovey, 1993).  Tellegen, Watson and Clark (1994) argued 
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that their results did not fully support a bipolar view as the correlations between NA 
and PA did not approach -1.00.  Further evidence for the unipolar view came from 
the finding that trait PA and NA were related to extraversion and neuroticism 
respectively (Tellegen, 1985), and that PA was associated with sensitivity to reward, 
and NA to sensitivity to punishment (Gray, 1994).  Research reviewed by Watson et 
al. (1988) indicated that there were resulting effects of sensitivity to reward and 
punishment on coping and frequency of pleasant events amongst others.  Reich, 
Zautra and Davis (2003) reviewed physiological research that showed differences in 
brain hemisphere activation and neurotransmitter processes for PA and NA. 
Both moods and emotions were found to differ in their degree of activation, 
as well as valence (Bush, 1973).  Such research highlighted that any model of mood 
must consider activation level, as well as valence and two related models comprising 
both components were shown to have empirical support (Watson & Tellegen, 1985; 
Feldman Barrett & Russell, 1998).  Tellegen, Watson and Clark (1999) also showed 
that ratings of happiness and unhappiness exist in a bipolar relationship alongside 
the two-dimensional relationships between PA, NA, pleasantness and engagement 
which suggests that the bipolar and unipolar views can be reconciled to a certain 
extent.  Table 1.1 details some examples of affective terms organised according to 
whether they are high or low in PA, NA, pleasantness or engagement.  NA and PA 
appear to be independent constructs, which require separate measurement.    
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Table 1.1:  Categorisation of affective terms according to Watson & Tellegen (1985) 
 Positive affect Negative 
Affect 
Pleasantness Engagement 
High Elated 
Strong 
 
Fearful 
Jittery 
Content 
Pleased 
Aroused 
Surprised 
Low Drowsy 
Dull 
At rest 
Placid 
Lonely 
Sorry 
Quiet 
Still 
 
1.3 Why Study Anxiety? 
Increasing rates of mental health problems have led to the view that it is 
mental health, rather than unemployment that is the biggest social problem faced by 
Britain today (Layard, 2004).  One in six individuals will suffer with a mental health 
problem at some point in their lives (Department of Health; DH, 2007) and the 
psychiatric morbidity survey (Office of National Statistics, 2001) showed that 15% 
of working age adults reported suffering from an anxiety disorder.     Mental health 
problems including anxiety disorders take up one-third of GP’s time (Jenkins, 
McCulloch, Friedli & Parker, 2002) and whilst the government’s improving access 
to psychological therapies programme (DH, 2007) is proving to be successful 
(Ireland, 2009), it is also costly (Layard, 2006).  Although interventions like 
cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT; Gould, Otto, Pollack & Yap, 1997, National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), 2007) have been proven to 
reduce anxiety levels, most do not return to levels of functioning seen in those never 
diagnosed with an anxiety disorder (Ballenger, 1999).  Recent research showed that 
modification of cognitive processing biases had beneficial effects on anxiety levels 
for high trait anxious individuals, although further research is needed to determine 
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the mechanism of action involved in order to develop the task as a clinical 
intervention (Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2009).  Further research is needed in 
order to improve understanding of the aetiology of anxiety disorders, as this may 
lead to new, more cost-effective treatments 
1.4 Theories Regarding the Regulation of Mood 
In order to develop interventions focused at helping individuals regulate 
clinical anxiety, it is important to consider how the regulation of non-clinical levels 
of mood has been conceptualised.  A literature search was carried out to identify 
articles of potential relevance to the functioning of cognitive biases in mood repair.  
A number of referencing databases (Academic Search Elite, Cochrane Library, 
Embase, Intute: Social Sciences, PscyINFO, Science Direct and Web of Knowledge) 
were searched with combinations of the words, ‘mood’, ‘affect’, ‘emotion’, 
‘anxiety’, ‘repair’, ‘management’ and ‘regulation’.  Abstracts were reviewed to 
ascertain which met the inclusion criteria and additional papers were identified from 
reviewing reference lists.  Studies concerning children under the age of 18 years 
were excluded, as were those concerning explicit, behavioural mood management.  
Articles printed in languages other than English and those not printed in peer-
reviewed journals were excluded.  Teape (2009) described three potentially useful 
models, which were identified in the literature search, and articles citing these 
models were reviewed, as was the special issue of the journal ‘Psychological 
Inquiry’ that the models were published in. 
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1.4.1 The ‘Hedonistic’ Model 
Larsen (2000a) proposed a model of mood regulation suggesting that individuals 
compare their current mood state to a desired set-point, and then use mood 
regulation mechanisms directed either internally or externally to move closer to that 
set-point.  The processes involved could be affected by six kinds of individual 
differences (Figure 1.1).  Whilst these individual differences are described in detail, 
the proposed mood regulation mechanisms are not.   
Figure 1.1:  Control theory model of mood regulation (Larsen, 2000a) 
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1.4.1.1 Critical Review of the Evidence for the ‘Hedonistic’ Model 
The basic assumption behind Larsen’s (2000a) model was that individuals 
will strive to increase pleasure and to decrease pain, which seems likely given that 
the ratio of PA and NA experienced by individuals over several months correlates 
with subjective wellbeing (SWB), life satisfaction and happiness (Larsen & Diener, 
1985).  Larsen (2000b) also reviewed evidence showing that most people feel happy 
most of the time (Meyers & Diener, 1996), and cite happiness as their main goal in 
life (Diener, 2000).  Participants induced into a happy mood non-consciously chose 
to watch positive film titles more frequently than those induced into a sad or neutral 
mood (Handley, Lassiter, Nickell,  & Herchenroeder, 2004) which the authors 
suggested was due to participants automatically learnt maintenance of positive 
moods. 
However participants induced into a sad mood experienced greater mood 
improvement than those induced into a happy or neutral mood in a study by Chang 
(2006), suggesting that decreasing pain is the overriding goal of mood regulation.  
Indeed, Wood, Heimpel and Michela (2003) found that individuals low in self-
esteem, in comparison to those high in self-esteem were more likely to dampen 
positive moods.  They concluded that the regulation of PA and NA is distinct and 
that individuals with low self-esteem may have a lower ‘set-point’ as the goal of 
mood regulation.  A study in rate of affect change by Hemenover (2003) found that 
individuals high in neuroticism showed slow NA decay and fast PA decay, whilst 
extravert individuals showed slow PA decay and fast NA decay, following positive, 
negative and neutral mood inductions using films.  Whilst these results, along with 
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those of Wood et al. (2003) suggest different motives for mood regulation between 
groups of individuals, Hemenover recognized that this could be due to the use of 
inefficient mood regulation strategies by these groups. 
Whilst Kuppens, Realo and Diener (2008) found that the frequency of 
reported positive emotions was related to a cognitive evaluation of satisfaction with 
life, cultural differences emerged that suggested that this was weaker in cultures 
where survival was a more pressing concern.  This suggests that the pursuit of PA 
may not be the only goal of mood regulation as the avoidance of physical threat in 
the environment is an important concern in some cultures, and such avoidance does 
not usually result in PA (Maslow, 1943).  As Larsen (2000a, 2000b) did not 
discriminate between the cognitive and the emotional aspects of happiness and life 
satisfaction in the studies he reviewed, an important distinction appears to have been 
missed. 
Larsen (2000a; 2000b) does not recognise that happiness may just be a lucky 
by-product of the process of goal attainment, as Martin (2000) points out, just 
because something occurs more frequently does not mean that is was the intended 
outcome.  This also assumes that achieving an optimal level of affect is always a 
goal in and of itself, and does not consider the possibility that goals such as avoiding 
a physical threat may be better served by maintaining negative moods, at least in the 
short term as they serve an informational purpose (Clore & Robinson, 2000; Isen, 
2000).  Cacioppo and Gardner (1999) reviewed a wide range of evidence supporting 
the idea that the behavioural expression of emotion may be unipolar in that 
individuals will either be inclined to approach or withdraw from a stimulus.  
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However, the evidence they reviewed suggested that the approach/withdrawal 
tendency is governed by information generated from two distinct positive and 
negative evaluative channels.  The ‘positivity offset’ they described, in which there 
is a tendency for PA in the face of neutral or unfamiliar stimuli, supports the 
hedonistic model.  However the ‘negativity bias’ they described, in which there is a 
stronger reaction to negative than positive information, does not support the 
hedonistic model as it demonstrates the utility of NA in ensuring safety. 
The studies that Larsen (2000a) reviewed to support the hedonistic 
assumption generally attempted to explore explicit goals with regards to emotion.  A 
study by Tamir, Chiu and Gross (2007) showed that participants viewed negative 
emotions such as worry as useful for the avoidance of threat.  Participants who held 
this view implicitly also preferred to engage in tasks which increased worry and fear 
when they anticipated a threatening task.  Participants in Tamir and Ford’s (2009) 
study also chose to increase their level of fear when they expected a goal related to 
avoidance.  The hedonistic model cannot account for these data as it demonstrates 
that explicit declarations of goals for mood regulation do not always match implicit 
aims.  Whilst Diener (2000) found that most people around the world rated 
happiness as their most important goal in life, it may be that individuals are not 
aware of what goals the emotion system works towards (Mayer, Salovey & Caruso, 
2000) and/or the goals the system works towards were not included on the list used 
by Diener (2000).  Interestingly, a minority of people in Diener’s (2000) study did 
not rate happiness as their most important goal in life, and the majority, whilst 
endorsing happiness as the most important goal, would presumably have admitted 
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that other goals carry some importance (albeit less than happiness).  Whilst 
happiness is clearly an important concern, such a simplistic view cannotaccount for 
the wide range of goal-driven situations where an individual might want to regulate 
their mood.  Also, Diener’s (2000) research may not support Larsen’s (2000a; 
2000b) position as it focused on long-term goals, which Freitas and Salovey (2000) 
pointed out are often met by ignoring current mood state.   
Additionally, Larsen’s (2000a) proposition that the hedonic goal of mood 
regulation is achieved by increasing pleasure and decreasing pain contains an 
implicit assumption that PA and NA are mutually exclusive constructs.  However, 
Larsen, McGraw and Cacioppo (2001) demonstrated that it is possible to feel happy 
and sad at the same time by asking participants to rate a range of different emotion 
terms in typical situations, and comparing them to the same ratings made in 
untypical situations such as after graduating from University.  Participants were 
more likely to have mixed feelings on untypical than on typical occasions, and the 
results could not be explained by what the authors termed acquiescence as similar 
patterns of responding were not seen for all emotion items.  The overriding goal of 
mood regulation cannot therefore be hedonistic, as this ignores the possibility that 
NA can co-occur with PA. 
Other research has shown that at least in the short-term, goals other than the 
attainment of PA may be important.  In one study, individuals in self-reported 
negative moods chose to watch films with congruent affective valence (Strizhakova 
& Krcmar, 2007).  Tice and Baumeister (1993) reviewed reports suggesting that 
anger is sometimes useful for example in attempts to influence officials in sports 
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matches, in protestors or in certain occupations such as debt collection where anger 
may pressurize people to pay (Hothschild, 1983).  Self-report data collected by Tice 
(1990) showed that individuals did occasionally attempt to create an angry state, but 
were more likely to try to prolong an angry state when they believed it might be 
useful.  Whilst self-reported experiences may not be representative of what actually 
occurs in practice, these data suggest that hedonism cannot be the only goal of mood 
regulation.  Other research has also demonstrated that speed of evaluations is 
increased when in a negative mood state for those high in trait neuroticism (Tamir & 
Robinson, 2004) and when in a neutral mood state for those low in trait extraversion 
(Tamir, Robinson, & Clore, 2002).  These results suggest that alternatives to positive 
mood states can be beneficial for certain individuals during evaluative processing.  
Gender differences found in social interactions also showed that men might seek NA 
to exert influence over others, whereas women seek PA to maintain the relationship 
(Timmers, Fischer & Manstead, 1998).  Watson (2000) reviewed evidence that 
shows that most individuals will engage in activities that do not fit with a short-term 
goal to increase PA, but do fit with a more long term goal to increase SWB.  Such 
differences in the apparent motivations to achieve PA and NA do not support a 
purely hedonistic understanding of the regulation of mood. 
Richards (2004) suggested that the differential effects of context on the mood 
congruency of interpretation biases in anxious and non-anxious individuals 
(Blanchette & Richards, 2003; Richards, Blanchette & Munjiza, 2007) showed that 
context is an important factor in mood regulation.  Indeed in collectivist, eastern 
cultures, where the focus is on the group rather than the individual, individuals 
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reported experiencing shorter and less intense periods of emotion than those in more 
individualistic, western cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991) which Eisenberg and 
Zhou (2000) suggested was due to individuals in eastern cultures learning to pay less 
attention to their emotions.  Indeed, emotions and life satisfaction have been found 
to be less correlated in collectivist as compared to individualistic nations, where it 
could be hypothesised that individual experiences of emotion have little relation to 
the centrally important social organization (Suh, Diener, Oishi, & Triandis, 1998).  It 
appears then that context may override hedonism in the process of mood regulation, 
since mood does not seem to be the most important determinant of life satisfaction 
across cultures. 
Tice and Bratslavsky (2000) put forward a modular theory which describes 
emotion regulation as one of many forms of self-regulation.  They reviewed 
evidence from eating, drinking, smoking and gambling which showed that 
individuals will sacrifice long term gains to achieve short term increases in PA.  
They also reviewed experimental evidence that showed that negative moods can 
interfere with achieving a long term goal, as individuals attempt to repair their 
mood, at the expense of their long term goal.  Another problem with Larsen’s 
(2000a) model seems therefore to be a focus on short-term over long-term goals 
(Freitas & Salovey, 2000).   
Whilst Tice and Bratslavsky’s (2000) theory seems sensible, and fits with the 
idea that hedonism will be the overriding concern “all other things being equal” 
(Larsen, 200b; p. 220), the situations when mood will become the overall focus are 
not defined, and neither are the particular mechanisms involved.  Larsen (2000b) 
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admitted that affect also provides information in a feedback loop for most tasks of 
self-regulation, but also needs to be regulated in and of itself.  Whilst this could be 
seen to be hedonistic, it could equally be explained by the research reviewed by Tice 
and Bratslavsky (2000) that is, mood needs to be regulated before it interferes with 
long term goals.  Individual differences in the methods and outcomes of mood 
regulation could therefore be seen as differences in the tendency to either seek 
desired goals, or to avoid undesired ones, and research reviewed by Hirt and McCrea 
(2000) supports this idea. 
1.4.1.2 Summary 
Methodological problems existed for many of the studies reviewed such as 
correlational designs attempting to imply causation, the ecological validity of 
reported preferences and experimental tasks and the lack of control conditions in 
certain studies.  Nevertheless, it seems clear that hedonistically defined goals are 
sometimes important for some people, some of the time.  However, such a simplistic 
view does not account for the changing effects of context on goals, be they 
emotional or otherwise, or indeed the time course over which such goals operate at 
least in experimental contexts.  Additionally, certain individual differences seem to 
affect the goals of mood regulation such that NA can be desirable in certain 
circumstances. 
1.4.2 The ‘Social Constraints Model’ 
Erber and Erber (2000) put forward a model of mood regulation which pays 
more attention to the importance of social and contextual factors than the hedonistic 
model.  They suggested that hedonism may be the principal goal “all else being 
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equal” (Erber & Erber, 2000, p. 143) but the process of repairing mood may cause 
the hedonistic principle to be overridden in the short-term at least.  Similarly to 
Larsen (2000a; 2000b) the mechanisms involved were not specified, although they 
reviewed a number of studies which provide support for the model. 
1.4.2.1 Critical Review of the Evidence for the Social Constraints Model 
Several studies have shown that mood repair will occur for both positive and 
negative moods when individuals are engaged in challenging, but not in ‘easy’ tasks.  
For example, Erber and Tesser (1992) conducted a series of studies to investigate 
whether effort expended on a task can attenuate negative and positive moods 
through what they termed ‘absorption’ which  proposed prevents a focus on mood 
congruent thoughts and therefore allows moods to decay.  They found that induced 
positive and negative moods were attenuated through the completion of a marketing 
task, but only when participants believed that the amount of effort they put in was 
instrumental to their success.  In a third study differences in induced positive and 
negative moods disappeared after completion of a difficult maths task, but not after 
completing an easy maths task or after doing nothing.  They concluded that the 
results proved that absorption in difficult tasks attenuated mood, and that this could 
not be explained by simple mood decay given the results of their third study.   
Similar results were obtained by Erber and Therriault (1994) using easy or hard 
physical exercise tasks.  If the hedonistic principle were correct, positive mood 
would not be mitigated after completing a difficult task and negative mood would 
not stay negative after completing easy tasks. 
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In order to extend the findings regarding task absorption, Erber and Erber 
(1994) induced sad and happy moods using memory recall, and then asked 
participants to recall a mood incongruent memory using low or high effort, or to use 
a list of adjectives to rate their mood in a control condition.  They found that sad 
moods were attenuated to a greater extent in the high effort as opposed to the low 
effort condition.  In a second study in a naturalistic setting, induced negative and 
positive moods produced mood incongruent memory recall only when task demands 
were perceived.  The results of the first study suggest that increasing effort results in 
increasing efficacy of mood regulation, and the results of the second study provide 
further support for the effects of task demands on mood regulation as they occurred 
in a more naturalistic setting than those of previous research.  A psycho 
physiological study by Silvestrini and Gendolla (2009) found that task effort for 
pleasant tasks was justified but not necessarily mobilised in comparison to task 
effort for unpleasant tasks.  They concluded that individuals will be motivated to 
undertake pleasant tasks for hedonic purposes as long as other tasks do not require 
the resources.  It appears as if both positive and negative moods will be regulated in 
certain contexts, suggesting that hedonistic concerns are not necessarily primary.. 
Kaufmann and Vosburg (1997) found that induced negative but not positive 
or neutral mood facilitated creative problem solving.  In a series of studies involving 
self-report and choices in memory recall, Tamir (2005) also showed that individuals 
high in neuroticism were more likely than those low in neuroticism to choose to 
increase worry when they expected a task to be demanding, but not when they 
expected it to be easy.  It also appeared as if such choices were beneficial to 
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promoting performance on a cognitive task.  This suggests that personality 
characteristics mediate the effects of context on the goal of mood regulation.   
Erber and Erber (2000) expanded their ideas to those involving social 
contexts.  They described something called the ‘coolness effect’, the tendency to 
maintain a neutral mood in the presence of others.  They suggested that this is 
necessary in order to stay composed in an unpredictable situation.  For example, 
Erber, Wegner and Therriault (1996) found that following negative and positive 
mood inductions, participants chose to complete mood congruent tasks when they 
thought that they would complete them alone, and mood incongruent tasks when 
they thought they would complete them with a stranger, regardless of the perceived 
mood of the stranger.  Similar results were found by Commons and Erber (1997) for 
the completion of tasks with a romantic partner versus a stranger or with an 
accepting versus a critical other, and by Augustine and Hemenover (2008) for NA 
repair following a negative mood induction when in the presence of a supportive 
other.  Interestingly, Augustine and Hemenover also found that the difference 
between introverts’ and extraverts’ ability to repair NA (with introverts having 
poorer abilities than extraverts when alone) disappeared in the presence of another.  
If hedonistic principles always drove mood repair such effects should not occur.  
Erber and Erber (2000) suggested that in social contexts, particularly with unknown 
or even potentially critical others, a more neutral mood state is desirable as extreme 
mood states may be inappropriate if others are in contrasting states.  
Whilst Erber and Erber (2000) accepted that mood will remain unregulated 
until a reason to regulate it arises, they placed specific emphasis on social situations 
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and difficult tasks without further expansion on other situations where mood 
regulation might be necessary.  Given the fact that humans are social beings who 
spend a vast amount of time in social contact the fact that most individuals spend 
only 15% of their time in a neutral mood state (Larsen, Diener & Emmons, 1985) 
does not support Erber and Erber’s (2000) position.  This suggests that other 
motivations than social context must be important to the regulation of mood. 
1.4.2.2 Summary 
It seems clear that contextual factors play an important part in when, and 
indeed how, individuals manage their mood.  However, by ignoring individual 
differences such as personality constructs (Mayer, 2000) and those described by 
Larsen (2000a), it is difficult to pinpoint when mood will become the focus of the 
self-control mechanisms described by Tice and Bratslavsky (2000) in the face of 
many self-control tasks, particularly as the model does not differentiate between 
short and long-term goals. 
1.4.3 Dual-Process Model of Mood Regulation 
Forgas and Ciarrochi (2002) described a ‘dual-process model of mood 
regulation’ based on Forgas’ (1995) ‘affect infusion model’ in which spontaneous 
management of mood occurs through two types of information processing (Figure 
1.2).  
Substantive processing promotes what Forgas (2000a) described as ‘affect 
infusion’ as mood congruent effects occur in cognition, which serve to maintain and 
amplify the mood state.  Motivated processing promotes what Forgas (2000a) 
described as ‘affect control’ through an effortful search for mood incongruent 
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information, which serves to attenuate the mood state.  Forgas and Ciarrochi (2002) 
suggested that substantive processing spontaneously occurs and motivated 
processing is only triggered in order to attenuate the mood state when a) a certain 
level of mood intensity (positive or negative; Erber & Erber, 2001) is reached or b) 
when personal, situational or task variables determine that the mood state needs to 
be attenuated. 
For example mood may not be regulated if physical threat is detected in the 
environment which needs to be dealt with or if insufficient cognitive resources are 
available to switch to motivated processing.  However mood may be regulated if a 
particularly happy mood occurs at a time when it is deemed to be inappropriate, for 
example at a funeral or if a particularly anxious mood occurs at a time when no 
physical threat in the environment is detected.  Mood is seen to be constantly 
monitored in a homeostatic feedback loop such that for example if mood became too 
sad at the funeral resulting in excessive displays of emotion which were deemed to 
be disapproved of by others, mood could be regulated again.  The thresholds within 
which mood is maintained are seen to differ between individuals by the model, and 
this could explain why anxious individuals experience more negative moods perhaps 
due to valuing of negative moods for potential threat detection.  Difficulties in 
switching from substantive to motivated processing could also explain anxious 
individuals prolonged experiences of NA. 
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Figure 1.2:  The dual process model of mood regulation (Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2002) 
 
This model seems the most plausible when compared with the hedonistic and 
social constraints models, as it incorporates internal hedonistic influences and 
contextual influences on the spontaneous regulation of mood.  Also it does not say 
that positive mood or neutral mood is the goal, rather that situational, task or person 
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factors dictate the current goal, which may require a particular mood state.  Indeed 
Arnold and Reynolds (2009) found an interaction between approach versus 
avoidance goals and regulation of negative affect, suggesting that it is not mood per 
se which is the goal, but that particular moods are useful depending on an 
individual’s goal orientation.  The model also suggests a way by which extreme 
mood states are attenuated given the fact that except in clinical mood disorders, they 
do not go on interminably (Forgas, 2000a) and describes this mechanism in greater 
detail than either the hedonistic or social constraints models.  
1.4.3.1 Contributions from Information Processing Theories 
Some theories have posited that emotions act as super-ordinate 
representations (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000), whereas other theories have seen 
cognition as primary, with emotion as a subordinate by-product of cognitive 
processing (e.g., Beck, 1967, 1976).  The dual process model predicts a bi-
directional relationship, and this possibility was also suggested by Mathews and 
MacLeod (2002) through their investigations of the causal nature of the relationship 
between cognitive biases and anxiety. 
Oatley and Johnson –Laird (1987) proposed that goals are achieved through 
the execution of plans, and that emotions were used in helping to decide which goals 
to give priority with different processing modes for different emotions.  The 
Schematic Propositional Analogical and Associative Representational Systems 
model (SPAARS; Power & Dalgliesh, 1997) predicted that processing of cognitions 
and emotions was far more complex, as they suggested that individual word 
meanings, beliefs and schematic goals were represented at different levels, with a 
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simpler associative network of connections for previously repeated events.  Mogg 
and Bradley (1998) suggested that the level of threat in a given situation was 
assessed, which affected whether current goals were set aside in favour of pursuing 
‘safety goals’.  They suggested that trait anxiety was defined by how biased the 
evaluation of threat for ambiguous information was. This is supported by research 
from cognitive neuroscience which has demonstrated both an automatic and a 
conscious pathway for the processing of threat-related information (LeDoux, 1996).  
Such models help to explain the dual-process model’s account of how and when 
mood will become the focus of current goals.  
Several theories have described integrative processing or elaboration as a 
strategic, controlled process which will strengthen a representation and its 
connections as opposed to activation, which is more automatic (Graf & Mandler, 
1984; Willams, Watts, MacLeod & Mathews; 1988, 1997).  Given that integrative 
processing is controlled, it could be seen as analogous to motivated processing in the 
dual-process model except that Forgas (2000a) suggested that motivated processing 
will lead only to affect control, and not to affect infusion as these ideas would 
suggest.  It seems possible that motivated processing could include an effortful 
search for mood incongruent or mood congruent information in order to attenuate or 
amplify current mood state depending on the current goal. 
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) suggested that the tendency to carry out 
integrative processing was determined by the allocation of greater cognitive 
resources by a ‘threat evaluation system’, determined by the level of perceived 
threat.  They suggested that processing capacity for threatening information could be 
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limited in those with high trait anxiety, but not in those with clinical anxiety 
disorders, through controlled effort, although this could be limited when mental load 
was already high.  This view is in line with that of the dual-process model, which 
suggests that pursuing a safety goal could be overridden depending on task, situation 
or person factors when cognitive resources were available. 
1.4.3.2 Critical Review of the Evidence for the Dual-Process Model 
Forgas (2000a) cited a range of studies supporting the proposition that 
substantive processing leads to maintenance of the current mood state.  For example 
positive mood leads to greater recall of positive memories (Bower, 1991), more 
positive attributions and judgements of others (Clore, Schwarz & Conway, 1994; 
Forgas, 1994; Forgas, 1995) and greater cooperation and confidence in certain 
behaviours (Forgas, 1998, 1999).  Ideas from Bower’s (1991) associative network 
theory suggest that substantive processing would also lead to maintenance of the 
mood state (Bower & Forgas, 2001) and further research has found that substantive 
processing leads to affect infusion (Forgas & Bower, 1987).   
Statistical modelling using data from an adult panel demonstrated the 
homeostatic management of mood (Chow, Ram, Boker, Fujita & Clore, 2005; Hess, 
Kacen & Kim, 2006) and Mogg et al. (1994) found that mood congruent 
interpretation biases on a homophone task for anxious individuals disappeared over 
time, which they interpreted as a mood repair mechanism in operation.  A study by 
McFarland, Buehler, von Rutti, Nguyen and Alvaro (2007) also suggested that when 
participants adopted a goal to repair their mood they were more likely to experience 
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mood incongruent thoughts following a negative mood induction.  Effects on mood 
were however not measured over time. 
Several studies have found that mood incongruent effects occur in a number 
of domains such as memory recall and task preferences (Erber & Erber, 1994; 
Harris, Sharman, Barnier, & Moulds, 2010; Parrott & Sabini, 1990, Raghunathan & 
Corfman, 2004; Raghunathan & Trope, 2002; Rinck, Glowalla, & Schneider, 1992).  
Berkowitz, Jaffee, Jo and Troccoli (2000) showed that social judgments were mood 
congruent when attention was directed towards others, but mood incongruent when 
attention was directed towards themselves.  It is possible that social constraints 
(Erber & Erber, 2000) impacted on the perceived appropriateness of participants’ 
mood causing the apparent switch from substantive to motivated processing to occur 
although this is difficult to conclude with certainty as no final measure of mood was 
taken.  Similar results were found by Forgas (1991) which had consequent effects on 
mood in the predicted direction suggesting that a switch in processing style does 
result in attenuation of mood states.  
A study by Knobloch (2003) provided evidence linking both the social 
constraints and dual process models.  Participants were induced into a positive or 
negative mood using a game or task expectation paradigm.  Their choices of music 
to listen to over the following time interval suggested that whilst participants mostly 
chose music congruent with their mood state, when they expected a difficult task to 
continue, they chose incongruent music.  As mood was not measured over time it is 
difficult to conclude that positive mood states were attenuated.  A similar study with 
no task expectations found mood incongruent music choices with no effect on 
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induced positive, negative and neutral mood (Knobloch & Zillman, 2002).  This 
suggests that mood incongruent cognitive biases are important in the regulation of 
mood, which depends on the task at hand. 
A study by Sedikides (1994) provided evidence for the occurrence of 
spontaneous mood management.  Following an imagery mood induction of sad, 
happy or neutral mood, participants were asked to write self-descriptions which were 
initially mood congruent, but became more mood incongruent as time went on, 
particularly for the sad mood.  Such effects were interpreted by Forgas (2000a) as 
evidence that participants spontaneously switched from substantive to motivated 
processing in order to repair their (sad) mood.  However, as mood was not assessed 
following generation of self-descriptions it is difficult to conclude that attenuation of 
mood occurred. 
Further evidence supporting the dual-process model comes from a series of 
studies by Forgas and Ciarrochi (2002) in which following a variety of positive, and 
negative mood induction techniques participants showed a consistent pattern of 
mood congruent, followed by mood incongruent responding in the generation of 
other person descriptions, in a word completion task and in the generation of self-
referent statements.  No change in the pattern of congruency of responding was 
found for neutral mood inductions.  A pilot study suggested a ‘dry-well’ account for 
the switch to mood incongruent responding whereby individuals run out of mood 
congruent responses was not likely as participants were able to provide far more 
positive or negative person descriptions than those generated before the switch to 
mood incongruent responses in the main study.  Similar results have also been found 
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by Chen, Zhou and Bryant (2007) with participants induced into a negative mood 
choosing to listen to joyful music with increasing frequency over time when 
compared to participants induced into a neutral mood.  Forgas and Ciarrochi 
admitted it was possible that mood simply decayed over time following the mood 
induction, and it was this that triggered the responding incongruent to the induced 
mood, but which was actually congruent with the mood as it decayed.  However they 
suggested that mood decay alone could not account for their results given that such a 
dramatic change in responding was seen.  Such a ‘chicken and egg’ account seems 
difficult to disprove given the wealth of evidence for mood congruent effects in 
cognition (e.g., Bower, 1991), the ongoing debate in the literature regarding the 
causal nature of the relationship between affect and certain cognitive processes 
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2002; Salemink, van den Hout & Kindt, 2007b) and the lack 
of mood measurement over time in the studies they report.   
Further support for the model comes from Beevers (2005) who applied it to 
understanding cognitive vulnerability to depression, suggesting that individuals have 
a negative bias in the substantive processing of information about the self.  It was 
proposed that motivated processing was not triggered to repair the mood for one of 
three reasons: 1) lack of cognitive resources, 2) because the individual’s 
expectations had not been violated or 3) because motivated processing was not 
sufficient to overcome the negative mood state.  Teasdale (1988) used the term 
‘cognitive interlock’ to explain the situation where negative mood results in mood 
congruent cognition through substantive processing, which results in further 
negative mood.  It is this interaction between mood and cognition which Beevers 
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hypothesised to result in a depletion of cognitive resources which then makes 
motivated processing more difficult, and several studies have shown that depressive 
cognition interferes with performance on cognitively challenging tasks (Ellis, 
Moore, Varner & Ottaway, 1997; Ellis, Ottaway, Varner, Becker & Moore, 1997).  
Furthermore, Beevers (2005) reviewed several studies suggesting that individuals 
may be vulnerable to depression due to being ‘stuck’ in substantive processing.  
Wenzlaff and Bates (1998) found that recovered, but previously depressed 
individuals completed sentences in a more negative way than those who had never 
been depressed, and Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane and Whitney (2002) found that 
these results significantly predicted which individuals would be more depressed four 
to six weeks later.  
The studies by Erber and Tesser (1992) and Erber and Erber (1994) 
demonstrated the importance of task effort in the attenuation of mood states.  When 
negative moods were induced using pictures, Van Dillen and Koole (2007) found 
that mood was attenuated by completion of cognitive tasks.  These results suggest 
that motivated processing occurs when participants are engaged in tasks involving 
increased amounts of effort although this does not necessarily prove that effort is a 
necessary pre-requisite for motivated processing to occur. 
Research has also suggested ways in which the process of mood regulation 
described by the dual-process model may break down.  Mood incongruent biases 
have been found in memory recall which seemed to function to repair an induced 
negative mood (Joormann & Siemer, 2004; Josephson, Singer & Salovey, 1996).  
However, the effect in the Joorman and Siemer (2004) study was only apparent for 
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non-dysphoric and not for dysphoric individuals, and only when participants were 
directed to ruminate on current mood state.  This suggests that, at least for dysphoric 
individuals, the ability to use mood incongruent memory biases as part of a mood 
repair mechanism is impaired.  As rumination facilitated the mood repair process 
this also suggested that processing effort was important. 
A study by Ottati and Isbell (1996) found both mood congruent and mood-
incongruent effects on interpretation of ambiguous information for naturally 
occurring (non-specified) negative mood, which were dependent on individual 
differences between participants.  When asked to evaluate information about 
political candidates, individuals high in political expertise were more likely to make 
positive judgements about the candidates which were incongruent with their 
negative mood than those with low expertise.  Ottati and Isbell (1996) suggested 
such results demonstrated interpretative processing biases acting as part of motivated 
processing in a mood repair mechanism when cognitive capacity was made available 
to focus on mood state due to high expertise, in line with the dual-process model. 
Using texts describing job interviews, Hirsch and Mathews (1997) asked 
high anxious or low anxious individuals to make lexical or grammatical decisions 
about ambiguous probe words in relation to the text being read.  Low anxious 
individuals made faster decisions for words with a benign interpretation, whereas 
high anxious individuals showed no preference for either.  Using the same method as 
the current study, Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards and Mathews (1991) presented 
clinically anxious patients, recovered patients, and non anxious controls with 
ambiguous sentences (e.g., “At the refugee camp, the week (weak) would soon be 
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finished”).  Later, participants were asked if they recognised sentences with benign 
or threatening interpretations of the sentences they had previously read (e.g., “At the 
camp the sick would soon be dead/At the camp, the weekend had nearly arrived”).  
The non anxious participants tended to rate the benign interpretations as being more 
similar, whereas anxious participants did not show a preference.  Both sets of 
findings indicate that the attention of low anxious individuals was diverted to a more 
benign interpretation as part of a ‘mood preservation’ process in the non-anxious 
participants, which was compromised in the anxious participants in line with the 
dual-process model.  These results suggest a way by which the use of motivated 
processing in mood regulation may be impaired in high anxious individuals, 
although the fact that effects on mood were not measured makes it difficult to 
conclude this with certainty. 
1.4.3.3 Summary 
The dual-process model seems best placed of the three models reviewed in to 
explain how individuals might regulate their mood under a variety of contextual 
conditions, with reference to both hedonistic and other more instrumental goals.  It is 
also in line with information processing theories accounts of the interplay between 
mood and cognition.  There is some evidence to suggest that when a threshold level 
of mood is reached, individuals switch from initially mood congruent to mood 
incongruent processing with the effect of attenuating both positive and negative 
moods when cognitive resources are available, and that this process is impaired in 
high trait anxious individuals.  Given the abundant literature on cognitive processing 
biases in anxious mood it would seem likely that such biases might be involved in 
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the regulation of anxious mood as the dual-process model would predict.  A review 
of the literature regarding the relationship between cognitive processing biases and 
anxious mood follows in the next section.   
1.5 Interpretive Processing Biases 
 A further literature search was carried out to identify articles of relevance to 
the relationship between interpretive biases and anxious mood.  A number of 
referencing databases (Academic Search Elite, Cochrane Library, Embase, Intute: 
Social Sciences, PscyINFO, Science Direct and Web of Knowledge) were searched 
with combinations of the words, ‘anxiety’, ‘anxious’, ‘cognitive’, ‘interpretation’ 
and ‘bias’.  Abstracts were reviewed to ascertain which met the inclusion criteria and 
additional papers were identified from reviewing reference lists.  Studies concerning 
children under the age of 18 years were excluded, as were those concerning 
attentional or other kinds of cognitive biases, those not concerned with anxiety and 
those concerning explicit, behavioural mood regulation.  Articles printed in 
languages other than English and those not printed in peer-reviewed journals were 
excluded.    
1.5.1 Anxious Populations 
Research in this area has focused on individuals in three main groups, those 
in transient emotional states of anxiety, those who have a high disposition to 
experience anxiety (high trait anxiety) and those diagnosed with anxiety disorders.  
The research can be further broken down into research into attentional processing 
biases, interpretive processing biases and memory biases.     
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Much research to date has demonstrated the existence of mood congruent 
attentional biases in both clinically and non-clinically anxious individuals (Williams, 
Watts, MacLeod & Mathews 1997).  The existence of mood congruent memory 
biases is more controversial, and seems to depend largely on the existence of co-
morbid depression (Mineka, Rafaeli, & Yovel, 2003).  Several studies, using a 
variety of methods, have now shown that clinically anxious individuals, as well as 
high-trait anxious individuals are more likely to interpret ambiguous emotional 
information in a negative way (Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009; Richards, 
2004).  For example deciding between two possible interpretations of a homophone 
(a word with the same pronunciation but more than one meaning for example ‘die’ 
and ‘dye’) presented auditorily (Eysenck, MacLeod & Mathews, 1987; Mathews, 
Richards & Eysenck, 1989; Mogg et al., 1994).  Richards and French (1992) found 
that for high anxious participants but not for low anxious participants, lexical 
decisions for real or nonsense words could be speeded up by presentation of an 
associated threatening homograph as a prime (a homograph is a word with more 
than one meaning although both are spelt the same).  This effect was only found 
when the prime was presented for 750 milliseconds or longer and only when the 
prime was related to the target words.  The conclusion drawn was that the anxious 
participants must have accessed the threatening interpretation of the homographs 
which facilitated their decisions regarding the targets. 
 Interpretation biases were also found for high-anxious individuals when 
reading ambiguous sentences which were followed by sentences that were consistent 
with either a benign or a threatening interpretation (MacLeod & Cohen, 1993).  As 
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reading times were slower when the second sentence had a benign interpretation, it 
was concluded that a threatening interpretation had already been made by the time 
the second sentence was presented.  Similar studies supported this idea (Calvo, 
Eysenck & Castillo, 1997; Calvo, Eysenck & Estevez, 1994), finding not only that 
lexical decisions for homographs or interpretations of ambiguous sentences are made 
in favour of threatening interpretations, but that information presented later is 
understood more quickly when that information also has a threatening meaning. 
 Using a more elaborate method, Eysenck et al. (1991) found that non-
anxious control participants were more likely to recognize benign interpretations of 
an ambiguous sentence that they had previously read, relative to anxious 
participants.  Whilst it is possible that an implicit memory bias was responsible for 
the effects observed, little evidence has been found for the existence of implicit 
memory biases in anxiety (Mineka et al., 2003).  Socially anxious individuals were 
shown to have factual recall but impose a bias on their interpretation of ambiguous 
information, especially after a time delay (Brendle & Wenzel, 2004) and predictive 
inferences in reading seem to be made on-line (Calvo & Castillo, 2001).   
Much research in this area has focused specifically on individuals with social 
anxiety.  When asked explicitly, participants with generalised social phobia 
(compared with anxious and non-anxious controls) appeared to have a negative 
interpretation bias for social information (Amir, Beard & Bower, 2005; Amin, Foa 
& Coles, 1998; Wenzel, Finstrom, Jordan, & Brendle, 2005), for the ambiguous 
behaviour of others (Kanai, Sasagawa, Chen, Shimada, & Sakano, 2010), for the 
identification of facial emotional expressions (Mohlman, Carmin, & Price, 2007) 
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and for the prediction of negative self-evaluation, negative personal characteristics 
and negative long term consequences due to social anxiety (Wilson & Rapee, 2005).  
Interpretation bias for ambiguous social information appeared to disappear following 
treatment (Franklin, Huppert, Langner, Leiberg & Foa, 2005).  Individuals high in 
social anxiety also demonstrated a negative interpretation bias and a lack of a 
positive interpretation bias for ambiguous social sentences in comparison to 
individuals low in social anxiety, both when they were required to independently 
generate their responses, and when they made a selection from two responses 
(Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa & Mathews, 2007).  A review by Hirsch and Clark (2004) 
also concluded that socially anxious individuals lack a positive interpretation bias, 
rather than possess a negative interpretation bias, which was supported in a study by 
Moser, Hajcak, Huppert, Foa and Simons (2008) using event-related brain potentials 
and in a correlational study by Huppert, Foa, Furr, Filip and Mathews (2003).  
Hirsch and Clark hypothesised that positive interpretation biases are used to repair 
mood in non-anxious individuals and that this process is blocked by negative self-
imagery in those who are socially anxious. 
Amir, Beard and Przeworski (2005) found that individuals with generalized 
social phobia (GSP) were unable to learn a non-threat meaning of a homograph in 
comparison to non-anxious controls (NACs).  Beard and Amir (2009) found that 
when threatening or benign words primed ambiguous sentences, NACs were more 
likely to endorse a benign interpretation and less likely to endorse a threatening 
interpretation compared to socially anxious individuals, who showed no preference 
for either.  Reaction time data suggested that threat interpretations were activated for 
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socially anxious individuals, but not for NACs.  The authors suggested that threat 
and benign interpretation biases should be treated as separate constructs when 
thinking about cognitive processing biases and the roles they play in causing and 
maintaining anxiety.  The results of the Huppert et al. (2003) study supported this 
view as they found only a modest correlation between positive and negative 
interpretation biases in participants with varying degrees of social anxiety.  These 
studies suggest that individuals with anxiety disorders are unable to disengage from 
threatening information which the NACs appeared to be able to do, perhaps as part 
of a mood repair mechanism. 
Research reviewed by Richards (2004) supported the view that there is 
automatic vigilance for threatening information, which is later avoided, and there is 
some evidence that this is compromised in individuals with post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Amir, Foa & Coles, 2002).   It may be that this strategic avoidance 
manifests itself as delayed disengagement from threatening information in those 
with high trait anxiety or clinical anxiety disorders (Fox, 2004).  Mogg and Bradley 
(2004) suggested that such avoidance occurs when the stimulus is too aversive as a 
protective fear response, but that attention is sometimes maintained when the level 
of threat is lower as a safety-seeking anxiety response.  It seems possible that 
individuals with clinical levels of anxiety perform this safety seeking response on 
information with much higher levels of perceived threat than non-clinically anxious 
individuals. 
Research undertaken with individuals with generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD) has similarly shown that they are more likely to interpret ambiguous 
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information in a threatening way, compared with NACs (MacLeod & Rutherford, 
2004).  It is also commonly accepted that individuals with agoraphobia and panic 
disorder interpret bodily sensations in a negative way when compared with 
individuals with social anxiety and NACs (Rosmarin, Bourque, Antony, & McCabe, 
2009; Stoler & McNally, 1991).  Westling and Öst (1995) showed that interpretation 
biases resolved for individuals with panic disorder following cognitive behavioural 
treatment. 
Individuals with GAD have been found to use antecedent information to 
interpret homographs used as primes in a threatening way, compared with low 
anxious individuals (Hazlett-Stevens & Borkovec, 2004).  Interestingly, the same 
individuals were unable to use non-threat cues to assist their interpretation of non-
threat homographs in comparison to low anxious individuals.  Again this suggests 
that individuals with clinical levels of anxiety are unable to strategically avoid 
threatening information, although since the effect occurred both with threat and non-
threat homographs, an explanation around being unable to disengage from threat 
seems unlikely.  It is possible that the clinically anxious individuals were unable to 
switch from substantive to motivated processing (Forgas, 2000a, 2000b). 
As the presence of cognitive processing biases in clinical and non-clinical 
anxiety seems well-established, research has since moved on to attempts to induce 
biases in order to ascertain causality in their relationship with anxiety. 
1.5.2 The Influence of Cognition on Mood 
In a review of several studies, Mathews and MacLeod (2002) stated that it 
was possible to induce both positive and negative interpretation biases, with 
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congruent changes in mood being reported only when individuals needed to actively 
generate meanings of ambiguous scenarios.  They concluded that changes in state 
anxiety can be induced by inducing biased processing of emotionally ambiguous 
information.  For example, Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) used the ‘ambiguous 
scenario’ method to induce either positive or negative interpretation biases in 
participants.  Scenarios with either a negative or a positive ending as a word 
fragment were presented, with the scenarios ending negatively containing both 
physical and social threat.  Participants’ interpretation biases were then measured 
using similar scenarios with ambiguous endings, followed by recognition ratings for 
sentences which either had a positive or a negative interpretation of the scenario and 
which had either similar or dissimilar content.  The results showed that participants 
in the positive condition showed a more positive bias through higher recognition of 
positive target items and participants in the negative condition showed a more 
negative bias through higher recognition of negative target items.  Congruent 
changes in mood were also noted and the authors suggested that it was possible that 
the procedure used to induce an interpretation bias had direct effects on mood.  
Additional studies found that the biases endured over a long time delay after the 
mood had decayed suggesting that it was the bias that had caused the mood and not 
vice versa and that the bias occurred at the time of encoding the information rather 
than at the time of testing.  When participants were not required to actively generate 
the ending of the scenario through completion of the word fragment, the effects of 
the training on interpretation biases and on anxiety disappeared.  
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Salemink, van den Hout and Kindt (2007a) replicated the study by Mathews 
and Mackintosh (2000) with the inclusion of a measure of participants’ awareness of 
the valence of their training.  They replicated the results found by Mathews and 
Mackintosh with regards to trained interpretation biases, but did not find congruent 
changes in mood or anxiety vulnerability (measured by mood response to a stressful 
anagram task) which they put down to differences in the sample between the two 
studies.  They did however find that participants were explicitly aware of the valence 
of their training, and the effect of training on interpretation biases disappeared when 
this was entered as a covariate into their main analysis.  They noted that this did not 
preclude the applicability of the results to naturalistic processes, especially as 
participants’ awareness of the valence of their responses on the recognition test was 
not measured (Teape, 2009). 
 Given that the method to induce biases and the recognition test were 
essentially the same task, Salemink, van den Hout and Kindt (2007b) replicated their 
study but included two further measures of interpretation bias in order to test 
whether participants had learnt what they termed as a ‘method-dependent strategy’.  
The first measure was implicit, the extrinsic affective Simon task (EAST; De 
Houwer, 2003) and the second allowed participants to report their own 
interpretations (rather than rating interpretations imposed by the experimenters), and 
was called the Ambiguous Social Situations Interpretation Questionnaire (ASSIQ; 
Stopa & Clark, 2000).  Whilst Mathews and Mackintosh’s (2000) results for 
interpretation biases using the recognition task were replicated for the positive 
training condition, no effects were seen for the negative training condition.  No 
 38
effects of training were found for either the EAST or the ASSIQ although reported 
power for the analysis for the EAST was low and the ASSIQ was designed for use in 
clinical populations and may not have been sensitive enough to detect changes in a 
non-clinical population.  Congruent effects on state anxiety were reported for both 
training conditions, and for trait anxiety for the positive training condition.  It 
therefore seemed possible that participants had learnt a method dependent strategy, 
and that no change in actual interpretation biases had occurred.  It was also still 
possible that the procedure had influenced anxiety rather than interpretation biases 
per se. 
Standage, Ashwin and Fox (2010) conducted two studies to test this 
hypothesis.  In the first study participants underwent cognitive bias modification 
(CBM) by reading positively or negatively valenced statements, and their bias was 
assessed through a scrambled sentences test (SST; Wenzlaff, 1993).  In the second 
study participants underwent a positive or a negative musical mood induction and 
had their biases assessed through the SST.  Whilst interpretation biases congruent 
with the CBM condition were seen in the first study, with congruent changes in 
mood, no interpretation biases were observed for the second study, although changes 
in mood congruent to the induction condition were observed.  As musical mood 
induction did not produce changes in interpretation biases when interpretation bias 
induction did, Standage et al. concluded that changes in interpretation bias could not 
be attributed solely to changes in mood since musical mood induction is not 
hypothesised to affect cognition.  However, the visual analogue scales that they used 
to measure mood were bipolar with ‘anxious’ and ‘relaxed’ at each end of the 
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anxiety scale and ‘happy’ and ‘depressed’ at each end of the depression scale.  As 
PA and NA should be measured independently it is difficult to be sure that the mood 
results are valid.  Nevertheless, when combined with the results of Mathews and 
Mackintosh (2000) it appears likely that interpretation bias affected mood, rather 
than the CBM procedure modifying mood which then modified interpretation bias.  
Given that the method used to assess biases in Standage et al. was different to the 
method used to induce the biases, it also seems unlikely that participants learnt a 
method dependent strategy and that the results revealed ‘true’ interpretation biases. 
Further research in this area demonstrated that inducing both positive and 
negative interpretation biases in clinically anxious, high trait anxious and non-
anxious individuals had congruent effects on social anxiety symptoms, thought 
intrusions, worry, self-imagery, state and trait anxiety, avoidance behaviour, 
emotional vulnerability, anxiety sensitivity and emotional reactivity (Beard & Amir, 
2008; Beard, Brady, Klumpp, Elias & Amir, 2005; Hayes, Hirsch, Krebs & 
Mathews, 2010; Hirsch, 2009; Hirsch, Mathews & Clark, 2007; Holmes, Mathews, 
Dalgliesh, & Mackintosh, 2006; Lange et al., 2010; Mackintosh, Mathews, Yiend, 
Ridgeway & Cook, 2006; Mathews, Ridgeway, Cook & Yiend, 2007; Murphy, 
Hirsch, Mathews, Smith & Clark, 2007; Salemink, van den Hout & Kindt, 2009; 
Salemink, van den Hout & Kindt, 2010; Steinman & Teachman, 2010; Wilson, 
MacLeod, Mathews & Rutherford, 2006).  A recent study by Beard and Amir (2010) 
found that negative interpretation of ambiguous social information mediated the 
relationship between social anxiety and state anxiety symptoms in response to a 
stressful speaking task in socially anxious participants.  The results of this study 
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provide further weight to the conclusion that the relationship between interpretation 
biases and anxiety is causal. 
Yiend, Mackintosh  and Mathews (2005) found that the effects of CBM 
endured over time periods of up to one day.  More ambiguous results were however 
seen in a study by Standage, Ashwin & Fox (2009), which aimed to investigate 
alternatives to visual presentation of CBM material.  Whilst negative interpretation 
biases were induced for both visual and auditory presentation, mood was seen to 
decrease for both the positive and the negative CBM conditions when the material 
was presented auditorily, which the authors suggested was due to the increased 
length of testing in that condition. 
Two recent studies also shed light on the mechanism behind the CBM 
results, finding firstly that CBM did not produce effects for lexical decisions about 
valenced words which were not homographs or homophones (Grey & Mathews, 
2009) and secondly that training involving active generation of word fragment 
meaning following presentation of ambiguous homographs resulted in greater effects 
on anxiety than did passive training (Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend & Mackintosh, 
2010a; Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend & Mackintosh, 2010b).  Both studies concluded 
that biased interpretations which affect mood only appear when two possible 
responses compete for resources, and not purely as a response bias to valenced 
targets. 
There is a wealth of evidence to suggest therefore that interpretation biases 
can have a causal effect on mood. 
 
 41
1.5.3 The Influence of Mood on Cognition 
Calvo, Eysenck and Castillo (1997) found a negative mood congruent 
interpretation bias in high as opposed to low-test anxious individuals who had been 
exposed to a stressful examination procedure intended to invoke an anxious mood.  
They used the ambiguous scenarios method described earlier, with reading times for 
the disambiguating positive or negative sentences indicating the direction of the 
interpretation bias.  Faster reading times were seen to indicate that meaning had 
already been accessed during reading of the scenarios.  The bias appeared to be 
generated when the participants initially encoded the information, rather than when 
they were later asked to retrieve it.  Also meanings did not appear to be accessed 
automatically when the disambiguating word in the sentence was read, but seemed 
to be accessed through integrative processing of the threat meaning. 
Calvo and Castillo (1997) similarly found mood congruent interpretation 
biases for high anxious individuals following an anxious mood induction, but not for 
low anxious participants in either an anxious or neutral mood induction.  The bias in 
the high anxious individuals was only present after time lags over 1,250 
milliseconds; again suggesting that integrative, motivated processing of all meanings 
occurred, followed by selection of a negatively biased interpretation.  It is possible 
that the low anxious participants initially demonstrated mood congruent biases 
which became mood incongruent over time as a result of a switch to motivated 
processing in order to repair mood.  As biases were not measured as a function of 
time such effects would have been lost in the analysis. 
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A study by Chen and Craske (1998) with university undergraduate 
participants found that change in anxiety states over the time around a stressful exam 
positively predicted change in interpretation bias for ambiguous exam-related 
information.  The authors recognised that such correlational evidence did not allow 
conclusions regarding the causality of the relationship between mood and 
interpretation bias to be drawn. 
The results of these studies appear to confirm that mood does have an effect 
on interpretation biases.  Mood incongruent interpretation biases were however not 
found, in contrast to predictions from the dual-process model.  There could be a 
number of explanations for this.  The mood congruent biases may have been 
activated through substantive processing early in the mood regulation process and 
later measurement would have revealed mood incongruent biases.  As mood was 
assessed before and after the mood induction (which was also the interpretation bias 
test) it is difficult to ascertain whether mood changed due to the mood induction 
itself, or due to the effects of the interpretation biases themselves. 
The role of context in the resolution of ambiguity was evidenced in a study 
by Blanchette and Richards (2003).  Participants in both an anxious and a control 
mood induction condition demonstrated both mood congruent and mood incongruent 
interpretation biases in a homophone spelling task, which depended on matching 
contextual information.   Anxiety was induced by telling participants that their 
performance on the interpretation bias test was being filmed and participants were 
presented with a contextual cue related to either the benign or negative interpretation 
of the homophone on a computer screen whilst listening to the homophone through 
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headphones.  The effect was stronger for participants induced into an anxious mood, 
and has been replicated in a more naturalistic setting with dental patients (Richards 
et al. 2007).  Richards (2004) suggested such effects could be attributed to a mood 
repair mechanism in operation, suggesting that contextual cues are able to override 
cues from mood and shift the individual into motivated processing.  The fact that the 
effect was stronger for the anxious participants may have been due to the fact that 
greater processing resources had been allocated to the threatening interpretations, 
allowing further motivated processing to repair the mood.  It would be interesting to 
find out whether the same results are observed in clinically anxious individuals.  If 
not, this suggests that clinically anxious individuals are not able to strategically 
avoid threatening information (Richards, 2004) or they are not able to implement 
mood repair mechanisms such as mood incongruent interpretation biases as part of 
motivated processing.  Whilst the result is interesting, it does not provide evidence 
for the assertion that interpretation biases are influenced by mood.  As Teape (2009) 
pointed out, the results could demonstrate an attentional bias for the threatening 
contextual cues, particularly as the presence of the video camera may have induced 
participants to try to do what they thought the experimenters wanted that is, pay 
attention to the contextual cues on screen. 
It seems possible therefore that mood incongruent interpretation biases form 
part of a range of responses designed to negate the impact of potentially threatening 
events (Taylor, 1991).  It seems likely that this occurs through the motivated and 
effortful process of diverting attention to benign interpretations.  For anxious 
individuals, it seems that it is difficult to switch into this motivated processing mode.  
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Although providing contextual information that there is no imminent danger helps, 
this does not seem to be sufficient for clinically anxious individuals.  It seems 
possible that mood incongruent interpretation biases also exist as response-focussed 
strategies, occurring after the anxiety state has been experienced and potential 
danger avoided, in order to return mood to a subjective set-point (Larsen, 2000a). 
1.5.4 Summary 
It now seems clear that high trait anxious (e.g., Richards & French, 1992) 
and clinically anxious individuals (e.g., Amir, Beard & Bower, 2005) are more 
likely to interpret threatening information in a negative way, and it is possible that 
the tendency to experience state anxiety in these individuals is due to a difficulty 
switching to motivated processing from substantive processing, the latter of which 
would be seen to cause the observed interpretation biases by the dual-process model. 
There is some evidence that inducing interpretation biases had congruent 
effects on mood (e.g., Hoppitt et al., 2010a), although the generalisability of the 
findings to more naturalistic processes is questionable due to participants’ apparent 
awareness of the valence of their training (Salemink et al., 2007a).  The large 
number of studies reporting similar results in this area and the study by Beard and 
Amir (2010) suggest that interpretation biases can have causal effects on mood.  A 
range of studies also demonstrated that both induced (Calvo & Castillo, 1997) and 
naturalistic mood (Chen & Craske,1998) produced congruent effects on 
interpretation biases, and that these biases appeared to be generated during semantic 
elaboration, rather than being produced automatically.  There is no evidence for 
mood incongruent interpretation biases acting to repair mood as the dual-process 
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model predicts, although as biases were not measured at different time points in the 
studies reviewed it is possible that biases changed over time.  None of the studies 
reviewed investigated the possibility of an interaction between mood and 
interpretation biases as the dual-process model predicts.  Whilst the model can 
account for most of the findings reviewed such that mood congruent effects of 
cognition on mood could be seen as substantive processing and mood incongruent 
effects could be seen as motivated processing, the limited information available as to 
the time-point in the mood repair mechanism that such biases were observed makes 
any definitive conclusions impossible to draw.  Future research would benefit from a 
direct focus on measurement of biases over time to delineate the potential switch 
from substantive to motivated processing, and to provide information about the time 
course for such a switch.  It would also be interesting to compare the mechanism in 
individuals low and high on measures of trait anxiety to determine if this individual 
difference affects the performance of the proposed mood repair mechanism. 
1.6 The Bi-Directional Relationship of Mood and Interpretation Biases 
Two unpublished studies (Hunter, Mackintosh & Eckstein, 2006; 
Vinnicombe, Mackintosh & Eckstein, 2006) found evidence for a mood incongruent 
response bias in those low trait anxious individuals who had undergone a negative 
but not a positive mood induction. Mood was induced using film clips, with the 
ambiguous scenarios method used to assess interpretation biases and music 
perceived to be congruent to the mood induction condition was played during the 
reading of the scenarios in an attempt to get participants to maintain their mood.  
Mood was assessed before the mood induction, after the mood induction and after 
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the recognition test.  The authors suggested that the observed effects should be 
attributed to a mood repair mechanism in line with the dual-process model since the 
effect was not seen in the positive mood induction, and was only observed for social 
and not physical information as different regulatory processes occur for social and 
physical threat information (Otto & Hupka, 1999).  The authors also suggested that 
mood repair could explain their results as mood was seen to change congruent to the 
mood induction, and then returned to baseline after the interpretation bias test for 
participants in both mood induction conditions. 
The authors suggested that the results could equally be viewed as a contrast 
effect, for example, information in the interpretation bias test seemed more positive 
because the individual compared it to the negative content of the film used to induce 
mood, which was completely unrelated to their current mood state.  However, this 
seemed unlikely due to the lack of mood incongruent effects in the positive mood 
induction condition. Furthermore, whilst the mood induction method itself was 
validated through pre- and post- measurement of mood, the effect of music played 
during the interpretation bias test (with the aim of maintaining the mood) was not 
measured and it is possible that it was at the very least distracting or at worst 
undermined the effects of the mood induction as music has been shown to have 
differential effects depending on previous experience (Carter, Wilson, Lawson, & 
Bulik, 1995).  Mood was also only assessed on a single, unipolar scale meaning that 
changes in positive affect may have been masked by changes in negative affect and 
vice versa, as it has been shown that positive and negative affect are separate 
constructs requiring distinct measurement. 
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The current study aimed to replicate Hunter et al. (2006) and Vinnicombe et 
al. (2006) in order to correct some of the above methodological problems, to extend 
the results to individuals with high trait anxiety and also to include the variable of 
time in order to ascertain if a switch from substantive, mood congruent processing, 
to motivated, mood incongruent processing would be observed.  Since previous 
research seemed to suggest that mood incongruent response biases functioned to 
repair anxious mood in low trait anxious individuals it seemed important to test this 
by experimentally manipulating mood and observing the effects on both 
interpretation bias and mood, as this has yet to be done.  It also seems important to 
extend the research to individuals high in trait anxiety, as previous research suggests 
that such individuals may be compromised in their ability to repair mood using 
interpretation biases. 
Clinically, the research is important as it will aid understanding of the way 
mood is regulated in non-clinical populations.  Such an understanding will help to 
evaluate how regulation of mood may break down in those suffering from clinical 
anxiety disorders and in what circumstances.  A review by Tice and Bratslavsky 
(2000) cited studies looking at failures in mood regulation, which found that those 
who expend lots of energy in trying to modulate negative affect often fail because it 
is necessary to work out all the ways to stop negative affect from being produced.  
They also said moods are difficult to control when your energy is depleted from 
engaging in other self-control tasks and this might explain why individuals suffering 
with clinical mood disorders may struggle to switch from substantive to motivated 
processing (Beevers, 2005). 
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Indeed interventions which use training of motivated processing in those 
with clinical levels of anxiety have shown some promising initial results (e.g., Beard 
& Amir, 2008) and the current research will help to direct future developments in 
this technique. 
1.6.1 The Proposed Study 
The study was conducted by myself and a fellow trainee clinical 
psychologist, Lynda Teape.  Lynda undertook what is reported as experiment 1 in 
the current research (Teape, 2009), whilst I undertook what is reported as 
experiment 2.  Both experiments aimed to investigate the effects of positive and 
anxious mood induction on interpretation bias as a function of time in low and high 
trait anxious individuals.  The experiments also aimed to investigate the effects of 
mood induction on mood at times 1, 2 and 3 (before and after the mood induction, 
and after the interpretation bias test).  Additionally, all participants in experiment 2 
undertook the interpretation bias measure alongside another cognitive task, 
hypothesised to block motivated processing since previous research has suggested 
that this requires cognitive processing capacity.  The addition of a cognitive load 
will help to add more weight to the argument that effort is necessary for motivated 
processing to occur if it is found that motivated processing does not occur when 
cognitive processing capacity is limited.  The positive mood induction was included 
as a control for the effects of context in order to test predictions from the social 
constraints model, as this would suggest no differences between a positive and 
negative mood induction undertaken in the same context. Indeed contrast effects as 
mentioned by Hunter et al. (2006) and Vinnicombe et al. (2006) would result in the 
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same pattern of results.  If predictions from the hedonistic model are correct, 
differences will be observed between the positive and negative mood inductions, as 
participants will be motivated to maintain a positive mood but to repair an anxious 
mood.  However, if predictions from the dual-process model are correct, high 
anxious participants will not be able to repair an anxious mood as they will not be 
able to disengage from substantive, mood congruent processing. 
1.6.1.1 Experiment 1 
In experiment 1 it was predicted that for the anxious mood induction, high 
anxious participants would show mood congruent interpretation biases throughout 
the test as there is evidence that they will be unable to shift from substantive to 
motivated processing (Amir et al., 2002; Beard & Amir, 2009; Eysenck et al., 1991; 
Fox, 2004; Hirsch & Clark, 2004; Hirsch & Mathews, 1997) perhaps due to 
expectations not being violated as predicted by Beevers (2005).  This will result in 
mood maintenance.  In contrast it was predicted that low anxious participants would 
show a switch from mood congruent to mood incongruent biases with resulting 
return of mood to baseline.  In the positive mood induction for experiment 1 it was 
predicted that both high and low anxious participants would show mood congruent 
interpretation biases resulting in mood maintenance. 
1.6.1.2 Experiment 2 
In the anxious mood induction in experiment 2 it was predicted that both 
high and low anxious participants would show mood congruent interpretation biases 
throughout the test due to an inability to switch from substantive to motivated 
processing due to insufficient cognitive resources as a result of the cognitive load 
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(Beevers, 2005; Erber & Erber, 1994; Erber & Tesser, 1992; Ottati & Isbell; 1996).  
It was predicted that an anxious mood would be maintained.  In the positive mood 
induction it was predicted that both high and low anxious participants would show 
mood congruent interpretation biases throughout the test with a positive mood being 
maintained. 
1.6.1.3 Hypotheses 
Experiment 1a – Anxious mood induction, no cognitive load 
1. High trait anxious participants 
a. Participants will show mood congruent interpretation biases 
throughout the test. 
b. Participants will show a more negative mood at times 2 and 3 than at 
time 1. 
2. Low trait anxious participants 
a. Participants will show an initially mood congruent interpretation bias 
in the first half of the test, changing to a more positive, mood 
incongruent interpretation bias in the second half of the test. 
b. Participants will show a more negative mood at time 2 than at times 1 
and 3. 
Experiment 1b – Positive mood induction, no cognitive load 
1. High trait anxious participants 
a. Participants will show a mood congruent interpretation bias 
throughout the test. 
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b. Participants will show a more positive mood at times 2 and 3 than 
at time 1. 
2. Low trait anxious participants 
a. Participants will show a mood congruent interpretation bias 
throughout the test. 
b. Participants will show a more positive mood at times 2 and 3 than 
at time 1. 
Experiment 2a – Anxious mood induction with a cognitive load 
1. High trait anxious participants 
a. Participants will show a mood congruent interpretation bias 
throughout the test. 
b. Participants will show a more negative mood at times 2 and 3 than at 
time 1. 
2. Low trait anxious participants 
a. Participants will show a mood congruent interpretation bias 
throughout the test. 
b. Participants will show a more negative mood at times 2 and 3 than at 
time 1. 
Experiment 2b – Positive mood induction with a cognitive load 
1. High trait anxious participants 
a. Participants will show a mood congruent interpretation bias 
throughout the test. 
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b. Participants will show a more positive mood at times 2 and 3 than at 
time 1. 
2. Low trait anxious participants 
a. Participants will show a mood congruent interpretation bias 
throughout the test. 
b. Participants will show a more positive mood at times 2 and 3 than at 
time 1. 
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CHAPTER 2:  METHOD 
2.1 Overview 
 The methods for experiments 1 and 2 were mostly the same.  Details of the 
methods for experiments 1a and 1b are therefore given first in section 2.2; following 
which details of any changes to this for experiments 2a and 2b are detailed in section 
2.3.  Within section 2.2 a summary of the design is presented in section 2.2.1, 
following which details of participant recruitment is given in section 2.2.2.  An 
overview of the measures used, along with a rationale for their use is given in 
section 2.2.3.  There follows detailed consideration of the materials used for the 
mood induction and interpretation bias test in section 2.2.4, along with a rationale 
for their use.  Ethical considerations are discussed in section 2.2.5, with a detailed 
account of the procedure described in section 2.2.6.  Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 detail 
changes to the measures and procedure respectively for experiment 2.  The chapter is 
concluded with details of the plans for data analysis in section 2.4. 
2.2 Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 was run by Lynda Teape and was reported in full in Teape 
(2009). 
2.2.1 Design 
To test predictions regarding mood following an anxious and a positive 
mood induction, an experimental 2x3 mixed design was used for each of 
experiments 1a (anxious mood induction) and 1b (positive mood induction).  The 
dependent variable was mood score, the between subjects variable was anxiety 
condition (high or low) and the within subjects variable was time (1: before the 
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mood induction, 2: after the mood induction and 3: after the interpretation bias test).  
To test predictions regarding interpretation biases, an experimental 2x2x2x2 mixed 
design was used.  The dependent variable was sentence recognition rating, the 
between subjects variable was anxiety condition (high or low) and the within 
subjects variables were item type (target or foil), item valence (positive or negative) 
and test half (first half or second half).  The design of the study is shown in figure 
2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Design of experiments 1a and 1b, anxious and positive mood inductions 
 
Participants’ mood was assessed at three time points, before the mood 
induction, immediately after the mood induction, and immediately after completing 
the interpretation bias test.  Interpretation bias was assessed once, immediately after 
the mood induction.  Mood was measured repeatedly to ensure that the mood 
induction had worked.  Although it would have been ideal to repeatedly measure 
interpretation bias in addition to mood, measures with sufficient test re-test 
reliability to do this are still under development.  Manipulating mood 
experimentally, and observing the effect on interpretation bias, along with the 
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resulting effect on mood allows the role of interpretation biases in mood repair to be 
determined. 
2.2.2 Participants 
 Participants were students and staff at the University of East Anglia (UEA) 
recruited via campus advertisements, from a psychology research volunteer website 
and emails sent out to school mailing lists of students and staff (Appendix A).  
Emails included a copy of the study information sheet (Appendix B).  The 
information sheet clearly stated that the study might induce negative emotions that 
participants could find distressing and that they were free to withdraw at any point 
without any adverse impact on their studies at the University.  The information sheet 
also contained contact details if further information was required, if a complaint 
needed to be made, or if the participant suffered distress as a result of participation 
in the study.   
2.2.2.1 Inclusion Criteria 
Participants over the age of 18 years were included in the study.  As the 
questionnaires and interpretation bias measures required fluent English and reading 
ability, participants were excluded if they were not a native English speaker, or if 
they had not lived in an English speaking country since the age of 10.  This latter 
criterion was imposed as a response bias was noted in non-native English 
participants who claimed to be fluent in English in a separate but related study 
(personal communication, B. Mackintosh, October 2008).  Participants with trait 
anxiety scores in the high or low anxious range were also included, and this will be 
further defined in section 2.2.3.2.1. 
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2.2.2.2 Exclusion Criteria 
It was intended that those who showed signs of repressive coping 
characterised by low levels of reported trait anxiety and high levels of defensiveness 
would be excluded as such individuals often experienced higher levels of anxiety 
than they reported (Weinberger, Schwartz & Davidson, 1979).  This has the effect of 
reducing any effects observed between anxiety conditions, as participants are not 
validly allocated to high or low anxious conditions.  Participants were excluded if 
they had taken part in a similar study in the past.  Participants who identified 
themselves as having suffered from a mental illness within the last five years were 
excluded to avoid the risk of invoking distress by inducing anxious mood and to 
ensure that the sample was representative of a non-clinical population.  Similarly, 
any participants who demonstrated clinical levels of anxiety or depression on the 
screening measures (discussed in section 2.2.3.2) were also excluded as a condition 
of the study’s ethical approval.  Participants who identified themselves as having a 
learning difficulty were also excluded to ensure participants could undertake the 
reading elements of the task.  Participants excluded due to mental illness, trait 
anxiety or repression scores were told that participants with specific demographic 
characteristics were being sought in order to match samples to avoid causing 
unnecessary distress. A non-clinical population was chosen to be able to compare 
directly with Hunter et al. (2006) and Vinnicombe et al. (2006) and to understand the 
possible mood repair mechanisms operating in healthy volunteers.  
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2.2.2.3 Sample Size 
As the current research base is small, estimating the likely number of 
participants required to ensure detection of an effect was difficult.  If the effect size 
for the interaction between sentence valance and mood induction found to be 
significant by Hunter et al. (2006) and Vinnicombe et al. (2006) is used, then 20 
participants in each anxiety condition, for each experiment, would be needed to 
achieve this effect at the 0.05 level of significance with 80% power.  Therefore it 
was aimed to recruit 40 participants to experiment 1a and 40 to experiment 1b.  The 
full power calculation is detailed in Appendix C. 
2.2.3Measures 
2.2.3.1 Demographics 
A demographic questionnaire (Appendix D) was used to collect information 
about all participants who responded to recruitment advertisements at the screening 
stage, before attendance at the study session. 
2.2.3.2 Screening 
2.2.3.2.1 Anxiety. 
As only participants who were high or low in trait anxiety scores were to be 
included a brief screening tool was needed to identify participants who might have 
trait anxiety scores that fell in that range.  Participants were screened using a 
shortened version of the trait scale of the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI; Spielberger, 1983) called the Mackintosh and Mathews Anxiety 
Questionnaires (MANX; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2006; Appendix E).  The MANX 
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is a 10 item self report instrument assessing trait anxiety, defined as an individual’s 
predisposition to anxiety when faced with possible danger (“Anxiety”, 1999).  It 
gives a total score out of 30, with higher scores indicating higher anxiety levels.  It is 
not formally standardised, but its reliability and validity were sufficient as a brief 
screen since the STAI was used to formally allocate participants to groups.  The 
MANX has been used successfully as a brief screen in similar studies and has a high 
correlation of .90 with the STAI and has good internal consistency with Cronbach’s 
alpha  .93, (B. Mackintosh, personal communication, February 1, 2008).  Scores on 
the MANX can be converted to predicted scores on the STAI using the formula 
(MANX x 2.3) + 8.8 = STAI (Mackintosh & Mathews, 2006).  It was used to 
identify participants likely to have scores on the trait scale of the STAI below 38 and 
above 48 (13 and 17 respectively on the MANX), which were the boundaries for the 
lower and upper third of participants tested by Lambie and Baker (2003) in a student 
population. 
2.2.3.2.2 Repression. 
As only participants who were truly high or low in trait anxiety score were to 
be included a brief screening tool was needed to identify participants who might 
report low trait anxiety as they are subjectively unaware of experiencing anxiety, but 
in fact objectively experience similar symptoms and behaviours as those who report 
high trait anxiety (Lambie & Baker, 2003).  As repression is characterised by high 
levels of defensiveness along with low levels of reported trait anxiety a shortened 
version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (S-MCSDS; Reynolds, 
1982, Appendix F) was used to identify defensive responding.  The S-MCSDS 
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(Reynolds, 1982) was developed from the full MCSDS (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) 
which has been widely used in research to identify socially desirable and defensive 
responding.  The S-MCSDS is a 13 item self-report measure, giving a total score out 
of 13 with higher scores indicating more socially desirable responding.  It has 
acceptable Kuder-Richardson reliability of .76 and correlates highly (.93) with the 
MCSDS (Reynolds, 1982).  As previous research (Lambie & Baker, 2003) found 
that university students with scores in the lower third on the trait scale of the STAI 
and in the upper third for the MCSDS show a repressive coping style, individuals 
returning screening questionnaires with MANX scores below 7 and S-MCSDS 
scores above 6 were not invited to participate. 
2.2.3.3 Trait Anxiety 
In order to confirm predictions from the MANX and to finally allocate 
participants to the high or low trait anxious conditions participants completed a 
measure of trait anxiety prior to the mood induction.  The trait scale of the STAI is a 
20 item self-report questionnaire with a minimum score of 20 and a maximum score 
of 80.  It has been standardised on several groups, including university students.  It 
has been extensively used in similar research studies and has acceptable test-retest 
reliability ranging between .73 and .86 and good internal consistency of .90 
(Spielberger, 1983).  In terms of validity, the trait scale of the STAI discriminated 
well between individuals with and without anxiety disorders and showed high 
correlations (.73 - .85) with other measures of trait anxiety (Spielberger, 1983). 
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2.2.3.4 Depression 
In order to identify participants with clinical levels of depression all 
participants completed a measure of depression before the mood induction 
procedure.  The Beck Depression Inventory - II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Brown, 
1996) is a 21 item self-report questionnaire assessing severity of depressive 
symptoms.  It gives a total score out of 63, with higher scores indicating more severe 
symptoms.  It has good test-retest reliability and internal consistency of .93.  In 
terms of validity it discriminated well between patients with and without mood 
disorders and showed high correlations (.71 - .93) with other measures of depression 
(Beck et al., 1996).  Kaiser’s measure of sampling adequacy (Dziuban & Shirkey, 
1974) was ..95 for the intercorrelations of the sampling matrix for psychiatric 
outpatients which is considered to show that the BDI-II has very good factorial 
validity.  
2.2.3.5 Current Mood 
Eight visual analogue scales (VAS, Appendix G) were used to assess the 
effectiveness of the mood induction, and any subsequent changes in mood over the 
course of the testing session, as this was the measure used by Hunter et al. (2006) 
and Vinnicombe et al. (2006).  The VAS was developed from the brief mood 
introspection scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988), which was developed from 
Watson and Tellegen’s (1985) model of affective states, with two items each 
representing high and low PA and high and low NA.  As Hunter et al. (2006) and 
Vinnicombe et al. (2006) averaged ratings on all eight scales to provide a single 
rating of mood, it is possible that changes in PA could have been obscured by 
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changes in NA as the two are seen to be independent constructs (see chapter 1).  
This was not therefore repeated in this study, with scores on high and low NA being 
entered into the analysis for experiment 1a, and scores on high and low PA being 
entered into the analysis for experiment 1b. 
Participants were asked to place a mark on a horizontal line, anchored by the 
statements ‘very much less’ and ‘very much more’.  The eight VAS were presented 
in a random order for each assessment of mood.  A score in millimetres is given for 
the distance of the participant’s mark from the ‘very much less’ end of the line for 
each mood.  A VAS for anxiety was found to have good criterion validity of .30 
when compared with the state scale of the STAI (Hornblow & Kidson, 1976).  As 
participants who had greater knowledge of anxiety were more likely to use the VAS 
as a continuous scale they suggested that providing information about the nature of 
the construct could improve its validity.  This was achieved by the use of the STAI 
prior to the VAS in the present study, mirroring the procedure of Hornblow and 
Kidson (1976).  Hornblow and Kidson also found a test-retest reliability coefficient 
for their VAS “very close to the median test-retest reliability coefficient of .32 
reported . . . for the STAI (State) anxiety scale.” (p.340, Hornblow & Kidson, 1976).  
Similar visual analogue scales have also been shown to be both reliable and valid 
when assessing related phenomena (Gift, 1989), and an electronic version showed 
exceptional concurrent validity of .98 with the VAS (van Duinen, Rickelt &  Griez, 
2008).  It was used because, unlike most standardised measures of mood, it is 
extremely simple and quick to complete, which should reduce the likelihood of 
induced moods decaying over time. 
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2.2.4 Materials 
2.2.4.1 Mood Induction 
It was necessary to choose a method that validly induced an anxious and a 
positive mood, and also to keep the method as close as possible to that used by 
Hunter et al. (2006) and Vinnicombe et al. (2006) in order to be able to compare the 
results.  As discussed in chapter 1, the reliability and validity of the mood induction 
procedure was not known, and it is possible that the use of music had a confounding 
effect on those of the films, due to differential effects of different music for different 
people. 
Inducing moods using films was found to be more successful than other 
methods such as social vignettes or photos (Gerrards-Hesse, Spies & Hesse, 1994; 
Westermann, Spies, Stahl & Hesse, 1996).  Clips from the films ‘Halloween’ and 
‘The Silence of the Lambs’ for the anxious mood induction in experiment 1a and 
‘When Harry Met Sally’ and ‘An Officer and a Gentleman’ for the positive mood 
induction in experiment 1b were therefore used.  These clips were shown to elicit the 
moods of fear (for ‘Halloween’ and ‘The Silence of the Lambs’), amusement, 
pleasure and happiness (for ‘When Harry Met Sally’ and ‘An Officer and a 
Gentleman’) consistently more often than any other emotion (Hewig et al., 2005).  
As the clips were relatively short (up to three minutes in length) both clips for each 
mood induction were shown in order to maximise the degree of the mood induced.  
Please see tables 2.1 and 2.2 for details of the clips used and editing guidelines for 
the anxious and positive mood inductions respectively. 
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Table 2.1:  Film clips for the anxious mood induction. 
Film Silence of the Lambs 
 Editing instructions from Gross and Levenson (1995) 
Clip 
description 
Clarice is on the hunt for a serial killer and goes to interview James.  
She follows him into the basement and is faced with a gruesome sight. 
Editing 
guidelines 
Start:  Camera shot of woodland, with a green caravan in the left of 
the scene.  Camera pans across to left over rail tracks to a house with a 
grey car parked outside.  End:  Clarice enters the basement, metal wire 
is hanging down and appears to touch her nose.  Re-start:  A hand 
holding gun moves rapidly across the screen with yellow wallpaper in 
the background.  End:  After the gruesome sight in the bath, the lights 
go out and she gasps. 
Clip length 2’15’’ 
Target 
emotion 
Fear 
Film Halloween 
 Editing instructions from Philippot (1993) 
Clip 
description 
Laurie arrives to babysit but finds no one home.  She explores the 
house a finds a corpse, whilst pursued by the killer. 
Editing 
guidelines 
Start:  Laurie is in the house in the dark where she has arrived to 
babysit but no one is home.  End:  Having seen the corpse in the 
wardrobe, she moves away and the murderer raises the knife behind 
her, end just before he lowers the knife. 
Clip length 0’58’’ 
Target 
emotion 
Fear 
Specific clip times have not been provided as these tend to differ depending on the 
recorded format. 
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Table 2.2:  Film clips for the positive mood induction. 
Film When Harry Met Sally 
 Editing instructions from Philippot (1993) 
Clip 
description 
Sally (Meg Ryan) is faking an orgasm at the table of a restaurant. 
Editing 
guidelines 
Start:  Camera pans across restaurant to Sally and Harry sat at a table 
discussing Harry’s previous relationships. 
End:  Woman at next table places her order “I’ll have what she’s 
having”. 
Clip length 2’45’’ 
Target 
emotion 
Amusement 
Film An Officer and a Gentleman 
 Editing instructions from Tomarken, Davidson, and Henriques (1990). 
Clip 
description 
Paula is working in a factory.  Zack comes in, kisses her and carries 
her out of the factory. 
Editing 
guidelines 
Start:  Final scene of film set in the factory.  Camera shot of machine 
and Zak (officer) is seen to appear from behind the machine entering 
the factory.  End:  Zak carries Paula out of the factory.  End before 
credits appear. 
Clip length 2’08’’ 
Target 
emotion 
Amusement 
Specific clip times have not been provided as these tend to differ depending on the 
recorded format. 
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As reviewed by Teape (2009), whilst there is evidence that music is effective 
when inducing moods (Bruner, 1990), which piece of music is effective differs 
between individuals, and is also dependent on context and current mood state 
(Crozier, 1997).  Music was therefore not used as an addition to the films due to its 
potential diluting effects on the induced mood. 
The four selected film clips were piloted on a small sample of six individuals 
by Teape (2009) which demonstrated that there were significant differences in the 
valence and affect induced by the four clips.  The differences were found to be in the 
expected direction for each clip and demonstrate that the clips induced the moods 
intended. 
2.2.4.2 Measure of Interpretation Bias. 
In order to be able to validly compare the results of this study with those of 
Hunter et al. (2006) and Vinnicombe et al. (2006) the ambiguous scenarios method 
was used to assess participants’ interpretation biases following the mood induction.  
This method is also preferable over for example, the homograph method, as it 
enables both social and physical threat to be investigated, which is especially 
important as the content of the films for the anxious mood induction is more related 
to physical threat information, whereas content for the positive mood induction is 
more related to social information.  The ambiguous scenario method also allows true 
interpretation biases to be differentiated from positive or negative response biases, 
due to the inclusion of target and foil items in the recognition test.  The recognition 
test part of the measure was validated by Salemink and Van Den Hout (2010) where 
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it was shown to discriminate between individuals low and high in neuroticism, 
regardless of induced mood. 
In the ambiguous scenario method, participants are presented with 20 
vignettes of ambiguous scenarios, 10 with a social theme and 10 a physical theme.  
They were presented line by line on a computer screen, with the final word 
incomplete which participants must complete in order to make sense of the content.  
This is followed by a simple yes/no question to ensure participants actively process 
the content of the vignette.  For example, one vignette was as follows: 
 
The wedding reception 
Your friend asks you to give a speech at her wedding reception. You prepare 
some remarks and when the time comes, get to your feet. As you speak, you 
notice some people in the audience start to L—gh. 
Press the down arrow key when you have identified the incomplete word. 
Then find and press the letter key corresponding to the first missing letter of 
the incomplete word. 
“Did you get up to speak” Y/N? 
  
This was followed by a recognition test, consisting of a series of four 
statements corresponding to each vignette presented one by one on a computer 
screen.  Whilst the content of the statements did not exactly match the content of the 
vignettes, two were targets, with similar content to the vignettes, and two were foils, 
with content not closely related to the vignette.  Of these, two were a positive and 
two a negative possible interpretation of the vignette.  Participants were required to 
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rate on a four point scale ranging from ‘very different meaning’ to ‘very similar 
meaning’ how closely each of the sentences resembled the vignette.  The statements 
related to the example above were: 
 
The wedding reception 
A) As you speak, people in the audience laugh appreciatively (positive target) 
B) As you speak, people in the audience find your efforts laughable (negative 
target) 
C) As you speak, some people in the audience start to yawn (negative foil) 
D) As you speak, people in the audience applaud your comments (positive foil) 
 
This method of assessing interpretation bias was originally reported by 
Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) where significant differences between positive and 
negative interpretations were consistently found between groups who had been 
trained to interpret in a positive or a negative way respectively.  An interpretation 
bias was evidenced in this study by an interaction of sentence type (target or foil) 
and sentence valence (positive or negative).  This measure has advantages over other 
measures of interpretation bias such as the homophone method, as it enables a 
distinction to be made between positive or negative response biases, and true 
interpretation biases.  Using this method a response bias would be evident from a 
main effect of sentence valence, without the interaction with sentence type.  It seems 
clear that the measure has face validity, and Eysenck et al. (1991) found that it 
discriminated between individuals with generalised anxiety disorder (GAD), 
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individuals who had recovered from GAD and matched control participants when 
using a shortened version of the same method.  Details of all vignettes and their 
associated sentences, which were adapted from Mathews and Mackintosh can be 
found in Appendix H. 
2.2.5 Ethical Considerations 
Potential participants were sent an information sheet (Appendix B) regarding 
the study, and those participants who signed up for the study session were given a 
further opportunity to read this, as well as an opportunity to ask questions about the 
study.  Participants who attended the study session signed a consent form (Appendix 
I) if they agreed to participate following reading the information sheet and asking 
questions of the experimenter.  It was therefore ensured that participants understood 
that the study might induce negative emotions that they might find distressing and 
that they were free to withdraw at any point without any adverse impact on their 
studies at the University.  The information sheet contained contact details if further 
information was required, if a complaint needed to be made, or if the participant had 
suffered distress as a result of participation in the study.  As a trainee clinical 
psychologist, the experimenter was trained and experienced in helping individuals 
cope with difficult emotions, and also had access to supervision from a qualified 
clinical psychologist so was able to provide support to participants who did find the 
negative film clips distressing. 
Those scoring in the clinically anxious and/or depressed ranges on the trait 
scale of the STAI or the BDI-II, taken to be three standard deviations above the 
mean score in the respective normative sample, were diverted to the positive mood 
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induction (with their data excluded from analysis) and were given advice regarding 
where to access help.  It was intended that the participant would be asked to return to 
a later testing session if participants in their session were all in the negative mood 
induction condition in order not to dilute the effects of the mood induction.  
However in practice when this occurred, there were no other participants present in 
that session, so the participant was shown the positive film clip immediately. 
As the procedure involved intentionally invoking negative emotions it was 
possible that some participants would become significantly distressed, although the 
procedures have been well tolerated in the past.  All participants were asked before 
leaving the testing session to rate their current mood and any participants that did not 
feel that their emotional state was manageable had their needs assessed by the 
experimenter and appropriate action taken for example, talking through their 
thoughts and feelings.  All participants in the anxious mood induction condition 
were given the opportunity to watch the positive film clips at the end of the testing 
session. 
All personally identifiable information collected about participants was kept 
strictly confidential.  Participants were allocated a participant number which was 
used to identify data pertaining to them. The information matching this code to 
participants’ identifiable details was held in an encrypted computer file, separate 
from other data.  Whilst the study was undertaken data were stored in a safe in the 
researcher’s home.  After the study has been completed data will be stored in a 
locked archive room at the University of East Anglia. 
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Participants were paid £5 in exchange for the time they had given up in 
taking part and were given an information sheet regarding advice and support for 
mental health problems available at the University and in the surrounding area 
(Appendix J).  It was necessary to deceive participants as to the specific hypotheses 
being investigated so as not to bias responses.  Whilst they were told they would 
read vignettes, they were not told about the recognition task.  However it was not 
expected that any aspect of the deception would be distressing for participants, 
particularly as research in the field often involves this kind of deception following 
which no participant distress has been reported.    Participants were fully debriefed 
at the end of the study session and information given about where to access further 
sources of help if appropriate. 
Participants excluded at the screening stage due to a history of mental illness, 
reported learning difficulty, or scores on the MANX in the mid-anxious range were 
told that the study was aiming to recruit participants with specific characteristics and 
therefore not every participant who applied was being invited to the study session.  
Participants excluded at the screening stage or at the study session due to trait 
anxiety or depression scores were informed of this, and directed to possible sources 
of help and support.  Participants excluded due to repression scores were not 
informed of this.  Repression is seen as a form of defence against anxiety (Teape, 
2009) of which individuals are mostly not aware (Derakshan & Eysenck, 1999) and 
to inform individuals of a repressive coping style could be damaging as it may 
expose them to emotions which may be intolerable for them. 
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Ethical approval for the study was granted by the University of East Anglia, 
Faculty of Health Ethics Committee on 1st August 2008, with approved amendments 
made on 22nd October 2008 (Appendices K and L). 
2.2.6 Procedure 
A flow diagram of the procedure is shown in Appendix M.  Upon receiving 
ethical approval for the study from the University’s ethics committee, consent to 
recruit students as participants from UEA heads of schools was sought.  When this 
consent was obtained, emails were sent to all students in the school inviting them to 
participate in a psychology experiment, including copies of the participant 
information sheet, demographic questionnaire, MANX and S-MCSDS.  Interested 
students returned the questionnaires by e-mail.  Advertisements were also placed 
around campus on school notice-boards and flyers were given to participants 
attending the study session to pass on to interested friends.  Students and staff who 
responded to these adverts were emailed a copy of the information sheet and both 
questionnaires. 
Participants who scored in the high or low anxious range on the MANX and 
who met the inclusion criteria were sent a link to an online scheduler to book a 
suitable time slot to attend for a testing session (Appendix N). 
Participants who did not meet the inclusion criteria were thanked for their 
interest in the study and were provided with details of a website where they could 
view details of further psychology experiments running at the University that they 
might wish to sign up for (Appendix O). 
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2.2.6.1 Participant Allocation to Experiment 
Experiments 1 and 2 were planned to run as a collaborative project as part of 
the Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology at the University of East Anglia.  
Experiment 1 was to be run and reported by Lynda Teape, and experiment 2 by the 
author.  Participants were to be allocated to a testing session as soon as they 
expressed an interest, in order to avoid participant attrition.  As a result it was not 
possible to fully randomise participants to experiments, as this would have required 
waiting for all participants’ details to be available.  It was therefore decided to 
alternately allocate experimental sessions accommodating up to five participants 
each as experiment 1a, 1b, 2a or 2b.  It was hoped this would prevent dilution of 
mood effects as participants in each session would either be watching the positive or 
the anxious films.  Eligible participants then signed up to a convenient testing 
session, without any knowledge as to which experiment they would take part in.  It 
was further planned that each experimenter would run sessions for both experiments 
1 and 2, in order to avoid experimenter bias. 
Initial allocation of participants to experiments occurred in the way 
described.  However due to a change in the author’s personal circumstances, only a 
small number of participants were recruited in the way described, with data 
collection and analysis for experiment 1 being completed significantly before that 
for experiment 2. 
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2.2.6.2 Testing Conditions 
Participants were tested in the same room in a computer laboratory on the 
university campus.  The laboratory contained 20 computers, segregated by privacy 
screens. 
2.2.6.3 Apparatus 
Each participant sat at a workstation with a desktop computer, keyboard and 
mouse.  Participants wore headphones firstly so that they could hear the soundtrack 
in the film clips, but secondly to block out background noise in the room for 
example, when the experimenter spoke to other participants to give them 
instructions. 
E-prime (Schneider, Eschmann, & Zuccolotto, 2002) was used to present the 
STAI, VAS and interpretation bias test.  E-prime also recorded participants’ 
responses for the data analysis.  Participants completed a paper copy of the BDI-II.  
The film clips were edited using Wondershare Video Converter Suite (Wondershare 
Software Company Ltd, 2008) and were presented on the computer using Windows 
Media Player (Microsoft, 2004). 
2.2.6.4 Procedure 
During the testing session participants first signed the consent form and then 
completed the trait scale of the STAI on the computer after reading the following 
instructions: 
A number of statements, which people have used to describe themselves, will 
be displayed on the screen. 
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Please read each statement and then tick the appropriate box to the right of 
the statement to indicate how you GENERALLY feel. 
There are no right or wrong answers but you will be unable to go back to the 
previous question if you make a mistake. 
Do not spend too much time on any one statement, but give the answer that 
best describes how you usually feel. 
Please use the mouse to tick the boxes.  Call us in when the screen says 
‘thank-you’. 
Press any key to go on. 
 
Each item for the STAI was displayed sequentially on the screen, with the 
next statement only appearing once a response had been selected for the last 
statement.  Once complete, the participants score was displayed embedded in a digit 
string for the experimenter to note down after which the experimenter instructed 
them to complete a paper version of the BDI-II, and to inform the experimenter 
when they had completed it.  During this time the experimenter checked the 
participants STAI score was not above the clinical cut-off. 
Participants then made their first rating on the VAS, after reading the 
following instructions which were presented on the computer: 
 
In this task you are asked to indicate how you are feeling at the moment, 
compared with how you generally feel. 
Indicate your rating by clicking on the scale bar. 
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A practice trial will be shown to illustrate how to do the rating. 
Each time, please read the labels on the scale very carefully before you start. 
Press any key to go on. 
 
Participants completed a practice trial using the item ‘tired’ before 
proceeding to the test items.  Each item was displayed one at a time, with the next 
item being displayed once a response had been made.  During this time, the 
experimenter scored the participants responses on the BDI-II to ensure that they did 
not fall in the clinical range.  If it (or the score on the STAI) was in the clinical range 
the participant was diverted to the positive mood induction if necessary.   
On completing the VAS, participants watched the appropriate film clips after 
reading the following instructions, presented on white A4 paper: 
 
We would now like you to watch two short film clips. 
Please put on the headphones provided so that you can hear the audio track. 
There are two film clips, each of which is 2-3 minutes long.  The clips are 
taken from commercially available and well known films. 
Please watch the films closely and pay attention to what feelings the film 
evokes in you, as you will be asked about this afterwards. 
The films may contain material that some people might find distressing. 
If at any point you decide that you don’t want to continue, you can stop the 
film at anytime by pressing the ESCAPE button in the top left hand corner of 
the keyboard, or you can ask one of the researchers to stop it for you.  
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A second rating on the VAS followed the film clips.  Participants then 
completed the interpretation bias measure after reading the following instructions 
presented on the computer: 
 
You are about to read 20 short stories, each story will be displayed line by 
line. 
Please press the ARROW DOWN key to start the story and to read each line.  
The last word of each story will appear in an incomplete form. 
Your task is to work out what the word is. 
AS SOON AS YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED THE WORD, PRESS THE 
ARROW DOWN KEY. 
Then find and press the LETTER KEY corresponding to the FIRST missing 
letter of the word. 
You will then be asked a simple question about the text and given feedback 
about your response. 
The first two stories are for practice. 
Press the ‘arrow down’ key to go on. 
 
After the instructions the story was presented one line at a time, after which 
the word fragment was presented on a new page.  After entering the first missing 
letter of the word fragment the completed word was presented for one second.  The 
comprehension question was then displayed on a new page, and participants were 
instructed to press the left arrow key to answer no and the right arrow key to answer 
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yes after which a new screen informed them if they were correct or incorrect.   The 
task began with two practice items, before the 20 test items were presented in a 
random order by E-Prime.  The same process was repeated for all 20 vignettes after 
which the recognition test began after participants had read the following 
instructions: 
 
Thank you.  That is the end of the first part of the task. 
Press the “arrow down” key to start the second part. 
[new page] 
Remember back to the stories you read before. 
Now you will be shown the title and a brief description as a reminder for 
each story along with 4 different endings. 
Please rate the endings in the following way: 
Press one of the number keys 1, 2, 3, 4 to indicate how similar the ending is 
to how you remember it. 
1=very different in meaning 
2=fairly different in meaning 
3=fairly similar in meaning 
4=very similar in meaning 
Read each ending carefully. 
Respond as quickly as possible. 
You will begin with two practice items. 
Please press the ‘arrow down’ key to start. 
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Participants completed two practice trials of four sentences each, related to 
the two practice vignettes read earlier before moving on to the test items.  The four 
sentences comprised a negative target, a positive target, a positive foil and a negative 
foil.  The four sentences corresponding to each vignette were presented in blocks, 
although the order was randomised for each participant within each block.  The 
order of presentation of each block was also randomised for every participant.  In 
total 80 statements for the recognition test were presented, with the title of the 
vignette they related to displayed at the top of the screen. Finally participants 
completed a third rating on the VAS. 
 At the end of this time participants were given their £5 payment along with 
an information sheet about where to find help regarding mental health problems at 
UEA and in Norwich.  They were then asked for any comments, and the researcher 
checked that their mood had returned to a tolerable state.  Those participants who 
scored in the clinical range on the STAI and/or BDI were given information about 
where to access help for mental health problems at UEA.  Participants in the anxious 
mood induction condition were given the opportunity to watch the positive mood 
induction film clips. 
2.3 Experiment 2 
 Apart from the changes detailed below, experiments 2a and 2b were identical 
to experiments 1a and 1b as detailed above. 
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2.3.1 Materials 
2.3.1.1 Cognitive Load 
In order to limit participants’ cognitive resources during the time that 
interpretation biases are hypothesised to be generated a cognitive load was applied 
whilst participants were reading the vignettes.  Participants were asked to remember 
a four digit number string whilst reading the vignettes.  The number string to be 
remembered was randomly generated, and differed from trial to trial.  It was 
presented before the first line of the vignette, and participants were asked to enter 
the number string immediately after answering the yes/no question regarding the 
content of the vignette.  This method was previously effectively used in similar 
research where it was found not to interfere with participants undertaking of similar 
cognitive tasks (Wood, Mathews & Dalgliesh, 2001).  Participants who were asked 
to remember one digit string in Standage et al. (2010) still demonstrated mood 
congruent interpretation biases, suggesting that it did not prevent substantive 
processing from occurring.  Participants were asked to remember four digits, as this 
was the capacity of short-term memory in most adults (Cowan, 2001).  Participants 
were not given feedback on their performance on this task as it is the effortful part of 
the process, rather than the outcome that is important since it is this that will create 
the cognitive load.  Also, it was important not to distract participants’ attention too 
much from the interpretation bias measure itself.  Wood et al. (2001) found that 
participants failed to remember the digit string correctly on 13% of trials, and data 
regarding participants’ performance on the number string recall were logged, and it 
was planned to compare the number of digit strings recalled correctly to those 
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recalled incorrectly in order to ensure that significant differences were found which 
would indicate that participants attended to the task. 
The vignettes with the addition of the cognitive load were piloted on an 
opportunistic sample of four participants.  This showed that all participants were 
able to attempt to remember the digit strings with no adverse effect on their ability to 
process the content of the vignettes.  Details can be found in appendix P. 
2.3.2 Procedure 
2.3.2.1 Recruitment 
 Participant recruitment initially progressed as described in section 2.2.6, with 
consent being sought from heads of schools before sending emails out to staff and 
students on the school mailing lists.  However, following the author’s break from 
recruitment a change of University protocol meant that all requests to approach 
students to participate in research had to go through the Dean of Students Office. 
Due to the Dean receiving a large number of similar requests it was decided to send 
one email out to first and second year undergraduate students only.  
In addition to recruitment methods described in section 2.2.6.1, recruitment 
to experiment 2 was also achieved through advertisements placed on the 
University’s online portal and on various student and staff interest websites. 
2.3.2.2 Testing Conditions 
 Following the author’s break from recruitment, testing initially continued 
under the conditions described in section 2.2.6.2.  Due to a change in room bookings 
it was no longer possible to continue to use the computer laboratory, and testing was 
moved to a purpose designed psychology research laboratory in a separate building 
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on the University campus.  This consisted of five sound proofed research pods, 
which each contained a desktop computer, keyboard and mouse.  It was possible for 
the participant to communicate when sections of the procedure had finished through 
a small window. 
2.3.2.3 Procedure 
 This was the same as for experiment 1 except following the second rating on 
the VAS the instructions for the test for interpretation biases were slightly altered: 
 
 You are about to read 20 short stories. 
Before seeing each description you will see a four digit number which you 
should try to remember. 
 Following the number each story will be displayed line by line. 
Please press the ARROW DOWN key to start the story and to read each line.  
The last word of each story will appear in an incomplete form. 
Your task is to work out what the word is. 
AS SOON AS YOU HAVE IDENTIFIED THE WORD, PRESS THE 
‘ARROW DOWN’ KEY. 
Then find and press the LETTER KEY corresponding to the FIRST missing 
letter of the word. 
You will then be asked a simple question about the text and given feedback 
about your response. 
The first two stories are for practice. 
Press the ‘arrow down’ key to go on. 
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Following the presentation of the instructions for the first part of the 
interpretation bias test a new page was displayed which said: 
 
Remember the following number: 
5847. 
 
The digit string was displayed for 3 seconds following which a new page 
appeared and the vignette was then presented line by line as previously described.  
Following the feedback for the comprehension question a new screen was presented 
which said: 
 
Please enter the number you were remembering. 
 
This screen remained until the participant made a response consisting of four 
key presses after which the next vignette was presented on a new screen.  No 
feedback was given regarding participants performance on the digit string task in 
order to keep their attention focussed on the content of the vignettes. 
2.4 Plan For Analysis 
It would have been possible to add mood induction condition and cognitive 
load as variables into the analyses, and analyse all of the data for experiments 1 and 
2 together.  Given the differences in the way participants were recruited and tested 
described above, it did not seem appropriate to analyse the data for experiments 1 
and 2 together as this would have introduced experimenter bias, and bias due to time 
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of year into the results.  Differences in participant numbers in each of the 
experiments would have reduced degrees of freedom for some of the analyses which 
would have had the effect of reducing the power of the analyses to detect effects 
where they existed.  As reviewed in chapter 1, PA and NA can be viewed as 
independent constructs and therefore it seemed more appropriate to undertake 
analyses regarding their effects separately.  It was therefore planned to carry out 
separate analyses for each of experiments 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b. 
For each experiment the data were checked for differences between groups 
firstly using a chi-square test for gender.  Following this demographic data were 
checked for normality by looking at skew, kurtosis and tests for normality.  
Parametric t tests or non-parametric Mann Whitney U tests were then used as 
appropriate to test for differences between the groups on age, STAI, BDI-II, MANX 
and S-MCSDS scores. 
It was planned to test the mood data and the interpretation bias data for 
normality by examining skew, kurtosis and by performing tests for normality.  It was 
planned to transform the data in order to meet normality assumptions for parametric 
tests.   
To test hypotheses regarding the effect of trait anxiety on mood, 2x3 mixed 
model ANOVAs were planned for each experiment.  The dependent variable was to 
be VAS score, the between subjects variable anxiety condition (high or low) and the 
within subjects variable time (1=before the mood induction, 2=after the mood 
induction, 3=after the interpretation bias test).  To test hypotheses regarding the 
effect of trait anxiety on interpretation biases, 2x2x2x2 mixed model ANOVAs were 
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planned for each experiment.  The dependent variable was to be recognition ratings 
for the sentences in the recognition task, and the between subjects variable anxiety 
condition (high or low).  The within subjects variables were to be sentence type 
(target or foil), sentence valence (positive or negative) and test half (first or second 
half of test).   
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CHAPTER 3:  EXPERIMENTS 1A AND 1B 
3.1 Results 
 Results for experiments 1a and 1b have been summarised for the purposes of 
this report.  They were reported in full by Teape (2009). 
3.1.1 Overview 
Section 3.1.2 describes recruitment to experiment 1 and gives demographic 
information regarding the sample.  Section 3.1.3 and section 3.1.4 respectively 
summarise the results of experiment 1a and 1b, the anxious and positive mood 
inductions.  Summaries of two mixed model ANOVAs for the effects of the mood 
induction on high and low NA (high and low PA for experiment 1b) are presented in 
sections 3.1.3.3 and 3.1.3.4 (3.1.4.3 and 3.1.4.4 for experiment 1b).  A summary of 
the results of a mixed model ANOVA for the interpretation bias data is presented in 
section 3.1.3.6 (3.1.4.6 for experiment 1b).   
3.1.2 Demographics and Recruitment 
 253 participants returned the screening questionnaires, 131 of which met the 
inclusion criteria.  Of these 18 were diverted to experiment 2, and 35 did not attend 
for the experiment.  Therefore 78 participants took part in experiment 1, and were 
quasi-randomly allocated to either experiment 1a or 1b.  Due to difficulties 
recruiting enough high anxious participants and the MANX not serving as a suitable 
predictor of STAI scores, participants were allocated to high or low anxious groups 
based on a median split of the 253 received MANX scores.  Five participants were 
then excluded from further analysis for a number of reasons including software 
failure or BDI or STAI scores in the severe range (see section 2.2.2.2).  Table 3.1 
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summarises the number of participants in each experiment and each anxiety 
condition. 
 
Table 3.1:  Number of participants in experiments 1a and 1b, divided by anxiety 
condition. 
 High anxious Low anxious 
Experiment 1a (anxious mood induction) 15 20 
Experiment 1b (positive mood induction) 17 21 
 
3.1.3 Experiment 1a – Anxious Mood Induction 
3.1.3.1 Participant Demographic Information 
Thirty five participants took part in experiment 1a.  No differences were 
found between the high and low anxious groups in terms of gender or scores on the 
S-MCSDS.  Significant differences were observed for age and for scores on the 
MANX, STAI and BDI-II.  Such differences might be expected given differences in 
trait anxiety, as depression and anxiety scores were found to correlate to a high 
degree (Clark, Steer & Beck, 1994) and social desirability was found to decrease in 
those with high trait anxiety (Lambie & Baker, 2003).  Differences in age could be 
due to changes to the recruitment procedure which involved including staff, in order 
to recruit more high anxious participants.  These variables were therefore not entered 
into the main mood data analysis as covariates as to do so would have resulted in 
loss of power. 
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3.1.3.2 Selection of Mood Items 
Literature reviewed in chapter 1 suggested that an anxious mood induction 
should produce increases on items high in NA (worried and tense) and decreases on 
items low in NA (calm and content).  Correlations revealed that mood items of calm 
and content were correlated with each other, so they were averaged to form the new 
variable low NA.  Correlations between worried and tense items were not as robust, 
so high NA was represented by the mood item tense alone. 
3.1.3.3 Main Analysis of High NA Data 
Data normality assumptions were addressed through the removal of outliers 
following which the data also met the assumption of homogeneity of variance. To 
test the hypotheses that low anxious participants would show a more negative mood 
at time 2 than at times 1 and 3 (as evidenced by an increase in high NA at time 2 
when compared with times 1 and 3), and that high anxious participants would show 
a more negative mood at times 2 and 3 than at time 1, a 2x3 mixed model ANOVA 
was performed.  The dependent variable was high NA, the between subjects variable 
was anxiety group (high or low) and the within subjects variables was time (1, 2 or 
3).  Descriptive statistics for the high NA data and the results of the mixed model 
ANOVA can be found in appendix Q. 
There was a main effect of time, F(2, 66) = 13.499, p < .01, and planned 
comparisons showed that high NA significantly increased from time 1 to time 2 as 
predicted [t(34) = 4.99, p < .01], but were shown to significantly decrease from time 
2 to time 3 for all participants [t(34) = 3.65, p < .01].  The predicted interaction 
between time and anxiety group was not significant [F(2, 66) = 0.164, p = .849] 
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although observed power was found to be 0.99, suggesting that lack of power could 
not explain this result. 
3.1.3.4 Main Analysis of Low NA Data 
Data normality assumptions were addressed through the removal of outliers 
following which the data also met the assumption of homogeneity of variance. To 
test the hypotheses that low anxious participants would show a more negative mood 
at time 2 than at times 1 and 3 (as evidenced by a decrease in low NA at time 2 when 
compared with times 1 and 3), and that high anxious participants would show a more 
negative mood at times 2 and 3 than at time 1, a 2x3 mixed model ANOVA was 
performed.  The dependent variable was low NA, the between subjects variable was 
anxiety group (high or low) and the within subjects variables was time (1, 2 or 3).  
Descriptive statistics for the low NA data and the results of the mixed model 
ANOVA can be found in appendix R. 
There was a main effect of time, [F(2, 66)=27.214, p < .01], and planned 
comparisons showed that low NA significantly decreased from time 1 to time 2 
[t(34) = 6.68, p < .01], but was shown to significantly increase from time 2 to time 3 
[t(34) = 5.21, p < .01].  The predicted interaction between time and anxiety group 
was not significant [F(2, 66) = 0.764, p = .470] although observed power was found 
to be 1.0 suggesting that lack of power could not explain the result. 
3.1.3.5 Summary of Analysis of Mood Data 
Both low and high anxious participants showed an increase in high NA and a 
decrease in low NA following an anxious mood induction and a decrease in high NA 
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and an increase in low NA following the interpretation bias test, suggesting that NA 
returned to baseline levels. 
3.1.3.6 Analyses of Interpretation Bias Data 
Data normality and homogeneity of variance assumptions were met.  It was 
hypothesised that high anxious participants would show a negative (mood 
congruent) interpretation bias in both halves of the test but that low anxious 
participants would show a negative bias which became more positive in the second 
half of the test.  A 2x2x2x2 mixed model ANOVA was performed to test these 
hypotheses with recognition rating as the dependent variable, anxiety condition 
(high or low) as the between subjects variable and test half (first or second), item 
valence (positive or negative) and item type (target or foil) as the within subjects 
variables.  The hypothesised effects would be demonstrated by an interaction 
between anxiety group, test half, item valence and item type.  Descriptive statistics 
for the recognition data and the results of the mixed model ANOVA can be found in 
appendix S. 
There was a main effect of item type [F(1, 33) = 467.54, p < .01], with 
targets being recognised more frequently than foils.  There was a main effect of 
anxiety group [F(1, 33) = 4.810, p < .05], with low anxious participants reporting 
higher recognition ratings in general than high anxious participants.  There was a 
significant interaction between anxiety group, test half and item type [F(1, 33) = 
7.13, p < .05] and post hoc t tests using a Bonferroni correction with alpha=0.025 
revealed that low anxious participants recognised more target items in the second 
than the first half of the test, with no such difference apparent for high anxious 
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participants.  There was a significant interaction between test half, item valence and 
item type and two further 2x2 repeated measures ANOVAs were undertaken to 
explore this, the results of which can be found in appendix S. 
The first, for target items with item valence and test half as the within 
subjects factors showed a significant interaction between item valence and test half 
[F(1, 34) = 5.47, p < .05[.  Post hoc t tests using a Bonferroni correction with 
alpha=0.025 revealed a significant increase in recognition of positive target items 
from the first to the second half of the test, but no similar decrease for negative 
target items.  The second repeated measures ANOVA, for foil items with item 
valence and test half as the within subjects factors showed no main effects or 
interactions. 
The predicted interaction between anxiety group, test half, item valence and 
item type was not significant [F(1, 33) = 0.08, p = .784] although observed power 
was found to be 0.97 suggesting that lack of power could not explain the result. 
3.1.3.7 Summary of Interpretation Bias Data Analysis 
As predicted, all participants showed higher recognition of target over foil 
items.  Low anxious participants also showed higher recognition in general than high 
anxious participants and recognised more target items in the second than the first 
half of the test.  There was an increase in the recognition of positive target items 
from the first to the second half of the test for all participants. For low anxious 
participants the hypothesised negative (mood congruent) interpretation bias in the 
first half of the test, which would become a positive (mood incongruent) 
interpretation bias in the second half of the test was not found.  For high anxious 
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participants the hypothesised negative (mood congruent) interpretation bias in both 
halves of the test was also not found.  Power for the analyses pertaining to these 
hypotheses was not found to be low.  This suggests that all participants initially 
showed no interpretation biases, which became mood incongruent in the second half 
of the test. 
3.1.3.8 Summary of Results of Experiment 1a 
 Both low and high anxious participants showed a more anxious mood 
following an anxious mood induction and a less anxious mood following the 
interpretation bias test.  During the interpretation bias test no interpretation biases 
were initially observed, but a mood incongruent positive interpretation bias was 
observed during the second half of the test for all participants.  Contrary to the 
hypotheses, no differences were observed between low and high anxious participants 
with regards to interpretation biases.   
3.1.4 Experiment 1b – Positive Mood Induction 
3.1.4.1 Participant Demographics 
Thirty eight participants took part in experiment 1b.  No differences were 
found between the high and low anxious groups in terms of gender or age.  
Significant differences were observed for scores on the MANX, S-MCSDS, STAI 
and BDI-II.  Such differences might be expected given differences in trait anxiety, as 
depression and anxiety scores were found to correlate to a high degree (Clark et 
al.,1994) and social desirability was found to decrease in those with high trait 
anxiety (Lambie & Baker, 2003).  These variables were therefore not entered into 
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the main mood data analysis as covariates as to do so would have resulted in loss of 
power. 
3.1.4.2 Selection of Mood Items 
Literature reviewed in chapter 1 suggested that a positive mood induction 
should produce increases on items high in PA (happy and carefree) and decreases on 
items low in PA (low and sad).  Correlations revealed that mood items of happy and 
carefree were correlated with each other, as were the mood items of low and sad, so 
they were averaged to form the new variables of high and low PA respectively. 
3.1.4.3 Main Analysis of High PA Data 
Data normality assumptions were addressed through the removal of outliers 
following which the data also met the assumption of homogeneity of variance. To 
test the hypotheses that all participants would show a more positive mood at times 2 
and 3 than at time 1 (as evidenced by an increase in high PA at times 2 and 3 when 
compared with time 1), a 2x3 mixed model ANOVA was performed.  The dependent 
variable was high PA, the between subjects variable was anxiety group (high or low) 
and the within subjects variables was time (1, 2 or 3).  Descriptive statistics for the 
high PA data and the results of the mixed model ANOVA can be found in appendix 
T.  
There was a main effect of time [F(1, 72) = 25.109, p < .01], and planned 
comparisons showed that high PA significantly increased from time 1 to time 2 as 
predicted [t(37) = 5.88, p < .01], but no significant differences were observed 
between time 1 and time 3 [t(37) = 1.29, p = .102]. 
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3.1.4.4 Main Analysis of Low PA Data 
Data normality assumptions were addressed through the removal of outliers.  
Data did not meet the assumption of homogeneity of variance and a more 
conservative alpha level of 0.025 was therefore used (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
To test the hypotheses that all participants would show a more positive mood at 
times 2 and 3 than at time 1 (as evidenced by a decrease in low PA at times 2 and 3 
when compared with time 1), a 2x3 mixed model ANOVA was performed.  The 
dependent variable was low PA, the between subjects variable was anxiety group 
(high or low) and the within subjects variables was time (1, 2 or 3).  Descriptive 
statistics for the low PA data and the results of the mixed model ANOVA can be 
found in appendix U. 
There was a main effect of time [F(2, 72) = 26.320, p < .01], and planned 
comparisons showed that, as predicted, low PA significantly decreased from time 1 
to time 2 [t(37) = 5.54, p < .01], but no differences were found between times 1 and 
3 [t(37) = 0.615, p = .271]. 
3.1.4.5 Summary of Analysis of Mood Data 
Both low and high anxious participants showed an increase in high PA and a 
decrease in low PA following a positive mood induction and a decrease in high PA 
and an increase in low PA following the interpretation bias test, suggesting that PA 
returned to baseline levels. 
3.1.4.6 Analyses of Interpretation Bias Data 
Data normality assumptions were addressed through the removal of outliers 
following which the data also met the assumption of homogeneity of variance.  It 
 94
was hypothesised that all participants would show a positive (mood congruent) 
interpretation bias in both halves of the test.  A 2x2x2x2 mixed model ANOVA was 
performed to test this hypotheses with recognition rating as the dependent variable, 
anxiety condition (high or low) as the between subjects variable and test half (first or 
second), item valence (positive or negative) and item type (target or foil) as the 
within subjects variables.  The hypothesised effect would be demonstrated by an 
interaction between item valence and item type.  Descriptive statistics for the 
recognition data and the results of the mixed model ANOVA can be found in 
appendix V. 
There was a main effect of item type [F(1, 36) = 327.51, p < .01], with 
targets being recognised more frequently than foils.  There was a main effect of item 
valence [F(1, 36) = 4.90, p < .05], with positive items being more frequently 
recognised than negative items. 
There was a significant interaction between item valence and anxiety group 
[F(1, 36) = 7.46, p < .05].  Post hoc t tests using a Bonferroni correction with 
alpha=0.025 revealed that low anxious participants recognised more positive items 
than negative items [t(20) = 3.3, p < .025], with no such difference apparent for high 
anxious participants.  There was a significant interaction between test half and item 
valence [F(1, 36) = 5.39, p < .05].  Post hoc t tests using a Bonferroni correction 
with alpha=0.025 revealed that the recognition of positive items increased from the 
first to the second half of the test [t(37) = 2.9, p < .01] with no difference in 
recognition of negative items between either half of the test [t(37) = 0.57, p = .570]. 
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The predicted interaction between item valence and item type was not 
significant [F(1, 36) = 2.58, p = .117] although observed power was found to be 1.0 
suggesting that lack of power could not explain the result. 
3.1.4.7 Summary of Interpretation Bias Data Analysis 
As predicted, all participants showed higher recognition of target over foil 
items and also of positive over negative items, and this became more positive over 
time.  This positive response bias only appeared for the low anxious participants.  
The hypothesised interaction between item valence and item type was not found and 
power for the analysis was not found to be low.  This suggests that participants did 
not display interpretation biases. 
3.1.4.8 Summary of Results of Experiment 1b 
All participants showed a more positive mood following a positive mood 
induction and a less positive mood following the interpretation bias test.  During the 
interpretation bias test a positive response bias became increasingly positive over 
time.  The positive response bias was observed only for the low anxious participants.  
Whilst the mood data would suggest a mood repair process in operation, no 
interpretation biases were found in either direction. 
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CHAPTER 4:  EXPERIMENTS 1A AND 1B 
4.1 Discussion 
 A discussion of the results of experiments 1a and 1b can also be found in 
Teape (2009). 
4.1.1 Overview 
 A discussion of the findings for experiments 1a (section 4.1.2) and 1b 
(section 4.1.3) is presented with reference to hypothesised results (sections 4.1.2.1 
and 4.1.3.1 for experiments 1a and 1b respectively) and observed results (sections 
4.1.2.2 and 4.1.3.2 respectively).  Discussion of the results in light of reviewed 
literature and relevant theory is discussed in sections 4.1.2.3 and 4.1.3.3 for 
experiments 1a and 1b respectively. 
4.1.2 Experiment 1a 
4.1.2.1 Hypotheses 
 For experiment 1a it was predicted that both low and high anxious 
participants would show a more anxious mood following an anxious mood 
induction.  Using ideas from the dual-process model of mood regulation, it was 
predicted that for low anxious participants, mood congruent interpretation biases 
would initially be evident, through substantive processing.  It was further predicted 
that mood incongruent biases would emerge through a process of motivated 
processing in order to repair the anxious mood.  It was predicted that this would 
result in a return of mood levels to baseline for the low anxious participants 
following the interpretation bias test.  It was predicted that high anxious participants 
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would show mood congruent interpretation biases throughout as a result of 
substantive processing, which would result in an anxious mood being maintained. 
4.1.2.2 Results 
As predicted, both low and high anxious participants showed a more anxious 
mood following an anxious mood induction. Whilst it was predicted that there would 
be differences between low and high anxious participants in observed interpretation 
biases during the first and second halves of the test following the anxious mood 
induction, no such differences were observed.  Instead, no interpretation biases were 
initially observed, but a mood incongruent positive interpretation bias was observed 
during the second half of the test for all participants.  Consequently, a less anxious 
mood was observed for all participants following the interpretation bias test, 
suggesting that they were all able to switch from substantive to motivated processing 
in order to repair an anxious mood. 
4.1.2.3 Discussion 
The results of experiment 1a appear to support the dual-process model of 
mood regulation (Forgas,200a), as an anxious mood appeared to be repaired for both 
low and high anxious participants by mood incongruent, positive interpretation 
biases.  There is some support that mood and interpretation biases have a bi-
directional relationship with anxious mood leading to mood incongruent 
interpretation biases, leading to a less anxious mood. 
It is however possible that the reduction in anxious mood following the long 
and repetitive interpretation bias test was due to mood decay, especially as 
differences were not observed between low and high anxious participants, as mood 
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decay would be expected to apply regardless of the level of trait anxiety.  This also 
seems likely as mood congruent interpretation biases were not observed in the first 
half of the test, which would have provided more robust support to an explanation 
regarding mood repair, rather than an explanation around mood decay.  It is 
therefore possible that a process of mood decay caused a reduction in the anxious 
mood, which resulted in a more positive interpretation bias in the second half of the 
test through substantive processing. 
The predicted difference between low and high trait anxious individuals in 
the interpretation biases observed was not found which may be due to a number of 
factors.  Firstly, it is possible that high anxious participants still possessed enough 
cognitive resources to switch to effortful, motivated processing as the low anxious 
participants possibly did, as the induced mood was not extreme enough to load 
cognition to the required extent.  The addition of a cognitive load to the procedure in 
experiment 2 should help to test this hypothesis.  Secondly, it is possible that the 
induced mood was not extreme enough and therefore congruent interpretation biases 
were not generated through substantive processing.  As a result cognitive resources 
would not have been impaired to the extent required by multiple generations of 
mood congruent associations, as predicted by Bower’s (1991) network activation 
theory in order to prevent motivated processing from occurring.  This would seem 
likely as mood congruent interpretation biases were not observed for either the low 
or the high anxious participants in either half of the test. 
The fact that high anxious participants showed lower recognition ratings in 
general than low anxious participants could be explained by an increased cognitive 
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load for the high anxious participants caused by increasing substantive processing in 
comparison to the low anxious participants, which makes the task of recognising 
target items more difficult for the high anxious participants (Erber & Erber, 2000). 
As low anxious participants reported recognising more target items in the second 
than the first half of the test it is possible that this also evidences a switch from 
substantive to motivated processing.  This is because the cognitive load caused by 
substantive processing may make the recognition of target items more difficult, 
which becomes easier as motivated processing takes over and mood congruent 
associations lessen.  The addition of a cognitive load to the procedure in experiment 
2 is therefore further indicated. 
The results observed in experiment 1a could also be explained by the social 
constraints model of mood regulation, as participants may have been motivated to 
repair their mood due to the slightly anxiety provoking nature of the situation which 
involved strangers, in line with the work by Erber et al. (1996).  If the social 
constraints model is correct, then positive mood should also be regulated in the same 
way. 
Further discussion of the results in terms of theoretical and clinical 
implications, and with regard to methodological limitations, can be found in chapter 
7. 
4.1.2.4 Conclusions 
 Experiment 1a has provided some limited support for a dual-process model 
of mood regulation, although the results of experiment 1b will help to test the 
hypothesis that mood was managed in this experiment due to contextual demands of 
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the situation.  A number of hypotheses have been highlighted to account for the lack 
of differences observed between high and low anxious participants.  The addition of 
a cognitive load to the procedure in experiment 2 should allow these hypotheses to 
be tested. 
4.1.3 Experiment 1b 
4.1.3.1 Hypotheses 
For experiment 1b it was predicted that both low and high anxious 
participants would show a more positive mood following a positive mood induction.  
Using ideas from the dual-process model of mood regulation, it was predicted that 
both low and high anxious participants would show mood congruent interpretation 
biases throughout as a result of substantive processing.  It was predicted that this 
would result in maintenance of the positive mood. 
4.1.3.2 Results 
As predicted, all participants showed a more positive mood following a 
positive mood induction.  Whilst it was predicted that all participants would show 
mood congruent interpretation biases throughout the interpretation bias test, instead 
a positive response bias was observed which became increasingly positive over 
time.  The positive response bias was observed only for the low anxious participants.  
As discussed in chapter 2, response biases evidence a propensity to respond to the 
sentences in the recognition test in a generally positive or negative way, regardless 
of the similarity to the vignette content.  As such, they are not seen to demonstrate 
true interpretation biases where a propensity to respond in a valenced way would be 
mediated by an interaction with item type.  Whilst the mood data would suggest a 
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mood repair process in operation as a less positive mood was observed for all 
participants following the interpretation bias test, no interpretation biases per se were 
found in either direction. 
4.1.3.3 Discussion 
 It is difficult to say which model of mood regulation the results of 
experiment 1b appear to support, as although an induced positive mood returned to 
baseline, this occurred following a measured positive response bias which became 
more positive over time (for the low anxious participants only). It seems possible 
that the decline in positive mood following the interpretation bias test was due to 
decay, as the test is long and somewhat repetitive, and that any effects of mood 
regulation on mood were lost during this procedure which often took up to 40 
minutes to complete. 
 The dual-process (Forgas, 2000a) and social constraints models (Erber and 
Erber, 2000) might suggest that participants did not attempt to regulate their mood as 
the context was not sufficiently challenging or anxiety provoking (at least for the 
low anxious participants).  As a result there was no switch from substantive to 
motivated processing and no evidence of interpretation biases.  The addition of a 
cognitive load to the procedure in experiment 2 is therefore indicated in order to 
determine if contextual changes motivate mood repair strategies for low (and 
perhaps also high) anxious participants (Blanchette & Richards, 2003). 
The fact that mood congruent interpretation biases were not observed could 
be explained by the relatively long time interval between the mood induction and  
the interpretation bias test, combined with the relatively mild mood induced.  This 
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would mean that any biases may have decayed by the time the test was performed.  
The observed positive response bias could be tentatively viewed as an emerging 
mood congruent bias which functioned to maintain positive mood, but which did not 
reach significance due to the same reasons. 
Given that a response bias was not observed for the high anxious 
participants, it would seem unlikely that a pure hedonistic model (Larsen, 2000a) 
could explain the overall pattern of results obtained.  This is because this model 
would say that all individuals would be motivated to achieve a positive mood and 
also because a positive mood was not obtained at the end of the interpretation bias 
test.  It is possible that the high anxious participants were not able to access as many 
positive associations (Bower, 1991) as the low anxious participants during the 
switch from substantive to motivated processing to maintain a positive mood.  The 
addition of a cognitive load to the procedure in experiment 2 is therefore indicated to 
determine if the difference between high and low anxious participants in this regard 
disappears under conditions of reduced cognitive resources. 
Further discussion of the results in terms of theoretical and clinical 
implications, and with regard to methodological limitations, can be found in chapter 
7. 
4.1.3.4 Conclusions 
The results of experiment 1b could support either the dual-process model or 
the social constraints model of mood regulation, with the lack of mood maintenance 
being explained through a process of mood decay.  The addition of a cognitive load 
in experiment 2 is indicated. 
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CHAPTER 5:  EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B 
5.1 Results 
It should be noted that similar analyses to those run by Teape (2009) were 
performed in order to be able to validly compare the results obtained. 
5.1.1 Overview 
 Section 5.1.2 describes recruitment to experiment 2 and gives demographic 
information regarding the sample.  Section 5.1.3. and section 5.1.4 respectively 
summarise the results of experiment 2a and 2b, the anxious and positive mood 
inductions.  Summaries of two mixed model ANOVAs for the effects of the mood 
induction on high and low NA (high and low PA for experiment 2b) are presented in 
sections 5.1.3.3 and 5.1.3.4 (5.1.4.3 and 5.1.4.4 for experiment 2b).  A summary of 
the results of a mixed model ANOVA for the interpretation bias data is presented in 
section 5.1.3.6 (5.1.4.6 for experiment 2b). 
5.1.2 Demographic Information and Recruitment for Experiments 2a and 2b 
Three hundred and thirty two  participants returned the screening questionnaires 
(table 5.1), of which 207 (62.3%) were female and 125 (37.7%) were male.  Of those 
who returned the screening questionnaires, 129 (38.9%) met the inclusion criteria for 
the study. 
Of the 203 participants who did not meet inclusion criteria, 130 (64.0%) 
were excluded due to scores on the MANX in the mid-anxious range , 47 (23.2%) 
were excluded due to lack of fluent English, 26 (12.8%) were excluded due to 
previous participation in similar research studies, 12 (5.9%) were excluded due to 
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missing data, 10 (4.9%) were excluded due to a history of mental health problems, 
10 (4.9%) were excluded due to learning difficulties involving reading or writing 
abilities and 3 (1.5%) were excluded (and directed to possible sources of help) due 
to displaying clinical anxiety levels on the MANX.  Participants excluded due to 
more than one reason have been included in all categories that applied to them for 
the above analysis. 
Table 5.1:  Demographic information regarding all participants who returned the 
screening questionnaires 
Age MANX S-MCSDS   
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Total 332 24.1 7.65 14.5 4.11 6.7 2.77 
MANX – Mackintosh and Mathews Anxiety Scale 
S-MCSDS – Short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
 
Of the 129 eligible participants, 11 were quasi-randomly diverted to 
experiment 2 and 66 did not respond to the invitation to participate in the study 
session, or did not attend the study session itself.  This left 52 participants who took 
part in the study session, 3 of whom were given information about where to access 
help for mental health problems as they showed high levels of anxiety on the STAI 
and/or depression on the BDI-II.  One participant’s data had to be excluded from the 
analysis due to technical problems during the second half of the testing session. 
The 52 participants who took part in the study session were initially allocated 
to the high or low trait anxious group using a predicted STAI score derived from the 
formula STAI = (MANX x 2.3) + 8.8 (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2006).  As described 
in chapter 2, the limits used by Lambie and Baker (2003) for identifying high and 
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low trait anxious individuals were used in order to do this such that participants with 
a MANX score of 17 or above (STAI score of 48 or above) were allocated to the 
high trait anxious condition and participants with a MANX score of 13 or below 
(STAI score of 38 or below) were allocated to the low trait anxious condition.  
Participants were then quasi-randomly allocated to either the positive (experiment 
2a) or anxious (experiment 2b) mood induction conditions as described in chapter 2. 
As participant recruitment continued, it became apparent that more high than 
low trait anxious participants were being recruited.  Once participants began to 
attend the testing session it could also be seen that the MANX did not adequately 
predict trait anxiety scores at the testing session, perhaps due to changes in state 
anxiety caused by the change in context between completing the MANX and 
completing the STAI.  Whilst Mackintosh and Mathews (2006) reported a 
correlation of .87 between the MANX and the STAI, Teape (2009) reported a lower 
correlation of .78, and data from experiment 2 showed a correlation of .79.  As a 
result several participants allocated to either the high or low trait anxious conditions 
had scores in the mid trait anxious range on the STAI.   Table 5.2 shows numbers of 
participants in each condition based on the Lambie and Baker (2003) cut-offs. 
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Table 5.2:  Number of participants in each of the low and high trait anxious 
conditions, partitioned by mood induction condition using the Lambie and Baker 
(2003) cut-offs. 
Mood induction 
condition 
High trait anxious Mid anxious Low trait anxious 
Positive 11 5 12 
Negative 7 6 11 
Total 18 11 23 
 
In order to maximise the number of participants data included in the analysis, 
given the aforementioned difficulties in recruiting sufficient numbers of participants, 
those participants in the mid anxious range were re-allocated to either the high or 
low trait anxious condition based on a median split of the 322 MANX scores 
recorded on the screening questionnaires.  This meant that all participants with an 
STAI score of 43 or below (15 or below on the MANX) were allocated to the low 
anxious condition, and all participants with a score of 44 or above (16 or above on 
the MANX) were allocated to the high anxious condition.  Data for two participants 
were excluded from further analysis due to a software failure for one participant and 
due to a score on the BDI-II in the clinical range for another.  This participant (and 
indeed several others who displayed particularly high STAI or BDI-II scores) was 
offered the opportunity to watch the positive film clips and directed to appropriate 
sources of support.  Table 5.3 shows the number of participants in each of the new 
high and low trait anxious conditions. 
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Table 5.3: Number of participants in each of the low and high trait anxious 
conditions, partitioned by mood induction condition using median cut-offs of STAI 
scores. 
Mood induction condition High trait anxious Low trait anxious 
Positive 13 13 
Negative 11 13 
Total 24 26 
 
5.1.3 Experiment 2a – Anxious Mood Induction 
5.1.3.1Participant Demographics 
Demographic information and screening questionnaire data for participants 
included in the data analysis for experiment 2a are shown in table 5.4 below. 
A Chi-square test showed that the high and low anxious conditions did not 
differ by gender [χ²(1) = 1.399, p = .237].  Since the data for age was not normally 
distributed, and showed significant skew and kurtosis, the Mann Whitney U Test 
was used to compare the high and low anxious conditions on this variable (table 
5.5).  The conditions were found to differ significantly on age. 
The data for MANX, STAI, S-MCSDS and BDI-II scores were found to be 
normally distributed so independent samples t tests were used to compare the high 
and low anxious groups on these variables.  The data for STAI, S-MCSDS and BDI-
II scores met the homogeneity of variance assumptions.  The data for the MANX 
scores did not meet the homogeneity of variance assumption so a lower alpha level 
of 0.025 was applied (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  The results of these tests are 
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presented in table 5.6 below.  The conditions were found to differ significantly on 
MANX, STAI, S-MCSDS and BDI-II scores. 
Table 5.4:  Demographic and screening questionnaire information for all 
participants’ data included in the analysis for experiment 2a. 
 Total High anxious Low anxious 
 N % N % N % 
Total 
 
24 100 11 100 13 100 
Female 18 75 7 64 11 85 
Male 6 25 4 26 2 15 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Age 23.0 6.47 23.0 8.22 22.9 4.88 
MANX 14.1 3.84 16.9 3.08 11.8 2.68 
STAI 41.2 9.31 49.9 4.28 33.8 4.78 
S-
MCSDS 
6.8 3.36 5.2 3.37 8.2 2.79 
BDI-II 8.4 6.03 12.5 5.72 4.9 3.77 
MANX – Mackintosh and Mathews Anxiety Scale 
STAI – Spielberger Trait Anxiety Scale 
S-MCSDS – Short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
BDI-II – Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition 
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Table 5.5:  Mann Whitney U Test for differences in age between the high and low 
anxious conditions in experiment 2a. 
 U z-score Exact sig. (2-tailed) 
Age 37.5 1.989 .047* 
* significant difference at p < .05 
 
Table 5.6:  T Tests for differences in MANX, STAI, S-MCSDS and BDI-II scores 
between the high and low anxious conditions in experiment 2a. 
 t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
MANX 4.371 22 .001** 
STAI 8.607 22 .001** 
S-MCSDS 2.363 22                     .027*    
BDI-II 3.865 22 .001** 
MANX – Mackintosh and Mathews Anxiety Scale 
STAI – Spielberger Trait Anxiety Scale 
S-MCSDS – Short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
BDI-II – Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition 
* significant difference at p < .05 
** significant difference at p < .01 
 
As expected, the conditions differed according to their trait anxiety score as 
assessed by both the MANX and the STAI.  Significant differences between the 
conditions in terms of BDI-II and S-MCSDS scores might be expected given 
differences in trait anxiety, as depression and anxiety scores were found to correlate 
to a high degree (Clark, et al., 1994) and social desirability was found to decrease in 
those with high trait anxiety (Lambie & Baker, 2003).  Whilst it was somewhat 
surprising to see that the groups differed according to age, the result was only 
marginally significant (p = .047).  MANX, STAI, BDI-II, S-MCSDS scores and age 
were not entered as covariates in the analysis of the mood and interpretation bias 
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data as to do so would involve loss of degrees of freedom (Coolican, 2004) with 
resulting loss of power which was already low due to smaller numbers of 
participants recruited than had been aimed for.  Additionally, entering these data as 
covariates into the analysis would have provided little additional information 
regarding the variables of interest in the study (mood and interpretation bias) but 
would have reduced the chance of finding significant effects where they existed. 
5.1.3.2 Mood Data 
5.1.3.2.1 Selection of mood items. 
Eight visual analogue scales were used for participants to rate their mood at 
time points one, two and three.  Literature reviewed in chapter 1 suggested that an 
anxious mood induction should produce increases on items high in NA (worried and 
tense) and decreases on items low in NA (calm and content). 
5.1.3.2.2 Data accuracy. 
The data were checked for missing values and inaccurate data input and one 
case of missing data was found in the raw high and low NA items.  Each missing 
value for this case was replaced with its series mean (Appendix W; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). 
5.1.3.2.3 Correlations between mood items. 
In order to be sure that these items could be combined to provide two 
measures of high and low NA, a correlation analysis was carried out.  The data were 
not normally distributed and showed significant skew and kurtosis (Appendix W) 
but it was not possible to transform the data due to the extent and direction of skew 
and kurtosis at different time points, on different items.  A non-parametric test was 
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therefore used to examine the correlations between the four items at times 1, 2 and 3, 
the results of which are presented in table 5.7. 
Table 5.7:  Spearman’s correlations between items low and high in NA at time 
points 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 2a. 
Time Item Worried Tense Calm Content 
Worried 1 0.476** -0.333 -0.318 
Tense 0.476** 1 -0.522** -0.375* 
Calm -0.333 -0.522** 1 0.542** 
1 
Content -0.318 -0.375* 0.542** 1 
Worried 1 0.719** -0.701** -0.834** 
Tense 0.719** 1 -0.751** -0.772** 
Calm -0.701** -0.751** 1 0.726** 
2 
Content -0.834** -0.772** 0.726** 1 
Worried 1 0.278 -0.536** -0.427** 
Tense 0.278 1 -0.544** -0.442* 
Calm -0.536** -0.544** 1 0.459* 
3 
Content -0.427** -0.442* 0.459* 1 
*Significant correlation at p < .05 (one-tailed) 
**Significant correlation at p < .01 (one-tailed) 
  
Items low in NA (calm and content) were found to be significantly correlated 
at all three times.  Items high in NA (worried and tense) were significantly 
correlated at times 1 and 2, but not at time3.  Similar to the results of experiment 1a 
(reported in Teape, 2009) it was apparent to see that data for the worried item did 
not show as strong a pattern of change, as the data for the tense item (table 5.8).  It 
 112
was therefore decided to use only data for the tense item to reflect high NA.  A new 
variable of low NA was therefore calculated by averaging scores on calm and 
content at all three time points.  Analyses of the low and high NA variables is 
summarised below. 
Table 5.8:  Descriptive statistics for the worried and tense items at times 1, 2 and 3 
in experiment 2a. 
Anxiety group Item Time N Mean SD 
1 13 0.49 0.16 
2 13 0.60 0.10 
Worried 
3 13 0.47 0.11 
1 13 0.44 0.18 
2 13 0.65 0.18 
Low anxious 
Tense 
3 13 0.58 0.10 
1 11 0.54 0.14 
2 11 0.55 0.08 
Worried 
3 10 0.49 0.12 
1 11 0.57 0.11 
2 11 0.65 0.21 
High anxious 
Tense 
3 10 0.50 0.14 
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5.1.3.3 Analysis of High NA Data 
5.1.3.3.1 Assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance. 
Data normality assumptions were addressed through the removal of outliers 
following which the data also met the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
(Appendix X).   
 5.1.3.3.2 Mixed model ANOVA with high NA data. 
 To test the hypotheses that both the high and low anxious participants would 
show a more negative mood at times 2 and 3 than at time 1 (as evidenced by an 
increase in high NA at times 2 and 3 when compared with time 1), a 2x3 mixed 
model ANOVA was performed.  The dependent variable was high NA, the between 
subjects variable was anxiety group (high or low) and the within subjects variable 
was time (1, 2 or 3).  Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable at all three 
time points for both anxiety groups are shown below in table 5.9. 
Table 5.9:  Descriptive statistics for high NA scores at times 1, 2 and 3 for the high 
and low anxious groups in experiment 2a. 
Group Time Mean SD N 
1 0.57 0.11 11 
2 0.69 0.12 11 
High anxious 
3 0.51 0.14 11 
1 0.48 0.09 13 
2 0.65 0.18 13 
Low anxious 
3 0.58 0.10 13 
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Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not significant (W(2) = 0.965, p = .684), so 
sphericity was assumed.  The results of the mixed model ANOVA are reported in 
table 5.10. 
Table 5.10:  Mixed model ANOVA for high NA data in experiment 2a 
Within-subjects effects 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Time 0.291 2 0.146 12.329 .000** 0.359 
Time x 
Anxiety 
0.078 2 0.039 3.303   .046* 0.131 
Error(Time) 0.520 44 0.012    
Between-subjects effects as above 
Anxiety 0.005 1 0.005 0.210 .651 0.009 
Error 0.537 22 0.024    
*significant at p < .05 
**significant at p < .01 
There was a main effect of time as predicted, and a significant interaction 
between anxiety group and time, which was not predicted.  A priori planned t tests 
were used to break down the main effect of time.  As predicted, participants showed 
significantly higher high NA scores at time 2 (mean=0.67) than at time 1 (mean = 
0.52), [t(23) = 4.289, p < .001].  However, high NA scores were not shown to be 
higher at time 3 than at time 1 as predicted, as no significant differences were found 
between high NA scores at time 3 (mean = 0.55) and time 1 (mean = 0.52), [t(23) = 
0.663, p = .514].  The main effect of time is illustrated in figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: Plot of average high NA scores at times 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 2a 
 
The significant interaction between anxiety group and time is demonstrated in 
Figure 5.2 below. 
By looking at figure 5.2 and the means for the low and high anxious 
conditions at times 1, 2 and 3 (table 5.9) it can be seen that they show different 
patterns.  Whilst the mean high NA score seems to return to baseline (and below) at 
time 3 for the high anxious group, it does not do so for the low anxious group, 
appearing to stay higher than the mean high NA score at time 1.  The interaction 
between anxiety condition and time was analysed using two one-way repeated 
measures ANOVAs looking at the effects of time on high NA scores for the low and 
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then the high anxious participants.  For both, the dependent variable was high NA 
and the independent variable was time (1, 2 or 3).  Mauchly’s test of sphericity was 
not significant for either the low anxious participants [W(2) = 0.890, p = .527] or for 
the high anxious participants [W(2) = 0.998, p = .993] , so sphericity was assumed.  
The results of the one-way ANOVA for the low anxious participants are reported in 
table 5.11. 
Figure 5.2:  Plots of average high NA scores at times 1, 2 and 3 for both the low and 
high anxious groups in experiment 2a. 
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Table 5.11:  Summary of one-way repeated measures ANOVA for the effects of 
time on high NA score for the low anxious participants in experiment 2a. 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Time 0.179 2 0.09 7.906 .002** 0.397 
Error(Time) 0.272 24 0.011    
**significant at p < .01 
There was a significant main effect of time for the low anxious participants.  Post-
hoc comparisons using a Bonferroni correction for multiple tests showed a 
significant increase in high NA scores between time 1 (mean=0.48) and time 2 
(mean=0.65) and between time 1 (mean = 0.48) and time 3 (mean = 0.58).  No 
significant differences were found for high NA scores between time 2 (mean = 0.65) 
and time 3 (mean = 0.58).  The analyses are summarized in table 5.12. 
Table 5.12:  Post-hoc comparisons between high NA scores at times 1, 2 and 3 for 
the low anxious participants in experiment 2a. 
Comparison Mean differences SE Sig.ª 
Time 1 – time 2 -0.165* 0.048 .005 
Time 1 – time 3 -0.095* 0.039 .033 
Time 2 – time 3                     .071 0.037 .080 
*significant at p < .05 
ª Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons 
 
 The results of the one-way ANOVA for the high anxious participants are 
reported in table 5.13. 
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Table 5.13:  Summary of one-way repeated measures ANOVA for the effects of 
time on high NA scores for the high anxious participants in experiment 2a. 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Time 0.189 2 0.095 7.637 .003** 0.433 
Error(Time) 0.248 20 0.012    
**significant at p < .01 
There was a significant main effect of time for the high anxious participants.  
Post-hoc comparisons using a Bonferroni correction for multiple tests showed a 
significant increase in high NA scores between time 1 (mean = 0.57) and time 2 
(mean = 0.69) and a significant decrease between time 2 (mean = 0.69) and time 3 
(mean = 0.51).  No significant differences were found for high NA scores between 
time 1 (mean = 0.57) and time 3 (mean = 0.51).  The analyses are summarized in 
table 5.14. 
Table 5.14:  Post-hoc comparisons between high NA scores at times 1, 2 and 3 for 
the high anxious participants in experiment 2a. 
Comparison Mean differences SE Sig.ª 
Time 1 – time 2 -0.120* 0.048 .032 
Time 1 – time 3                    0.063 0.048 .219 
Time 2 – time 3 0.183* 0.047 .003 
*significant at p < .05 
ª Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons 
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5.1.3.4 Analysis of Low NA Data 
 
5.1.3.3.1 Assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance. 
The low NA data was checked for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test as 
the number of participants was less than 2000 (Field, 2005).  No evidence of non-
normality, skew or kurtosis was found. The data also met the homogeneity of 
variance assumption.  The analyses are summarised in Appendix Y. 
 5.1.3.3.2 Mixed model ANOVA with low NA data. 
 To test the hypotheses that both the high and low anxious participants would 
show a more anxious mood at times 2 and 3 than at time 1 (as evidenced by a 
decrease in low NA at times 2 and 3 when compared with time 1), a 2x3 mixed 
model ANOVA was performed.  The dependent variable was low NA, the between 
subjects variable was anxiety group (high or low) and the within subjects variables 
was time (1, 2 or 3).  Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable at all three 
time points for both anxiety groups are shown below in table 5.15. 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not significant (W(2) = 0.860, p = .204), so 
sphericity was assumed.  The results of the mixed model ANOVA are reported in 
table 5.16. 
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Table 5.15:  Descriptive statistics for low NA scores at times 1, 2 and 3 for the high 
and low anxious groups in experiment 2a. 
Group Time Mean SD N 
1 0.49 0.08 11 
2 0.39 0.10 11 
High anxious 
3 0.51 0.09 11 
1 0.58 0.13 13 
2 0.40 0.11 13 
Low anxious 
3 0.47 0.07 13 
 
Table 5.16:  Mixed model ANOVA for low NA scores in experiment 2a. 
Within-subjects effects 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Time 0.229 2 0.115 10.435 .000** 0.322 
Time x 
Anxiety 
0.051 2 0.026 2.343      .108 0.096 
Error(Time) 0.484 44 0.011    
Between-subjects effects 
Anxiety 0.007 1 0.007 0.661 .425 0.029 
Error 0.223 22 0.010    
**significant at p < .01 
There was a main effect of time, with no significant interaction between 
anxiety group and time as predicted.  A priori planned t tests were used to break 
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down the main effect of time.  As predicted, participants showed significantly lower 
low NA scores at time 2 (mean=0.40) than at time 1 (0.54), [t(23) = 3.929, p < .01].  
However, low NA scores were not shown to be lower at time 3 than at time 1 as 
predicted, as no significant differences were found between low NA scores at time 1 
(mean = 0.0.54) and time 3 (mean = 0.49), [t(23) = 1.602, p = .123].  The main 
effect of time is illustrated in figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3: Average low NA scores at times 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 2a. 
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5.1.3.5 Summary of Analysis of Mood Data 
 High and low anxious participants showed an increase in high NA and a 
decrease in low NA following an anxious mood induction.  Significant differences in 
high NA were found for the low anxious participants between times 1 and 3, 
suggesting that NA remained elevated following the interpretation bias test.  No 
significant differences in high NA for the high anxious participants, and in low NA 
for both the high and low anxious participants were found between times 1 and 3, 
suggesting that NA returned to baseline levels following the interpretation bias test. 
5.1.3.6 Analyses of Interpretation Bias Data 
5.1.3.6.1 Data accuracy. 
The data were checked for accuracy as described by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007).  
No inaccurate data or missing cases were identified. 
 5.1.3.6.2 Cognitive load accuracy. 
 It was important to check that participants actually attempted to remember 
the digit string whilst reading the vignettes, in order to be certain that a cognitive 
load was being applied to participants.  Data regarding how many times participants 
recalled a digit string inaccurately was therefore compared for participants in the low 
and high anxious groups. 
  5.1.3.6.2.1 Normality assumptions. 
 Data normality assumptions were met (Appendix Z). 
  5.1.3.6.2.2 Independent samples t test. 
 An independent samples t test revealed that there were no significant 
differences between the mean number of inaccurately recalled digit strings between 
 123
the low (mean = 6.23) and the high anxious groups (mean = 5.73), [t(22) = 0.249, p 
= .806].  Remembering of digit strings was therefore assumed to provide an 
adequate cognitive load for both the low and the high anxious groups during the 
interpretation bias test. 
5.1.3.6.3 Assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance for 
recognition data. 
Data normality assumptions were addressed through the removal of outliers 
following which the data also met the assumption of homogeneity of variance.  A 
summary of these analyses can be found in appendix AA.  
5.1.3.6.4 Mixed model ANOVA with recognition interpretation bias data. 
It was hypothesised that both low and high anxious participants would show 
a negative (mood congruent) interpretation bias in both halves of the test.  A 
2x2x2x2 mixed model ANOVA was performed to test these hypotheses with 
recognition rating as the dependent variable, anxiety condition (high or low) as the 
between subjects variable and test half (first or second), item valence (positive or 
negative) and item type (target or foil) as the within subjects variables.  The 
hypothesised effect would be demonstrated by an interaction between item valence 
and item type for both the low and the high anxious participants.  Descriptive 
statistics for the recognition data for both the high and low anxious participants can 
be found in table 5.17.  The results of the mixed model ANOVA are reported in 
table 5.18. 
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Table 5.17:  Descriptive statistics for recognition data for all participants in 
experiment 2a. 
Anxiety Item Test half Mean SD N 
1 2.61 0.288 11 Positive target 
2 2.63 0.343 11 
1 1.66 0.287 11 Positive foil 
2 1.68 0.343 11 
1 2.62 0.627 11 Negative target 
2 2.65 0.515 11 
1 1.54 0.307 11 
High 
anxious 
Negative foil 
2 1.61 0.226 11 
1 2.60 0.416 13 Positive target 
2 2.74 0.617 13 
1 1.55 0.328 13 Positive foil 
2 1.54 0.524 13 
1 2.63 0.522 13 Negative target 
2 2.28 0.650 13 
1 1.44 0.250 13 
Low 
anxious 
Negative foil 
2 1.45 0.414 13 
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Table 5.18:  Mixed model ANOVA for recognition data in experiment 2a. 
Within-subjects effects 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Test half 0.003 1 0.003 0.028 .869 0.001 
Test half x anxiety group 0.094 1 0.094 1.034 .320 0.045 
Error (test half) 1.990 22 .090    
Item valence 0.466 1 0.466 2.046 .167 0.085 
Item valence x anxiety group 0.156 1 0.156 0.687 .416 0.030 
Error (item valence) 5.010 22 0.228    
Item type 51.263 1 51.263 161.578 .000** 0.880 
Item type x anxiety group 0.048 1 0.048 0.152 .700 0.007 
Error (item type) 6.980 22 0.317    
Test half x item valence 0.113 1 0.113 1.464 .239 0.062 
Test half x item valence x 
anxiety group 
0.209 1 0.209 2.704 .114 0.109 
Error (test half x item valence) 1.702 22 0.077    
Test half x item type 0.043 1 0.043 0.383 .542 0.017 
Test half x item type x anxiety 
group 
0.022 1 0.022 0.198 .661 0.009 
Error (test half x item type) 2.461 22 0.112    
Item valence x item type 0.000 1 0.000 0.001 .978 0.000 
Item valence x item type x 
anxiety group 
0.156 1 0.156 2.014 .170 0.084 
Error (item valence x item type) 1.708 22 0.078    
Test half x item valence x item 
type 
0.234 1 0.234 2.962 .099 0.119 
Test half x item valence x item 
type x anxiety group 
0.173 1 0.173 2.194 .153 0.091 
Error (test half x item valence x 
item type) 1.739 22 0.079 
   
Between-subjects effects 
Anxiety 0.428 1 0.428 0.733 .401 0.032 
Error 12.845 22 0.584    
**significant at p < .01 
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There was a main effect of item type, with target items (mean = 2.60) being 
recognised more often than foil items (mean = 1.56) by all participants.  The effect is 
demonstrated in figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4:  Average recognition ratings for target and foil items for all participants 
in experiment 2a 
 
 
The predicted interaction between item valence and item type was not found 
[F(1,22) = 0.001,  p= .978].  A post-hoc power calculation was performed which 
showed that the analysis achieved power of only .05 using partial eta-squared as an 
estimate of effect size. 
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One interaction that did approach significance was that between test half, 
item valence and item type [F(1,22) = 2.962, p = .099].  Post-hoc power for this 
analysis was also low (.12).  By examining a plot of the interaction (figure 5.5) it 
appears as if recognition of positive target items increased from the first to the 
second half of the test, and that recognition of negative target items decreased from 
the first to the second half of the test for all participants. 
Figure 5.5:  Average recognition data for all participants in the first and second half 
of the test for positive and negative items and for target and foil items in experiment 
2a. 
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5.1.3.6.5 Summary of interpretation bias data analysis. 
As predicted, all participants showed higher recognition of target over foil 
items.  For all participants the hypothesised negative (mood congruent) 
interpretation bias in both halves of the test was not found.  Power for the analysis 
was found to be low and it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that 
interpretation biases would not be evident. 
5.1.3.7 Summary of Results of Experiment 2a 
 Following an anxious mood induction, both high and low anxious 
participants demonstrated a more anxious mood shown by an increase in high NA 
and a decrease in low NA.  Following a test for interpretation biases, high anxious 
participants’ mood returned to baseline, as shown by a decrease in high NA and an 
increase in low NA.  Low anxious participants’ mood appeared to return to baseline 
when low NA scores were examined, but did not appear to do so for high NA scores.  
No evidence of interpretation biases was found, with all participants showing higher 
recognition of target over foil items.  Limited evidence was found for increasing 
recognition of positive targets and decreasing recognition of negative targets from 
the first to the second half of the test. 
5.1.4 Experiment 2b – Positive Mood Induction 
5.1.4.1Participant Demographics 
Demographic information and screening questionnaire data for participants 
included in the data analysis for experiment 2b are shown in table 5.19 below. 
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Table 5.19:  Demographic and screening questionnaire information for all 
participants data included in the analysis for experiment 2b. 
 Total High anxious Low anxious 
 N % N % N % 
Total 
 
26 100 13 50 13 50 
Female 17 65 9 53 8 47 
Male 9 35 4 44 5 56 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Age 24.7 6.93 24.0 7.10 25.3 6.97 
MANX 14.3 5.11 18.5 2.82 10.2 3.11 
STAI 41.4 11.56 51.5 5.04 31.2 5.43 
S-
MCSDS 
6.6 2.74 4.8 2.19 8.6 1.78 
BDI-II 7.4 6.05 11.1 6.12 3.8 3.17 
MANX – Mackintosh and Mathews Anxiety Scale 
STAI – Spielberger Trait Anxiety Scale 
S-MCSDS – Short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
BDI-II – Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition 
 
 A Chi-square test showed that the high and low anxious conditions did not 
differ by gender [χ²(1) = 0.170, p = .680].  Since the data for age and BDI-II scores 
was not normally distributed, being significantly skewed, the Mann Whitney U Test 
was used to compare the high and low anxious conditions on these variables.  The 
results of these tests are presented in table 5.20 below. The conditions were found to 
differ significantly on BDI-II score but not on age. 
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Table 5.20:  Mann Whitney U Tests for differences in age and BDI-II scores 
between the high and low anxious conditions in experiment 2b. 
 U z-score Exact sig. (2-
tailed) 
Age 61.5 1.18                      .243 
BDI-II score 20.0 3.32 .000* 
BDI-II – Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition 
* significant difference at p < .05 
 
The data for MANX, STAI and S-MCSDS scores was all found to be 
normally distributed so independent samples t tests were used to compare the high 
and low anxious groups on these variables.  The data also met the homogeneity of 
variance assumption.  The results of these tests are presented in table 5.21 below.  
The conditions were found to differ significantly on MANX, STAI and S-MCSDS 
scores. 
Table 5.21:  T Tests for differences in MANX, STAI and S-MCSDS scores between 
the high and low anxious conditions in experiment 2b. 
 t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
MANX 7.07 24 .000** 
STAI 9.88 24 .000** 
S-MCSDS 4.65 23 .000** 
MANX – Mackintosh and Mathews Anxiety Scale 
STAI – Spielberger Trait Anxiety Scale 
S-MCSDS – Short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
** significant difference at p < .01  
As expected, the conditions differed according to their trait anxiety score as 
assessed by both the MANX and the STAI.  Significant differences between the 
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conditions in terms of BDI-II and S-MCSDS scores might be expected given 
differences in trait anxiety, as depression and anxiety scores were found to correlate 
to a high degree (Clark et al.,1994) and social desirability was found to decrease in 
those with high trait anxiety (Lambie & Baker, 2003).   MANX, STAI, BDI-II and 
S-MCSDS scores were not entered as covariates in the analysis of the mood and 
interpretation bias data as to do so would involve loss of degrees of freedom 
(Coolican, 2004) with resulting loss of power which was already low due to smaller 
numbers of participants recruited than had been aimed for.  Additionally, entering 
these data as covariates into the analysis would have provided little additional 
information regarding the variables of interest in the study (mood and interpretation 
bias) but would have reduced the chance of finding significant effects where they 
existed. 
5.1.4.2 Mood Data 
5.1.4.2.1 Selection of mood items. 
Eight visual analogue scales were used for participants to rate their mood at 
time points one, two and three.  Literature reviewed in chapter 1 suggested that a 
positive mood induction should produce increases on items high in PA (happy and 
carefree) and decreases on items low in PA (low and sad). 
5.1.4.2.2 Correlations between mood items. 
In order to be sure that these items could be combined to provide two 
measures of high and low PA, a correlation analysis was carried out.  The data were 
not normally distributed and showed significant skew and kurtosis (Appendix AB) 
but it was not possible to transform the data due to the extent and direction of skew 
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and kurtosis at different time points, on different items.  A non-parametric test was 
therefore used to examine the correlations between the four items at times 1, 2 and 3, 
the results of which are presented in table 5.22. 
Table 5.22:  Spearman’s correlations between items low and high in PA at time 
points 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 2b 
Time Item Carefree Happy Low Sad 
Carefree 1 0.568** -0.291 -0.435* 
Happy 0.568** 1 -0.75** -0.703** 
Low -0.291 -0.75** 1 0.762** 
1 
Sad -0.435* -0.703** 0.762** 1 
Carefree 1 0.514** 0.076 -0.446* 
Happy 0.514** 1 -0.815** -0.917** 
Low 0.076 -0.815** 1 0.798** 
2 
Sad -0.446* -0.917** 0.798** 1 
Carefree 1 0.741** -0.562** -0.502** 
Happy 0.741** 1 -0.611** -0.627** 
Low -0.562** -0.611** 1 0.632** 
3 
Sad -0.502** -0.627** 0.632** 1 
*Significant correlation at p < .05 
**Significant correlation at p < .01 
  
Items high in PA were found to be significantly correlated at all three times, 
as were items low in PA.  Two new variables high and low PA were therefore 
calculated by averaging scores on carefree and happy, and low and sad respectively 
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at all three time points.  Analyses of the low and high PA variables is summarised 
below. 
5.1.4.3 Analysis of High PA Data 
5.1.4.3.1 Data accuracy. 
The data were checked for missing values and inaccurate data input but no 
cases were found (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
5.1.4.3.2 Assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance. 
Data normality assumptions were addressed through the removal of outliers 
and the data did not meet the homogeneity of variance assumption so a more 
conservative alpha level of .025 was used (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).  The 
analyses are summarised in Appendix AC.  
 5.1.4.3.3 Mixed model ANOVA with high PA data. 
 To test the hypotheses that both the high and low anxious participants would 
show a more positive mood at times 2 and 3 than at time 1 (as evidenced by an 
increase in high PA at times 2 and 3 when compared with time 1), a 2x3 mixed 
model ANOVA was performed.  The dependent variable was high PA, the between 
subjects variable was anxiety group (high or low) and the within subjects variables 
was time (1, 2 or 3).  Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable at all three 
time points for both anxiety groups are shown below in table 5.23. 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not significant [W(2) = 0.997, p = .963], so 
sphericity was assumed.  The results of the mixed model ANOVA are reported in 
table 5.24. 
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Table 5.23:  Descriptive statistics for high PA scores at times 1, 2 and 3 for the high 
and low anxious groups in experiment 2b. 
Group Time Mean SD N 
1 0.45 0.11 13 
2 0.58 0.09 13 
High anxious 
3 0.44 0.11 13 
1 0.55 0.18 13 
2 0.65 0.16 13 
Low anxious 
3 0.50 0.12 13 
 
Table 5.24:  Mixed model ANOVA for high PA scores in experiment 2b. 
Within-subjects effects 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Time 0.307 2 0.153 15.147 .000* 0.387 
Time x 
Anxiety 
0.005 2 0.002 0.223      .801 0.009 
Error(Time) 0.486 48 0.010    
Between-subjects effects 
Anxiety 0.111 1 0.111 3.331 .080 0.965 
Error 0.798 24 0.033    
*significant at p < .025 
There was a main effect of time, with no significant interaction between anxiety 
group and time as predicted.  Parametric a priori planned t tests were used to break 
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down the main effect of time.  As predicted, participants showed significantly higher 
high PA scores at time 2 (mean = 0.61) than at time 1 (0.50), [t(25) = 4.051, p < 
.025].  However, high PA scores were not shown to be lower at time 3 than at time 1 
as predicted, as no significant differences were found between high PA scores at 
time 1 (mean = 0.50) and time 3 (mean = 0.47), [t(25) = 1.292, p = .208].  The main 
effect of time is illustrated in figure 5.6. 
Figure 5.6: Average high PA scores at times 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 2b. 
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5.1.4.4 Analysis of Low PA Data 
 
5.1.4.4.1 Data accuracy. 
The data were checked for missing values and inaccurate data input but no 
cases were found (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
5.1.4.4.2 Assumptions of normality and homogeneity of variance. 
Data normality assumptions were addressed through the removal of outliers 
following which the data also met the assumption of homogeneity of variance.  The 
analyses are summarised in Appendix AD.   
 5.1.4.4.3 Mixed model ANOVA with low PA data. 
 To test the hypotheses that both the high and low anxious participants would 
show a more positive mood at times 2 and 3 than at time 1 (as evidenced by a 
decrease in low PA at times 2 and 3 when compared with time 1), a 2x3 mixed 
model ANOVA was performed.  The dependent variable was low PA, the between 
subjects variable was anxiety group (high or low) and the within subjects variables 
was time (1, 2 or 3).  Descriptive statistics for the dependent variable at all three 
time points for both anxiety groups are shown below in table 5.25. 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not significant [W(2) = 0.815, p = .096], so 
sphericity was assumed.  The results of the mixed model ANOVA are reported in 
table 5.26. 
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Table 5.25:  Descriptive statistics for low PA scores at times 1, 2 and 3 for the high 
and low anxious groups in experiment 2b. 
Group Time Mean SD N 
1 0.49 0.16 13 
2 0.38 0.19 13 
High anxious 
3 0.49 0.09 13 
1 0.47 0.12 13 
2 0.37 0.18 13 
Low anxious 
3 0.46 0.13 13 
 
Table 5.26:  Mixed model ANOVA for low PA scores in experiment 2b. 
Within-subjects effects 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Time 0.204 2 0.102 8.871 .000* 0.278 
Time x 
Anxiety 
0.001 2 0.001 0.062      .940 0.003 
Error(Time) 0.528 48 0.011    
Between-subjects effects 
Anxiety 0.007 1 0.007 0.155 .697 0.006 
Error 1.055 24 0.044    
*significant at p < .01 
There was a main effect of time, with no significant interaction between 
anxiety group and time as predicted.  Parametric a priori planned t tests were used to 
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break down the main effect of time.  As predicted, participants showed significantly 
lower low PA scores at time 2 (mean = 0.37) than at time 1 (mean = 0.48), [t(25) = 
3.309, p < .01].  However, low PA scores were not shown to be lower at time 3 than 
at time 1 as predicted, as no significant differences were found between low PA 
scores at time 1 (mean = 0.48) and time 3 (mean = 0.48), [t(25) = 0.000, p = 1.000].  
The main effect of time is illustrated in figure 5.7. 
Figure 5.7: Average low PA scores at times 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 2b 
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5.1.4.5 Summary of Analysis of Mood Data 
 High and low anxious participants showed an increase in high PA and a 
decrease in low PA following a positive mood induction.  No significant differences 
in high or low PA were found for either the high or low anxious participants 
between times 1 and 3, suggesting that PA returned to baseline levels following the 
interpretation bias test. 
5.1.4.6 Analyses of Interpretation Bias Data 
 5.1.4.6.1 Data accuracy. 
The data were checked for accuracy as described by Tabachnick and Fidell 
(2007).  No inaccurate data or missing cases were identified. 
 5.1.4.6.2 Cognitive load accuracy. 
It was important to check that participants actually attempted to remember 
the digit string whilst reading the vignettes, in order to be certain that a cognitive 
load was being applied to participants.  Data regarding how many times participants 
recalled a digit string accurately and inaccurately was therefore compared for 
participants in the low and high anxious groups. 
  5.1.4.6.2.1 Normality assumptions. 
 The data was checked for using the Shapiro-Wilk test as the number of 
participants was less than 2000 (Field, 2005).  No evidence of non-normality, skew 
or kurtosis was found. The analyses are summarised in Appendix AE. 
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  5.1.4.6.2.2 Independent and paired samples t tests. 
 An independent samples t test revealed that there was a significant difference 
between the mean number of inaccurately recalled digit strings between the low 
(mean = 4.69) and the high anxious groups (mean = 7.69), [t(24) = 2.326, p < .05].   
 Whilst this suggests that the cognitive load was more effective for the low than the 
high anxious group, a paired samples t test revealed that in general participants 
recalled significantly more digit strings accurately (mean=13.8) than inaccurately 
(mean=6.2), t(23) = 5.444, p < .01.  Remembering of digit strings was therefore 
assumed to provide an adequate cognitive load during the interpretation bias test. 
 5.1.4.6.3Normality assumptions for the recognition data. 
Data normality assumptions were addressed through the removal of outliers 
following which the data also met the assumption of homogeneity of variance.  A 
summary of these analyses can be found in appendix AF.  
5.1.4.6.4 Mixed model ANOVA with recognition interpretation bias data. 
It was hypothesised that all participants would show a positive (mood 
congruent) interpretation bias in both halves of the test.  A 2x2x2x2 mixed model 
ANOVA was performed to test this hypothesis with recognition rating as the 
dependent variable, anxiety condition (high or low) as the between subjects variable 
and test half (first or second), item valence (positive or negative) and item type 
(target or foil) as the within subjects variables.  The hypothesised effects would be 
demonstrated by an interaction between item valence and item type.  Descriptive 
statistics for the recognition data for both the high and low anxious participants can 
 141
be found in table 5.27.  The results of the mixed model ANOVA are reported in 
table 5.28. 
Table 5.27:  Descriptive statistics for recognition data for all participants in 
experiment 2b. 
Anxiety Item Test half Mean SD N 
1 2.76 0.423 13 Positive 
target 2 2.80 0.469 13 
1 0.72 0.460 13 Positive foil 
2 1.60 0.428 13 
1 2.60 0.497 13 Negative 
target 2 2.70 0.549 13 
1 1.51 0.395 13 
High 
anxious 
Negative 
foil 2 1.65 0.422 13 
1 2.74 0.403 13 Positive 
target 2 2.83 0.368 13 
1 1.48 0.196 13 Positive foil 
2 1.62 0.387 13 
1 2.46 0.487 13 Negative 
target 2 2.50 0.705 13 
1 1.39 0.253 13 
Low 
anxious 
Negative 
foil 2 1.48 0.366 13 
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Table 5.28:  Mixed model ANOVA for recognition data in experiment 2b. 
Within-subjects effects 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Test half 0.213 1 0.213 1.686 .206 0.066 
Test half x anxiety group 0.031 1 0.031 0.248 .623 0.010 
Error (test half) 3.026 24 0.126    
Item valence 1.270 1 1.270 4.689 .041* 0.163 
Item valence x anxiety group 0.138 1 0.138 0.508 .483 0.021 
Error (item valence) 6.498 24 0.271    
Item type 64.971 1 64.971 519.322 .000** 0.956 
Item type x anxiety group 0.031 1 0.031 0.250 .622 0.010 
Error (item type) 3.003 24 0.125    
Test half x item valence 0.039 1 0.039 0.694 .413 0.028 
Test half x item valence x 
anxiety group 
0.153 1 0.153 2.728 .112 0.102 
Error (test half x item valence) 1.350 24 0.056    
Test half x item type 0.001 1 0.001 0.007 .934 0.000 
Test half x item type x anxiety 
group 
0.036 1 0.036 0.432 .517 0.018 
Error (test half x item type) 2.021 24 0.084    
Item valence x item type 0.194 1 0.194 1.397 .249 0.055 
Item valence x item type x 
anxiety group 
0.064 1 0.064 0.462 .503 0.019 
Error (item valence x item type) 3.330 24 0.139    
Test half x item valence x item 
type 
0.034 1 0.034 0.517 .479 0.021 
Test half x item valence x item 
type x anxiety group 
0.034 1 0.034 0.517 .479 0.021 
Error (test half x item valence x 
item type) 1.568 24 0.065 
   
Between-subjects effects 
Anxiety 0.598 1 0.598 0.878 .358 0.035 
Error 16.342 24 0.681    
*significant at p < .05 
**significant at p < .01 
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There was a main effect of item valence, with positive items (mean = 2.19) 
being recognised more often than negative items (mean = 2.04) by all participants.  
The effect is demonstrated in figure 5.8. 
Figure 5.8:  Average recognition ratings for positive and negative items for all 
participants in experiment 2b. 
 
 
There was a main effect of item type, with target items (mean = 2.67) being 
recognised more often than foil items (mean = 1.56).  The effect is demonstrated in 
figure 5.9. 
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Figure 5.9:  Average recognition ratings for target and foil items for all participants 
in experiment 2b. 
 
 
The predicted interaction between item valence and item type was not found, 
[F(1,24) = 1.397, p = .249] and observed power for the interaction was low (.21). 
 5.1.4.6.5 Summary of interpretation bias data analysis. 
As predicted, all participants showed higher recognition of target over foil 
items and they also showed higher recognition of positive over negative items (a 
positive response bias).  The hypothesised positive (mood congruent) interpretation 
bias in both halves of the test for all participants was not found although observed 
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power was found to be low.  It was not possible to reject the null hypothesis that 
interpretation biases would not be evident.   
5.1.4.7 Summary of Results of Experiment 2b 
 Following a positive mood induction, both high and low anxious participants 
demonstrated a more positive mood shown by an increase in high PA and a decrease 
in low PA.  Following a test for interpretation biases, both low and high anxious 
participants’ mood returned to baseline, as shown by a decrease in high PA and an 
increase in low PA.  No evidence of interpretation biases as such was found, with all 
participants showing higher recognition of target over foil items and higher 
recognition of positive over negative items. 
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CHAPTER 6:  EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B 
6.1 Discussion 
6.1.1 Overview 
A discussion of the findings for experiments 2a (section 6.1.2) and 2b 
(section 6.1.3) is presented with reference to hypothesised results (sections 6.1.2.1 
and 6.1.3.1 for experiments 2a and 2b respectively) and observed results (sections 
6.1.2.2 and 6.1.3.2 respectively).  Discussion of the results in light of reviewed 
literature and relevant theory is discussed in sections 6.1.2.3 and 6.1.3.3 for 
experiments 2a and 2b respectively. 
6.1.2 Experiment 2a 
6.1.2.1 Hypotheses 
 For experiment 2a it was predicted that both low and high anxious 
participants would show a more anxious mood following an anxious mood 
induction.  Using ideas from the dual-process model of mood regulation, it was 
predicted that for both low and high anxious participants, negative, mood congruent 
interpretation biases would be evident throughout the interpretation bias test as a 
result of substantive processing.  It was not predicted that mood incongruent 
interpretation biases would emerge as it was hypothesised that the cognitive load 
would not allow effortful motivated processing to occur.  It was predicted that the 
mood congruent interpretation biases would result in maintenance of an anxious 
mood for both low and high anxious participants following the interpretation bias 
test. 
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6.1.2.2 Results 
As predicted, both low and high anxious participants showed a more anxious 
mood following an anxious mood induction.  Interpretation biases were not observed 
for low or high anxious participants, instead all participants showed higher 
recognition of target over foil items.  Except for low anxious participants’ high NA 
scores, mood was observed to return to baseline for all participants following the 
interpretation bias test. 
6.1.2.3 Discussion 
It is difficult to say which of the models the results of experiment 2a support.  
It seems likely that the decline in anxious mood was due to mood decay, due to the 
length and nature of the interpretation bias test (as discussed in chapter 4).  Whilst 
low anxious participants’ high NA scores did not appear to return to baseline 
following the interpretation bias test in experiment 2a, the relevant result did 
approach significance, and this is most likely due to low power rather than mood 
maintenance per se.  Erber and Tesser’s (1992) ‘absorption’ hypothesis predicted the 
attenuation of positive and negative moods in experiment 2 through prevention of 
focus on mood congruent thoughts.  This however seems unlikely as similar results 
were seen for experiments 1a and 1b where a cognitive load was not present.  Given 
the failure to find evidence of interpretation biases of any kind it seems unlikely that 
an explanation for the mood results around mood repair is plausible.   
The failure to find any kind of interpretation bias  suggests that interpretation 
biases are not involved in mood repair as the dual-process model  predicts.  There 
are a number of possible explanations for this finding. 
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Firstly, as commented on in chapter five, observed power for the analysis 
that would demonstrate interpretation biases (an interaction between item valence 
and item type) was low, suggesting that the sample size was too small to detect any 
effects that may have been present.  It is therefore impossible to accept or reject the 
null hypothesis that no interpretation biases would be present.  However there is an 
important point to be made about this conclusion.  Observed power is calculated 
based on the observed effect size, not on effect size estimated from previous 
research (O’Keefe, 2007).  The effect sizes for the two interactions observed in 
experiment 1a (anxiety group, test half and item type; test half, item valence and 
item type) were large (partial eta-squared=0.94).  Vinnicombe et al. (2006) also 
reported a large effect size (partial eta-squared=0.89) for a two-way interaction (item 
valence and mood induction).  Whilst power was undoubtedly low, the failure to 
find even a small effect that approached significance was surprising (the effect size 
found was =0.000). 
Secondly, it is possible that the participants who took part in experiment 2a 
were not anxious enough for any kind of interpretation bias to be evident as their 
average trait STAI score was actually over 2 standard deviations lower than the 
clinical cut-off.  This seems unlikely as the mean trait STAI score for the 
participants who took part in experiment 1a was actually lower, and interpretation 
biases were still evident in that experiment.  We also know it is possible to induce 
mood congruent interpretation biases in control participants and in those showing 
high levels of trait anxiety (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) and it is therefore difficult 
to understand why mood congruent biases at least would not be present.  As mood 
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congruent biases were not observed in experiment 1 either, it is possible that any 
bias had decayed during the relatively long period between the mood induction 
procedure and the interpretation bias test.  This would seem more likely given the 
relatively mild nature of the induced mood, which would lead to respectively mild 
induced biases. 
Thirdly, it is possible that the cognitive load was so extreme that it prevented 
participants engaging in the interpretation bias test at all that is, their responses were 
no better than chance would predict.  This seems unlikely given that a large effect 
was seen for item type, which demonstrates that all participants recognised target 
items significantly more often than foils.  It therefore seems obvious that participants 
were engaged in the task as they were able to recognise sentences that were related 
to the content of the vignettes compared with those that weren’t. 
Lastly, the hedonistic model does not contain terms enabling predictions to 
be made under conditions of cognitive load as the mechanisms are not specified in 
detail.  Both the social constraints and dual-process models would predict that mood 
repair mechanisms will breakdown under cognitive load as the processes are 
effortful.  Neither mood congruent nor mood incongruent biases were observed.  
Perhaps the cognitive load was extreme enough to cause the process of motivated 
processing to breakdown for both the low and the high anxious participants, and also 
to cause substantive processing to breakdown.  Breaking down mood congruent 
biases is an important focus of psychological therapies for anxiety disorders (Wells, 
1997) and this finding might prove useful for future research into cognitive bias 
modification in anxiety disorders.  If neither mood congruent nor mood incongruent 
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biases were present induced mood would be expected to decay as there would be no 
bias to regulate it.  An explanation for both the mood and the interpretation bias 
results involving the blocking of mood repair mechanisms by the cognitive load 
therefore seems likely. 
Further discussion of the results in terms of theoretical and clinical 
implications, and with regard to methodological limitations, can be found in chapter 
7. 
6.1.2.4 Conclusions 
 Experiment 2a has produced some unexpected results which seem possible to 
accommodate within the dual-process framework.  It seems that the cognitive load 
may have stopped mood incongruent interpretation biases acting in a mood repair 
mechanism for both low and high anxious participants.  Whilst methodological 
issues may play a role in the interpretation of the results, it may be possible to utilise 
them in future research into the benefits of cognitive bias modification with 
clinically anxious individuals. 
6.1.3 Experiment 2b 
6.1.3.1 Hypotheses 
For experiment 2b it was predicted that both low and high anxious 
participants would show a more positive mood following a positive mood induction.  
Using ideas from the dual-process model of mood regulation, it was predicted that 
both low and high anxious participants would show mood congruent interpretation 
biases throughout as a result of substantive processing.  It was predicted that this 
would result in maintenance of the positive mood. 
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6.1.3.2 Results 
As predicted, all participants showed a more positive mood following a 
positive mood induction.  Whilst it was predicted that all participants would show 
evidence of mood congruent, positive interpretation biases, no evidence of 
interpretation biases as such was found.  All participants showed higher recognition 
of target over foil items and higher recognition of positive over negative items (a 
positive response bias).  Following the test for interpretation biases, both low and 
high anxious participants’ mood returned to baseline. 
6.1.3.3 Discussion 
 Similar to experiment 1b, it is difficult to say which model of mood 
regulation the results of experiment 2b support, as although an induced positive 
mood returned to baseline, this occurred following a measured positive response 
bias.  It seems possible that the decline in positive mood following the interpretation 
bias test was due to decay, as the test is long and repetitive, and that any effects of 
mood regulation on mood were lost during this procedure which took up to 40 
minutes to complete. 
 Whilst mood decay is likely to be the explanation for the lack of observed 
mood maintenance, the hedonistic model is unable to account for this, due to the 
unspecified nature of the mechanisms involved.  The social constraints model might 
suggest that participants did not attempt to regulate their mood as the context was 
not sufficiently challenging or anxiety provoking.  However, changing the context 
from experiment 1, by adding a cognitive load and making the task more 
challenging, did not achieve significantly different results suggesting that context 
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alone cannot explain the results obtained.  This indicates that the social constraints 
model is not best placed to make predictions about when and how individuals go 
about regulating their mood. 
It is difficult to evaluate the dual-process model in light of the results of this 
experiment alone.  The failure to find mood congruent interpretation biases, which 
might have supported the model could be explained by the relatively long time delay 
between the mood induction and the interpretation bias test, and the mild nature of 
the mood induced.  The finding of a positive response bias would support such an 
explanation, since it suggests the presence of a decaying bias.  Similar to experiment 
2a, it seems unlikely that the cognitive load made it impossible for participants to 
attend to or access the task, given the higher recognition of target over foil items. 
Further discussion of the results in terms of theoretical and clinical 
implications, and with regard to methodological limitations, can be found in chapter 
7. 
6.1.3.4 Conclusions 
The results of experiment 2b could be seen to support the dual-process model 
of mood regulation, with the lack of mood maintenance being explained through a 
process of mood decay.  By combining conclusions regarding experiments 1a and 1b 
with those for experiments 2a and 2b it should be possible to make more definite 
conclusions regarding the utility of the dual-process model. 
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CHAPTER 7:  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
7.1 Overview 
 A summary of the methodological limitations of the study is provided in 
section 7.1.1.  This is followed by a summary of the hypotheses (section 7.1.2) and 
results (section 7.1.3) for both experiments 1 and 2.  Implications of the results for a 
hedonistic model of mood regulation are discussed in section 7.1.4, for the social 
constraints model in section 7.1.5 and for the dual-process model in section 7.1.6.  
Further implications for the results in terms of the effects of trait anxiety on 
interpretation biases (section 7.1.7) and in terms of a bi-directional relationship 
between mood and interpretation biases (section 7.1.8) are also discussed.  Ideas for 
future research and discussion of the clinical implications of the current research are 
set forward in section 7.1.9.  Conclusions are made in section 7.1.10. 
7.1.1 Methodological Limitations 
7.1.1.1 Design 
 Analyses for experiments 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b with regards to both the mood 
data and the interpretation bias data were conducted separately.  Data from all four 
experiments could have been pooled in order to perform one analysis for each of the 
mood and interpretation bias data, by adding two new variables of mood induction 
condition (positive or anxious) and cognitive load (load or no load).  Hypotheses 
regarding differences between the positive and negative mood inductions and 
regarding the effects of a cognitive load could then have been tested.  The decision 
to conduct separate analyses for the positive and negative mood inductions was 
made due to theoretical and empirical support for the independent nature of PA and 
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NA, as reviewed in chapter 1.  It was felt that any effects of mood inductions on PA 
and NA should therefore be assessed independently. 
 Whilst it was planned that the experiments conducted with load and those 
conducted without be run as part of the same study, this did not occur in practice as 
outlined in chapter 2.  As a result most participants who took part in experiment 2 
were recruited at a different time to those recruited for experiment 1.  There were 
also differences in testing conditions and recruitment methods, as well as differences 
in the experimenters. It seemed sensible to conduct separate analyses in order to be 
explicit regarding these sources of systematic bias.  Separate analyses were carried 
out in order to maximize the chance of finding effects of interest to the research 
hypotheses as differences in participant numbers in experiments 1 and 2 would have 
reduced power.  
7.1.1.2 Participants 
Due to changes to University regulations discussed in chapter 2 and technical 
problems with the apparatus it was not possible to recruit as many participants as 
planned to experiment 2.  This reduced the power of the analyses for the mood and 
interpretation bias data (Coolican, 2004).  However, as discussed in chapter 6, the 
failure to find even a small effect that approached significance was surprising, given 
the large effects found in experiment 1 and by Hunter et al. (2006) and Vinnicombe 
et al. (2006).  Nevertheless it is difficult to conclude that the analyses had sufficient 
power to detect any effects that might have existed. 
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7.1.1.3 Measures 
 7.1.1.3.1 MANX. 
 As discussed in chapters 3 and 5, there were unexpected difficulties with the 
MANX as an adequate and reliable predictor of STAI score.  Whilst it was expected 
that participants who attended for testing sessions would fall either within the high 
or low anxious ranges, many did not, and this contributed to the small difference in 
STAI score between the low and high anxious groups.  These effects are surprising 
given the good correlation between MANX and STAI scores reported by 
Mackintosh and Mathews (2006), and the acceptable correlations found in 
experiments 1 and 2.  The difficulties in using the MANX to reliably predict STAI 
scores is probably due to low test-retest reliability, which has yet to be assessed.  
Trait anxiety is defined as a relatively stable variable, and the STAI has acceptable 
test-retest reliability (Spielberger, 1983).  
 As the MANX was used only to predict STAI scores, and therefore did not 
directly affect the main results.  As such the real effect of the difficulties with the 
MANX was to reduce the difference between the low and high anxious groups.  This 
problem is discussed in more detail in section 7.1.7. 
 7.1.1.3.2 VAS. 
 The measure of current mood used in experiments 1 and 2 is unstandardised, 
with undefined reliability and validity.  It is therefore possible that the results 
achieved were not due to changes in PA and NA as concluded in chapters 4 and 6.  
However, correlations were found amongst items theoretically predicted to be 
related to each other which suggests some degree of internal consistency, and the 
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measure was able to detect predicted changes in mood over time.  The use of eight 
items also helps to control for general positive or negative response biases, which 
can occur in research looking for more specific interpretation biases (Salemink, et 
al., 2007a), as response biases would be more likely to occur with a measure with 
fewer items. 
 Analyses were carried out only for the NA data in experiments 1a and 2a, 
and for only the PA data in experiments 1b and 2b.  However all participants in both 
experiments completed all eight items of the VAS at all three time points.  Future 
research might consider assessing only those items which pertain to the predicted 
variable of interest for example, PA items for a positive mood induction.  This is 
especially important as the measure was chosen for its brevity, which is 
compromised when participants complete items which are never used in a 
subsequent analysis.  It is not thought that this affected the results to a great extent, 
as each item took most participants less than 10 seconds to complete.  
 7.1.1.3.3 Interpretation bias test. 
The reported method of assessing interpretation biases has been used several 
times in similar research studies due to its ability to discriminate between social and 
physical threat and to truly discriminate between response biases and interpretative 
biases (e.g., Salemink et al.,2007a).  However, as Teape (2009) pointed out, it is 
possible due to the length and depth of the procedure that participants were aware 
that their interpretation biases were being assessed, and therefore altered their 
responses accordingly (Salemink et al., 2007b).  This would therefore not represent a 
measurement of true interpretation biases, but a measurement of participants’ 
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response bias given their assessment of experimenter expectations.  As Teape (2009) 
pointed out, whilst this was not explicitly measured in either experiment 1 or 2, such 
an explanation seems unlikely.  Participants in both experiments were routinely 
asked what they thought the aims of the experiment were, and very few were able to 
correctly identify them.  Only two participants commented on doing what Salemink 
et al. (2007b) hypothesized was occurring that is, consciously changing their 
responses from negative to positive.  It therefore seems likely that the results can be 
applied to understanding the function of more naturalistic biases, as they do not 
seem to be due solely to conscious efforts to modify responding.  However, future 
research should measure participants’ awareness of the process more formally in 
order to be certain that this is the case. 
7.1.1.4 Materials 
 7.1.1.4.1 Mood induction procedure. 
 The film clips effectively induced both a positive and an anxious mood, 
although it appears as if the extensiveness and durability of these moods was low 
given that they appeared to decay following the interpretation bias test in both 
experiments.  Inducing moods in experimental conditions is always challenging, 
especially given that more extreme methods would most likely not be ethical, and 
induced moods are therefore by their nature less extreme.  The decision not to use 
music to enhance the mood induction procedure seems warranted, given research 
that suggested that the effects of musical mood induction varied between individuals 
(Crozier, 1997), and that music induced only low intensity emotions (Konecni, 
2008).  Music may therefore have decreased the overall effects of the films on mood, 
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rather than enhanced them.  Nevertheless, future research may need to focus on 
perhaps using only one film clip, in order to prevent possible dilution of effects from 
one film to the next, to determine the optimal mood induction procedure.  
Additionally, future research could consider including only data for participants who 
reached pre-specified criteria for mood induction, in order to ensure that differences 
between mood induction conditions are achieved. 
 7.1.1.4.2 Cognitive load. 
 The results of experiment 2 suggest that the cognitive resources of both low 
and high anxious participants were more extremely impaired than expected, as no 
evidence of interpretation biases of any kind was found.  This is supported by the 
fact that nearly all participants who took part in experiment 2 commented on how 
difficult it was to remember the numbers at the same time as completing the 
interpretation bias measure.  Despite this, the results of experiment 2 where higher 
recognition of target over foil items was seen, suggest the method did not stop 
participants engaging in the task itself.  Further research is needed to determine 
whether an easier task would result in the observation of the predicted mood 
congruent interpretation biases for example a simultaneous Stroop task presented 
visually (Stroop, 1935).  Having said that the brevity and simplicity of the task 
meant that it did not add excessive time to the procedure. 
7.1.1.5 Procedure 
 7.1.1.5.1 Recruitment. 
 Whilst recruitment to experiments 1 and 2 was planned to run concurrently, 
in practice there were differences both in when participants were recruited and also 
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in the methods used, as discussed in chapter 2.  There is therefore a small possibility 
that participants who took part in experiments 1 and 2 effectively came from 
different populations.  This seems unlikely given that the main method to contact 
potential participants was the same that is, via email, the only difference was that 
one email was sent by the Dean of Students for experiment 2, whereas several 
emails were sent by individual school offices for experiment 1.  Whilst other 
differences in contact methods existed for example, experiment 2 used student 
interest websites to advertise on, the number of participants who actually contacted 
the researcher via this method was relatively small.  Additionally participants who 
were recruited to experiment 2 were recruited almost exactly one year later, such 
that there were no differences in for example, time of year. 
Nevertheless, it is important to bear these differences in mind when drawing 
conclusions regarding the results, and a strength of the study’s design is that 
analyses for experiments 1 and 2 were carried out separately in order to avoid 
allowing confounding variable such as recruitment method to affect the results. 
 7.1.1.5.2 Participant allocation to experiment. 
 Participants were not randomly allocated to experiments due to time 
constraints.  It was also important to allocate eligible participants to experiments as 
and when they expressed an interest in participating, in order to avoid participant 
attrition.  As a result there is a possibility that some systematic bias could have been 
introduced.  As Teape (2009) pointed out, block randomisation (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007) may have been possible, although this would not have allowed 
participants to choose a convenient time.  Further developments to this system may 
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make more elaborate randomization procedures possible which would help to reduce 
the possibility of systematic bias whilst continuing to avoid high participant attrition. 
 7.1.1.5.3 Testing conditions. 
 Differences in testing conditions between experiments 1 and 2 could also 
have introduced some systematic bias into the results, as some of the participants 
tested in experiment 2 did so under different conditions to those tested in experiment 
1.  Approximately two thirds of participants were actually tested under the same 
conditions as experiment 1, and the differences were minor in relation to the overall 
procedure for example, tested in individual research pods rather than in an open plan 
computer lab.  Such differences affected both experiments 2a and 2b, and it would 
therefore be hoped that systematic bias had not been introduced.  The decision to 
conduct separate analyses for experiments 1 and 2 is therefore further supported. 
 7.1.1.5.4 Procedure. 
 The finding of a mood incongruent, positive interpretation bias during the 
second half of the test in experiment 1a suggests that motivated processing was used 
to repair the induced anxious mood, as the dual-process model would predict.  
However, it is difficult to conclude this with certainty given that it appears that 
induced moods decayed following the mood induction in all four experiments.  It is 
therefore possible that interpretation biases in the second half of experiments 1a 
were actually produced through substantive processing as they were actually 
congruent with participants’ mood as it decayed (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).  
Given the positive response bias seen in experiment 1b this seems unlikely, as such 
an explanation would predict that a negative bias would have been seen.  It seems 
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more likely that the biases observed in experiments 1a and 1b were produced 
through motivated processing to repair and maintain induced moods, but that the 
effects on mood in experiment 1b were lost due to decay as the bias produced was 
only a response bias, not an interpretation bias and was therefore not strong enough 
to maintain the mood. 
Nevertheless, the addition of a fourth measure of mood on the VAS in 
between reading the vignettes and completing the recognition test would allow this 
hypothesis to be tested in future research.  
 The application of the cognitive load during the time when participants read 
the vignettes was a strength of the procedure, as both the results of experiments 2a 
and 2b, and participant comments suggested that the cognitive effort involved made 
it difficult for them to engage in motivated processing.   
7.1.1.6 Summary of Methodological Limitations 
 Methodological limitations were identified which involved difficulties 
recruiting sufficient participants to experiment 2, difficulties with the MANX as an 
adequately reliable predictor of STAI score, overuse of all items on the VAS, the 
mild nature of the induced moods, the lack of randomization to experiments and the 
lack of mood measurement during the interpretation bias test.  These limitations 
have mostly been controlled for by conducting separate analyses for each 
experiment, or did not have direct effects on the results obtained.  Where they did 
have direct effects on the results, conclusions have been drawn tentatively.  Several 
strengths of the methodology were also identified including the decision to conduct 
separate analyses for each experiment, the ability of the VAS and the interpretation 
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bias test to control for response bias and the brevity, apparent effectiveness and 
timing of the cognitive load task in the procedure. 
7.1.2 Hypotheses 
 The dual-process model would predict that induced anxious mood would 
result in mood congruent interpretation biases, which would become mood 
incongruent over time as a result of motivated processing to repair induced anxious 
moods.  It was predicted that this process would not be observed for high anxious 
participants due to limited cognitive resources caused by increased load on cognition 
of the anxious mood.  It was therefore predicted that neither high nor low anxious 
participants would be able to engage in motivated processing under a cognitive load, 
and that mood regulation would subsequently not occur.  It was predicted that all 
participants would engage in substantive processing to maintain induced positive 
moods, and that this process would not be affected by the application of a cognitive 
load. 
7.1.3 Results 
 In experiments 1a and 1b an anxious and a positive mood were induced 
which appeared to decay over time.  Whilst a positive response bias for the low 
anxious participants, which became increasingly positive over time was observed in 
experiment 1b, a positive interpretation bias was observed in experiment 1a, which 
also became increasingly positive over time.  No differences were observed between 
low and high anxious participants in experiment 1a.  The results obtained were 
interpreted as evidence of mood incongruent interpretation biases acting to repair an 
induced anxious mood through motivated processing. 
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 Similar to experiments 1a and 1b, an anxious and a positive mood were 
induced which appeared to decay over time in experiments 2a and 2b.  A positive 
response bias was also seen in experiment 2b, but no evidence of response or 
interpretation biases was observed in experiment 2a.  No differences were observed 
between low and high anxious participants.  The results obtained were interpreted as 
evidence of a cognitive load blocking the use of mood incongruent interpretation 
biases in mood repair through motivated processing. 
7.1.4 Hedonistic Model of Mood Regulation 
 Similar to the results of Erber et al. (1996) and Commons and Erber (1997), 
and in contrast to the results of Handley et al. (2004), a positive mood was not 
maintained in either experiments 1b or 2b. This does not support the hedonistic 
model’s prediction that participants would be motivated to attempt to maintain a 
positive mood.  Whilst this could be due to the cognitive load blocking attempts at 
mood maintenance in experiment 2b, this could not explain why mood was not 
maintained in experiment 1b.  The positive response bias seen in both experiments 
1b and 2b might be evidence that participants attempted to maintain a positive mood, 
especially as this bias became increasingly positive over time for the low anxious 
participants in experiment 1b.  It is therefore likely that the high anxious participants 
in experiment 1b, and those under a cognitive load in experiment 2b were not able to 
switch from automatic substantive processing to effortful motivated processing 
involving stronger mood congruent biases as the low anxious participants in 
experiment 1b did.  This replicates results achieved by Joorman and Siemer (2004) 
with dysphoric individuals. 
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7.1.5 Social Constraints Model of Mood Regulation 
 The social constraints model suggested that participants tested in the same 
context should be motivated to maintain or regulate their mood to the same extent 
(Commons & Erber, 1997; Erber et al., 1996).  By comparing the results of 
experiments 1a and 1b, and the results of experiments 2a and 2b, it can be seen that 
differences in observed cognitive biases exist between experiments 1a and 1b and 
between experiments 2a and 2b.  That is a positive interpretation bias emerged over 
time in experiment 1a, and a positive response bias became more positive over time 
for the low anxious participants in experiment 1b.  No evidence of response or 
interpretation biases was found in experiment 2a and a positive response bias was 
observed for all participants in experiment 2b.  The differing conditions between 
experiments 1 and 2 seem to be responsible for the differing pattern of results, as 
differences in task expectations were in the study by Knobloch (2003) and as 
differences in attention were in the study by Berkowitz et al. (2000).  This suggests 
that a factor other than context must explain the differences observed.  It appears as 
if, at least for these experimental conditions, hedonistic concerns were motivating 
participants to attempt to maintain a positive mood, but to regulate an anxious mood. 
7.1.6 Dual Process Model of Mood Regulation 
Following an anxious mood induction it appears as if participants attempted 
to regulate their mood through the use of mood incongruent interpretation biases 
during motivated processing, similar to the results found by Chen et al. (2007) and 
Sedikides (1994).  When this process was repeated under a cognitive load, no such 
biases were evident suggesting that the load on cognitive resources prevented 
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participants from engaging in effortful motivated processing and this resulted in 
mood decay, as no biases were present to maintain or regulate induced mood.  This 
provides further evidence that task effort is important for mood repair (Erber & 
Erber, 1994), and is similar to the results obtained by Ottati and Isbell (1996), Hirsch 
and Mathews (1997) and Eysenck et al. (1991) where it was hypothesised that lack 
of cognitive resources prevented some participants from engaging in motivated 
processing.  Having said that, no evidence of both substantive and motivated 
processing was found (Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2002; Sedikides, 1994), perhaps due to 
insufficient strength of the mood induction. 
 Following a positive mood induction it appears as if under conditions of no 
cognitive load, some participants attempted to maintain their mood through the use 
of a positive response bias as this became increasingly positive over time.  This 
result is similar to that of Sedikides (1994) but in contrast to that of Forgas and 
Ciarrochi (2002) suggesting that unspecified contextual differences between studies 
may impact on the regulation of mood as found by Knobloch (2003).  The same 
result was not found for participants completing the procedure under a cognitive 
load.  This suggests that whilst positive response biases were activated through 
initial substantive processing, these biases were not maintained or enhanced through 
motivated processing due to limited cognitive resources.  It appears as if mood 
congruent substantive processing alone may not be sufficient to maintain positive 
moods, at least in an anxiety provoking experimental context.  Motivated processing 
involving mood congruent biases may therefore be needed.  Such results could help 
to inform the dual-process model of mood regulation in that motivated processing 
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could be seen to involve an effortful search for both mood congruent and 
incongruent information, depending on the current (mood) goal.  Further support is 
also provided for the notion that motivated processing is effortful (Dillen & Koole, 
2007; Erber & Erber, 1994; Erber & Tesser, 1992), given that it did not appear to be 
observed under conditions of cognitive load. 
Unfortunately the mood results do not support these conclusions, most likely 
due to mild induced moods decaying during a long and repetitive interpretation bias 
test.  Whilst it was mentioned in chapter four that the positive interpretation biases 
observed in experiment 1a may therefore in fact be congruent to the mood as it 
decays, the fact that a congruent positive response bias was seen in experiments 1b 
and 2b and the fact that the biases observed by Mathews and Mackintosh (2000) 
endured over long time periods would make this conclusion seem unlikely.  Clearly 
future research should measure mood during the interpretation bias test itself, as well 
as piloting different mood induction methods in order to assess more clearly the 
effects on mood of biases hypothesised to be involved in mood repair.  The 
methodological limitations highlighted earlier also make the conclusions regarding 
interpretation biases tentative, and future research should attempt to replicate this 
data having addressed the concerns identified. 
7.1.7 Effects of Trait Anxiety on Interpretation Biases 
 Following an anxious mood induction, there were no differences in observed 
biases between the low and high anxious participants in experiment 1a in contrast to 
the results of Calvo and Castillo (1997), Calvo et al. (1997) and Eysenck et al. 
(1991).  However, high anxious participants showed lower recognition in general 
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and low anxious participants showed increasing recognition of target items from the 
first to the second half of the test.  This suggests that the ability of the high anxious 
participants to engage in the task itself was lower than the low anxious participants, 
and that the low anxious participants showed a change in their processing style from 
the first to the second half of the test which the high anxious participants did not.  
Such differences might be due to decreased cognitive resources for the high anxious 
participants and an increased ability for the low anxious participants to switch from 
substantive to motivated processing.  Indeed NACs in Beard and Amir’s (2009) 
study appeared to have accessed threatening interpretations which they later 
suppressed which could also be viewed as a switch from substantive to motivated 
processing. 
 Such conclusions are supported by the lack of observed interpretation biases 
under a cognitive load for either low or high anxious participants following an 
anxious mood induction in experiment 2a, which also occurred in Salemink et al.s 
(2007b) study.  As Teape (2009) pointed out, such conditions may be more 
indicative of everyday life, where in the context of increasing demands for cognitive 
resources, mood regulation does not become the focus out of the many self-control 
tasks a regulatory system has to deal with (Tice & Bratslavsky, 2000). 
  For the positive mood induction in experiment 1b only the low anxious 
participants appeared to attempt to maintain their mood through the use of a positive 
response bias.  This was not found for high anxious participants suggesting that 
insufficient cognitive resources were available for motivated processing to be 
instigated or that the high anxious participants were not motivated to maintain a 
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positive mood as found by Hemenover (2003).  As stated in section 7.1.6, it appears 
as if mood congruent substantive processing alone may be insufficient to maintain 
positive moods. 
 It is likely that predicted differences between low and high anxious 
participants in observed interpretation biases were not found due to the small 
differences in trait anxiety scores between the groups, as discussed in section 
7.1.1.3.1.  Future research should attempt to maximise the possibility of finding 
predicted differences by using different methods to recruit participants high in trait 
anxiety for example by using a clinical sample compared with a control sample 
recruited from a student population.  
7.1.8 The Bi-Directional Relationship of Mood and Interpretive Processing Biases 
 Due to what appears to be decay of the induced moods over time, it is not 
possible to draw conclusions regarding the causal effect of interpretive processing 
biases on mood.  However, it is possible to comment on the causal effect of induced 
mood on interpretation biases. 
 It appears as if, in line with the results of Hunter et al. (2006) and 
Vinnicombe et al. (2006), an anxious mood induction caused participants to engage 
in motivated processing using mood incongruent, positive interpretation biases.  It 
also appears as if this effortful motivated processing may have been blocked by the 
application of a cognitive load.  A positive mood induction resulted in what 
appeared to be mood congruent response biases, regardless of whether a cognitive 
load was applied. 
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 Given that there is a wealth of research that has demonstrated that 
interpretation biases have causal effects on mood (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002), it 
appears as if the relationship may in fact be bi-directional, with mood influencing 
interpretation biases, which in turn influence mood.  In the context of a dual-process 
model of mood regulation, it appears as if at least under these experimental 
conditions, hedonistic concerns motivate the attainment or regulation of positive 
moods. 
7.1.9 Future Research and Clinical Implications 
 The methodological limitations discussed in section 7.1.1 should be 
addressed in any future research which attempts to replicate the results achieved 
here, particularly with regard to ensuring adequate numbers of participants are 
recruited in order to test the research hypotheses with sufficient power to detect any 
effects that might exist.  In addition to this it would be important to add another 
measure of mood in between reading the vignettes and completing the recognition 
task during the interpretation bias test, in order to delineate the causal effects of 
interpretation biases on mood and vice versa.  As discussed in chapter 1, Standage et 
al. (2010) found that active processing of vignette content was not required to 
demonstrate interpretation biases, and future research may therefore be able to 
shorten and simplify the interpretation bias measure. 
It would be particularly interesting to extend the research to clinical samples, 
perhaps compared with a non-clinical control sample in order to test predictions 
regarding differences between individuals high and low in trait anxiety.  Such 
research would enable conclusions regarding differences to be drawn with more 
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certainty, as there would likely be significantly greater differences in trait anxiety 
between the groups. 
If differences between the groups were found in the extent to which 
interpretation biases were used to repair anxious moods, and/or to maintain positive 
moods, further research could use varying levels and modifications to the cognitive 
load task to determine what level of cognitive resources are needed in order for 
motivated processing to occur.  The simplicity and brevity of the cognitive load used 
in this study helped to minimise effects on the length of the procedure and may have 
helped participants to remain focused on the interpretation bias test.  However, it 
may be that other tasks such as tracking tasks (Levens, Muhtadie & Gotlib, 2009) or 
a modified visual Stroop task are easier to vary in terms of the cognitive resources 
they use.   
 The results of this study are helpful to an understanding of how mood 
regulation and maintenance might be achieved by low trait anxious individuals.  It is 
also possible that other forms of cognitive processing biases such as attentional and 
memory biases are involved in a dual-process model of mood regulation, and future 
research could also investigate this possibility. 
The results also give an insight into how and when the process of mood 
regulation might break down for individuals high in trait anxiety, and future research 
should ensure that participants in a high trait anxious condition are truly 
representative of a ‘high trait anxious’ label, perhaps by using participants drawn 
from a clinical sample.  This would enable conclusions to be drawn regarding the 
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severity of trait anxiety at which mood regulation through the use of interpretative 
processing biases becomes problematic. 
 Following on from this it would be important to understand whether 
insufficient cognitive resources are the only factor responsible for a breakdown in 
motivated processing in mood repair and maintenance.  It may be that other parts of 
the mechanism proposed by Beevers (2005) in his application of the dual-process 
model to vulnerability to depression may break down such as expectations not being 
violated.  In applying his ideas to an understanding of anxiety, individuals high in 
trait anxiety may have positive beliefs about the usefulness of worry and anxiety 
(Wells, 1997) and may not therefore have learnt to switch from substantive to 
motivated processing. 
 The results obtained in this study have important implications for the 
development of cognitive bias modification (CBM) paradigms used to engender 
positive, mood incongruent interpretation biases in individuals suffering from a wide 
range of mood disorders (e.g., Beard & Amir, 2008).  The results provide support for 
the idea that mood regulation can be achieved through the use of interpretation 
biases.  However, they also suggest that in order to be successful individuals need to 
have available to them sufficient cognitive resources to engage in effortful motivated 
processing.  Future CBM research should therefore attempt to ensure that tasks are 
as simple as possible in order to ensure that participants have sufficient cognitive 
resources in order to be able to learn how to engage in motivated processing.  Whilst 
context was not seen to influence achieved results in this study, previous research 
found that participants attempted to achieve a more neutral mood when undertaking 
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difficult tasks and in the presence of strangers (Erber & Tesser, 1992; Erber et al. 
1996).  It would therefore be important to ensure that participants have sufficient 
practice at CBM tasks and to ensure that participants know the individuals who 
undertake the tasks with them, or perhaps even to conduct them online from the 
comfort of participants homes, to ensure that they are successful. 
The results of experiment 2b also suggest that substantive as well as 
motivated processing was blocked under conditions involving a cognitive load.  
Given that increased substantive processing is what was predicted to both cause and 
maintain symptoms of anxiety in anxious populations (Hazlett-Stevens & Borkovec, 
2004; MacLeod & Rutherford, 2004) then this finding could be used in the 
development of interventions for individuals suffering from anxiety disorders.  
Perhaps CBM training tasks as described above could be modified to include very 
difficult cognitive load tasks in order to break down substantive processing in order 
to determine whether this can generalise to everyday life for individuals suffering 
with high levels of anxiety? 
7.1.10 Conclusions 
 The results of this study have provided some insights into the use of 
interpretation biases in mood regulation as predicted by the dual-process model of 
mood regulation.  Neither the hedonistic nor the social constraints model is able to 
account for the results obtained, as a more complex model is needed to help 
understand when hedonistic concerns will become the focus of self-control.  
Methodological issues limit the strength of the conclusions drawn, particularly with 
respect to how such biases operate under conditions of cognitive load.  Nevertheless, 
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it appears as if mood regulation is achieved through a switch from substantive mood 
congruent processing, to motivated processing which may be mood congruent or 
incongruent.  Such a switch from substantive to motivated processing appears to 
require cognitive processing capacity, which may be limited in individuals high in 
trait anxiety.  Further research should attempt to correct the methodological 
limitations identified and investigate further the differences in the process between 
high and low trait anxious individuals.  The results have wide reaching theoretical 
and clinical implications, particularly with regard to helping individuals high in trait 
anxiety learn to manage mood through the use of cognitive processing biases. 
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APPENDIX A 
Initial E-mail to Students Inviting Participation in this Study 
Dear Fellow Student, 
An Invitation to Participate in Psychological Research 
We are trainee Clinical Psychologists undertaking doctoral studies at the 
Institute of Health, UEA.  We are contacting you to invite you to participate in a 
research study that we are undertaking for our thesis.   
This is an exciting project looking at the effect of emotions on the way 
people think and behave.  It is hoped that the results of this study will help inform 
future treatments and interventions for people with emotional disorders.  
The study will take only an hour of your time, at your convenience and will 
take place on the UEA campus.  We hope that taking part in the study will be an 
interesting experience and an opportunity for you to find out more about 
psychological research.  As compensation for your time, we would also like to offer 
all participants a £5 HMV Voucher and an informative booklet about coping 
with the stress of being a student.   
If you are interested in taking part or would just like to find out more, then 
please e-mail us at xxxxxx.  Once we receive your e-mail, we will send you further 
details of the study to help you decide if you would like to take part.  With the 
information will be some short questionnaires for you to complete and return to us if 
you do decide to take part. 
 
Best wishes 
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Lynda Teape Lorna Shelfer 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Supervised by  
Dr Bundy Mackintosh, Senior Lecturer in Abnormal Psychology 
Dr Helen Buxton, Clinical Psychologist and Senior Clinical Tutor 
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APPENDIX B 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Cognition and Emotion Research Project 
 
Title of Project: The Effects on Comprehension of Viewing Emotional Films 
 
In order to improve understanding of the way our emotions work, new research 
projects regularly take place with the eventual aim of developing improved 
treatments and services for those individuals that suffer from emotional disorders or 
other mental health problems.  I would therefore like to invite you to take part in a 
current research project.  Before you decide, it is important for you to understand 
why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time to read the 
following information carefully.  Talk to others about the study if you wish.  If you 
are agreeable we will go over the details when we meet to make sure you understand 
Please reply to 
Lynda Teape and Lorna Shelfer 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
Elizabeth Fry Building 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich   NR4 7TJ 
04th March 2008 E-mail:     l.teape@uea.ac.uk or l.shelfer@uea.ac.uk  
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what is involved and you will be asked to sign a form to give your consent to taking 
part.  Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
Psychologists have realised for some time that when people experience emotions 
there are changes in the way they think and behave and these changes can perpetuate 
those emotions.  We are interested in your experience of emotions and how that 
affects the way you think and behave. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen because you are an undergraduate student at the University of 
East Anglia. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No.  It is up to you whether or not to take part.  If you do, you will be given the 
opportunity to discuss the project further when we meet when you will be asked to 
sign a consent form if you are willing to go ahead.  You will remain free to withdraw 
at any time and without giving a reason.  A decision not to take part, or to later 
withdraw, will in no way affect your studies at the University and no-one except the 
research team will be aware of any aspects of your participation. 
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What will happen to me if I take part? 
The first thing that will happen is that you will be asked to complete a number of 
questionnaires asking you about your thoughts, feelings and behaviour.  This will 
help us decide whether this study is suitable for you and to ensure we select 
equivalent individuals for the different parts of the study.  Then some people will be 
asked to attend a session, lasting approximately an hour, when you will complete a 
number of further questionnaires, watch a short video clip, and answer some 
questions about what you saw on the video.  Not everyone who completes the 
questionnaires will be asked to attend this session.  For instance, you would not be 
suitable for the study if you are not fluent in written and spoken English or have any 
significant reading problems. Also, as this is a study of usual emotional responses in 
volunteers we will not ask people to participate if they have a history of depression, 
anxiety or other mental illness in the past 5 years.  Finally, people who have 
completed a similar psychology study in the past may not be suitable as this could 
affect the reliability of the results of the study, we will need to ask about any 
previous studies in which you have participated.  The study is not aimed at 
investigating the quality of your memory of the video clip; we are more interested in 
your perception of it. 
 
What do I have to do? 
All you will have to do is complete the initial questionnaires and come to a session 
at a time agreed between you and the researcher to complete the further 
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questionnaires, watch the video clip and answer the questions about it, and complete 
a brief comprehension task.  These activities are not at all difficult. 
 
Will I be paid? 
Individuals who attend the testing session will be paid £5 and will also be given a 
booklet on how to improve mental wellbeing as a thank you for taking part. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We hope that this will be an interesting and informative experience of psychological 
research for you.  Although there are no direct benefits for participants it will help 
our understanding of emotions, which will be helpful in developing further 
psychological treatments. 
 
Are there any disadvantages of taking part? 
The video clips contain scenes taken from popular movies, some pleasant and some 
less pleasant which could invoke negative emotions and there is a possibility that 
some may find these distressing.  If this is the case you can ask the researcher to stop 
at any time and withdraw yourself from the study.  However, as the clips have all 
been taken from movies available to the public on general release, and have been 
used in previous research where they have caused no problems to other participants 
this is highly unlikely.  Most find that the negative emotions invoked dissipate after 
a short period of time.  The only other disadvantage is the possible inconvenience of 
coming to the session.  Some people have also said that the activities can seem a bit 
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dull!  However, others have also said they have found them quite interesting to do 
and find out about, so this might not be too much of a problem for you. 
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
Yes.  All information which is collected about you during the course of the research 
will be kept strictly confidential to the research team.  You will be allocated an 
anonymous code number which will be used to identify your personal contribution. 
The information that matches this code to your name will be held in a special 
encrypted computer file, separate from the other information about the study.  Once 
we have completed collecting information about you for the study we will ensure 
that only the anonymous code remains so that the results remain completely 
confidential.  Storage and use of information in this study will be fully compliant 
with the Data Protection Act. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
We hope to publish the results in journals reporting research in psychology.  You 
will not be identified in any way in the reports of the research.  We will be happy to 
send you a summary of our findings. 
 
Who is organising and funding the research?  
The research has been organised by Lynda Teape and Lorna Shelfer as part of their 
research on the Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology.  They are supervised 
by Dr Bundy Mackintosh, an academic research psychologist and Dr Helen Buxton, 
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a clinical psychologist.  None of the research team is being paid additionally to their 
normal salaries. Please contact Lynda Teape or Lorna Shelfer on the email addresses 
above if you would like any further information.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The study has been reviewed by the University of East Anglia Research Ethics 
Committee and given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct at the University. 
 
If there is a problem: 
If you have a concern about any aspect of the study you should contact Lynda Teape 
or Lorna Shelfer, Trainee Clinical Psychologists on the contact details above, who 
will do their best to answer your concerns, or direct you to further sources of help 
and advice.  If you remain unhappy and wish to make a more formal complaint, then 
you should contact Dr Helen Buxton, Clinical Tutor for the Doctoral Programme in 
Clinical Psychology on 01603 593 310 who will help you to take the complaint 
forward. 
Although we are not able to make any clinical diagnoses or offer treatment, and this 
is not the aim of this study,  it may become apparent that you are currently 
experiencing distress.  If this is the case, we will provide you with some information 
and suggest where to seek help. 
 
This Information Sheet and the Consent Form that follows are for you to keep. 
With many thanks for considering taking part and taking time to read this sheet. 
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APPENDIX C 
Power Calculation 
Hunter et al. (2006) reported an effect size of 0.89 for a two-way interaction between 
item valence and mood induction. 
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Therefore 20 participants would be needed in each of the high and low anxious 
conditions. 
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APPENDIX D 
Demographic Questionnaire 
 
Please answer ALL questions in ALL three sections: 
 
 Section one: 
1. Full Name  
2. Date of Birth (01/01/1980)  
3. Gender  
4. School or Faculty  
5. Year of Study  
6. Is English your first 
language?  Or have you 
spoken English in an 
English speaking country 
since the age of 10 years? 
 
7. Are you aware that you 
have any learning or 
language difficulties (e.g. 
dyslexia, dysphasia, 
memory impairments)? 
 
8. Do you currently have or 
have you experienced in 
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the last five years, any 
form of mental illness 
whether treated or 
untreated? 
9. Have you participated in a 
psychological study at 
UEA before? 
 
10. If you have answered YES 
to question 9, please give 
as much detail as you can 
about the study, including 
who ran the experiment, 
when it was, and what the 
study was about. 
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APPENDIX E 
Short Form MANX 
Instructions: 
Below are a number of words that describe different feelings or emotions. 
Please read each item and then tick the box to the right of the word which best 
indicates how you GENERALLY feel.  Please do not dwell long on each answer as 
we are interested in the first response that comes to mind.  Just give the answer that 
best describes your feelings generally.  There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
 
 
Almost 
never 
Occasionally Sometimes Often Almost 
always 
1 interested       
2 satisfied      
3 inadequate      
4 sleepy      
5 calm      
6 worried      
7 energetic      
8 useful      
9 optimistic      
10 a failure      
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APPENDIX F 
S-MCSDS 
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APPENDIX G 
 
Visual Analogue Scales 
1.  Practice Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how tired are you feeling right now? 
←less tired than usual  more tired than usual→ 
very much 
less 
much less less a little bit 
less 
the same a little bit 
more 
more much 
more 
very much 
more 
 
         
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your choice. 
--------new page-------- 
Thank you, this was the practice example. 
Please press any key to go on. 
--------new page-------- 
2.  Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how low/depressed are you feeling right 
now? 
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very much 
less 
much less less a little bit 
less 
the same a little bit 
more 
more much 
more 
very much 
more 
 
         
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your choice. 
--------new page-------- 
3.  Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how sad are you feeling right now? 
very much 
less 
much less less a little bit 
less 
the same a little bit 
more 
more much 
more 
very much 
more 
 
         
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your choice. 
--------new page-------- 
4.  Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how tense are you feeling right now? 
very much 
less 
much less less a little bit 
less 
the same a little bit 
more 
more much 
more 
very much 
more 
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Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your choice. 
--------new page-------- 
5.  Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how worried are you feeling right now? 
very much 
less 
much less less a little bit 
less 
the same a little bit 
more 
more much 
more 
very much 
more 
 
         
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your choice. 
--------new page-------- 
6.  Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how carefree are you feeling right now? 
very much 
less 
much less less a little bit 
less 
the same a little bit 
more 
more much 
more 
very much 
more 
 
         
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your choice. 
--------new page-------- 
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7.  Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how content are you feeling right now? 
very much 
less 
much less less a little bit 
less 
the same a little bit 
more 
more much 
more 
very much 
more 
 
         
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your choice. 
--------new page-------- 
8.  Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how calm are you feeling right now? 
very much 
less 
much less less a little bit 
less 
the same a little bit 
more 
more much 
more 
very much 
more 
 
         
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your choice. 
--------new page-------- 
 
 
9.  Test Item 
Compared with how you feel generally, how happy are you feeling right now? 
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very much 
less 
much less less a little bit 
less 
the same a little bit 
more 
more much 
more 
very much 
more 
 
         
 
Please use the mouse to move to a point on the scale and click to record your choice. 
--------new page-------- 
Thank you. 
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APPENDIX H 
Vignettes and Recognition Sentences Used in the Ambiguous Scenario Method to 
Assess Interpretation Biases 
Practice Item 1 
Title Walking in the park 
Line1 You are walking through the park early on a Sunday morning. 
Line2 The sun is shining and as you look around you see children playing 
Line3 on the grass.  You begin to tire, so you decide to rest for 
Line4 a few minutes while sitting on a  
Word fragment b - n c - 
Completed word bench 
Comprehension 
question Did you see children in the park? 
Positive Target You were walking through the park and sat down to rest 
Negative Target You had a picnic in the park one afternoon 
Positive Foil You rode your bike through the park on your way home 
Negative Foil You were walking through the park when a thunderstorm started 
 
Practice Item 2 
Title Getting off the bus 
Line1 You are on the bus going to work 
Line2 when you see your stop approaching. 
Line3 You press the bell and 
Line4 get ready to stand up when the bus  
Word fragment s t o - p s 
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Completed word stops 
Comprehension 
question Were you going to work on the bus? 
Positive Target As you stand, the bus comes to a slow halt 
Negative Target As you stand, the bus screeches to a halt 
Positive Foil As you stand, the bus drives straight past your stop 
Negative Foil As you stand, the bus accelerates past your stop 
 
Social Threat Item 1 
Title The wedding reception 
Line1 Your friend asks you to give a speech at her wedding reception. 
Line2 You prepare some remarks and when the time comes, 
Line3 get to your feet. As you speak, you notice 
Line4 some people in the audience start to 
Word fragment l - - g h 
Completed word l a u g h 
Comprehension 
question Did you stand up to speak? 
Positive Target As you speak, people in the audience laugh appreciatively 
Negative Target As you speak, people in the audience find your efforts laughable 
Positive Foil As you speak, people in the audience applaud your comments 
Negative Foil 
As you speak, some people in the audience start to yawn in 
boredom 
 
Social Threat Item 2 
Title The local club 
Line1 You are invited for a night out at a local club, although you don't 
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know 
Line2 any of the members very well. As you approach the door 
Line3 you can hear loud music and noisy conversation, 
Line4 but as you enter the room it is quiet for a 
Word fragment m - m - n t 
Completed word m o m e n t 
Comprehension 
question Do you know most of the club members? 
Positive Target As you enter the room the music stops for a moment. 
Negative Target As you enter the room everyone stops and stares at you. 
Positive Foil As you enter the room someone greets you warmly. 
Negative Foil As you enter the room someone asks you why you are there. 
 
Social Threat Item 3 
Title The bus ride 
Line1 You get on a bus and find an empty seat next to one 
Line2 that has a rip in it. At the next stop several people get on 
Line3 that you vaguely recognise, but they sit together 
Line4 and the seat next to you remains 
Word fragment v - c a - t 
Completed word v a c a n t 
Comprehension 
question Were the people who got on strangers to you? 
Positive Target The seat next to you remains empty because it looks damaged. 
Negative Target 
The seat next to you is empty because no one wants to sit with 
you. 
Positive Foil The person in the seat next to you talks to you in a friendly way. 
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Negative Foil The person in the seat next to you makes a rip in the fabric. 
 
Social Threat Item 4 
Title The job interview 
Line1 You applied for a job in a company you'd really like to work in. 
Line2 You are invited to an interview, where you answer 
Line3 the questions as well as you can. Reflecting later, 
Line4 you think that the quality of your answers decided the 
Word fragment o u - c o m - 
Completed word o u t c o m e 
Comprehension 
question Did you think about your answers later? 
Positive Target You think that your astute answers led to you being offered the job. 
Negative Target You think that your poor answers lost you the job. 
Positive Foil You think it was a good thing you did not take the job. 
Negative Foil You think your poor reference must have made a bad impression. 
 
Social Threat Item 5 
Title Meeting a friend 
Line1 
In the street, you bump into an old friend you haven't seen for a 
long time. 
Line2 She is too busy to stop, so you arrange to meet later in a bar. 
Line3 You arrive a little late but the bar is empty 
Line4 and a few minutes later she is still not 
Word fragment t h - - e 
Completed word t h e r e 
Comprehension Was anyone else in the bar? 
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question 
Positive Target You arrange to meet a friend in a bar but your friend is late. 
Negative Target You arrange to meet in a bar but your friend stands you up. 
Positive Foil You are busy but your friend insists on meeting you in a bar. 
Negative Foil Your friend tells you that she does not want to meet you. 
 
Social Threat Item 6 
Title Your birthday 
Line1 It is your birthday and you wake up looking forward to your day. 
Line2 You wonder how many friends will send you a birthday card. 
Line3 However, you have to go to work as usual, 
Line4 and by the time you leave, no cards have 
Word fragment a r r - v - d 
Completed word a r r i v e d 
Comprehension 
question Did you have to go to work on your birthday? 
Positive Target You have to leave for work before the postman brings your mail. 
Negative Target You leave for work realising that no one has sent you a card. 
Positive Foil 
You leave for work feeling pleased with the cards you have 
received. 
Negative Foil You leave for work knowing that it is going to be a stressful day. 
 
Social Threat Item 7 
Title Your first painting 
Line1 You've taken up painting as a hobby, and have just finished 
Line2 your first picture. You hang it on the wall 
Line3 when a group of friends visit. Later you overhear your friends 
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Line4 making remarks that make clear their opinion of your 
Word fragment a b - l - t y 
Completed word a b i l i t y 
Comprehension 
question Did you leave the painting on an easel? 
Positive Target 
You overhear some friends saying how much they liked your 
painting. 
Negative Target 
You overhear some friends making critical remarks about your 
picture. 
Positive Foil You overhear some complimentary remarks about your good taste. 
Negative Foil You overhear some friends making fun of something you just said. 
 
Social Threat Item 8 
Title The private view 
Line1 Your neighbour invites you to a private exhibition of his art. 
Line2 You arrive to find many other guests whom you do not know. 
Line3 You try talking to some of them, and can see 
Line4 how interested they are in your 
Word fragment c - - v e r - - t i - n 
Completed word c o n v e r s a t i o n 
Comprehension 
question Was the private view at a relative's house? 
Positive Target You talk to some guests and can tell that they find you interesting. 
Negative Target You talk to some guests but they think what you say is boring. 
Positive Foil You meet many guests whom you know and enjoy talking to them. 
Negative Foil 
You don't know anyone there and everyone ignores you 
completely. 
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Social Threat Item 9 
Title The first aid refresher 
Line1 You participate on a first aid refresher course at work. 
Line2 The instructor asks a question and no one in the group 
Line3 
volunteers an answer, so he looks directly at you. You offer a 
reply, 
Line4 thinking about how your answer must be sounding to the 
Word fragment o t h - - s 
Completed word o t h e r s 
Comprehension 
question Was the refresher course organized by a local charity? 
Positive Target 
You answer the question, thinking that the others may be quite 
impressed. 
Negative Target You answer the question, thinking how ignorant you may seem. 
Positive Foil 
You answer the question, pleased that you have such an 
interesting teacher. 
Negative Foil 
You answer the question, realising you are irritated by this 
teaching style. 
 
Social Threat Item 10 
Title The joke 
Line1 
You are with a group of new friends, on your way to an open air 
concert. 
Line2 You decide to tell a joke you heard recently. Everyone looks at you 
Line3 as you start telling the joke, and you see 
Line4 their expressions change when you get to the punch 
Word fragment l - n e 
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Completed word l i n e 
Comprehension 
question Did you hear the joke you told quite recently? 
Positive Target When you get to the end you see everyone starting to laugh. 
Negative Target When you get to the punch line everyone looks confused. 
Positive Foil When you get to the end you receive several compliments. 
Negative Foil When you start telling your joke someone interrupts you. 
 
Physical Threat Item 1 
Title Visiting the doctor 
Line1 
You have been feeling dizzy occasionally, and decide to get a 
check-up. 
Line2 You make an appointment right away. 
Line3 Your doctor takes your blood pressure and listens to your chest, 
Line4 and then tells you to relax while giving you his 
Word fragment o p - n - o n 
Completed word o p i n i o n 
Comprehension 
question Did you delay before going to the doctor? 
Positive Target The doctor tells you all is normal and you are in good health. 
Negative Target The doctor tells you he has bad news about your health. 
Positive Foil 
The doctor tells you that you have free dental care on your health 
plan. 
Negative Foil 
The doctor tells you that you will have to pay extra on your health 
plan. 
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Physical Threat Item 2 
Title Late return home 
Line1 
Your partner is working late this evening but now it is well past the 
time 
Line2 
you were expecting them home. You are thinking about a crash 
you saw on 
Line3 
the route your partner drives, when the phone rings. You pick it up 
and 
Line4 find out what had 
Word fragment h a - - e n - d 
Completed word h a p p e n e d 
Comprehension 
question Did you expect your partner to be late? 
Positive Target 
The phone rings and it is your partner telling you they are nearly 
home. 
Negative Target 
The phone rings and you are informed your partner is hurt in the 
accident. 
Positive Foil 
The phone rings and a friend invites you and your partner round 
for a meal. 
Negative Foil 
The phone rings and a friend tells you about gossip being spread 
about you. 
 
Physical Threat Item 3 
Title Your eye operation 
Line1 
You're finding that your sight is worse than it was and despite the 
risks 
Line2 you decide to try an experimental laser surgery you've read about. 
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Line3 
Afterwards as the bandages are taken off your eyes, you realise 
your life 
Line4 will be affected radically by the 
Word fragment r - s u - t 
Completed word r e s u l t 
Comprehension 
question Did you read about the laser surgery? 
Positive Target You realise that this operation has made your vision perfect 
Negative Target You realise that the operation has made your vision much worse 
Positive Foil You realise that you are surrounded by gifts from your friends 
Negative Foil You realise the operation cost far more than you can afford 
 
Physical Threat Item 4 
Title The evening stroll 
Line1 You are taking a stroll on a quiet street near where you live. 
Line2 As you round the corner you see someone coming towards you 
Line3 
on the same side of the road. As you meet, he stares straight at 
you 
Line4 and moves closer while raising his 
Word fragment h - - d 
Completed word h a n d 
Comprehension 
question Was the person on the opposite side of the street? 
Positive Target 
As you meet he waves in recognition and gives you a friendly 
greeting 
Negative Target As you meet he moves closer and raises his fist menacingly 
Positive Foil As you meet he tells you how much he and his wife love your 
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house 
Negative Foil As you meet he mutters obscenities and staggers away drunkenly 
 
Physical Threat Item 5 
Title A flight abroad 
Line1 You are on your way on holiday abroad. You have been in the air 
Line2 for an hour when you hear a change in the sound of the engine 
Line3 next to you. The fasten seat-belt sign flashes, 
Line4 and you hear the captain begin to make an 
Word fragment a n n - - n c - - e n t 
Completed word a n n o u n c e m e n t 
Comprehension 
question Did the engine sound different than before? 
Positive Target 
The seat belt light comes on and the captain says there will be 
turbulence 
Negative Target 
The seat belt light comes on and the captain tells you one engine 
is failing 
Positive Foil 
The seat belt light comes on and the cabin crew say lunch will be 
served now 
Negative Foil 
The seat belt light comes on, the cabin crew say you are diverted 
due to fog 
 
Physical Threat Item 6 
Title At home one night 
Line1 You are at home alone late one night. You have just 
Line2 finished reading and turn out the light to go to sleep. 
Line3 While lying in the dark you hear a soft rustling sound 
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Line4 coming from just outside your 
Word fragment w - - d - w 
Completed word w i n d o w 
Comprehension 
question Were you listening to the radio before turning out the light? 
Positive Target 
Lying in bed you hear the sound of a small animal outside your 
window 
Negative Target 
Lying in bed you hear the sound of someone trying to get in at your 
window 
Positive Foil 
Lying in bed you hear the sound of birds singing outside your 
window 
Negative Foil 
Lying in bed you hear a car accident in the street outside your 
window 
 
Physical Threat Item 7 
Title The screening clinic 
Line1 You have been offered a routine cancer screening appointment 
Line2 at your local health centre. You have an X-ray and some samples 
Line3 
are taken for tests. While waiting you see the doctor point out 
something 
Line4 on the X-ray plate to the 
Word fragment n - r s e 
Completed word n u r s e 
Comprehension 
question Were you being screened for cancer? 
Positive Target 
You notice the Doctor pointing out to the nurse that your X-ray is 
normal. 
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Negative Target 
You notice the Doctor pointing out a tumour on your X-ray to the 
nurse. 
Positive Foil You notice the Doctor pointing out your impressive fitness score. 
Negative Foil You notice the Doctor pointing out that you are very unfit. 
 
Physical Threat Item 8 
Title Walking home 
Line1 
You have been visiting some friends in the centre of town, when 
you 
Line2 realise it is getting late. They offer you a lift but you set off on foot. 
Line3 
Walking through a street that you don't know at all well, you can 
hear 
Line4 someone running up from 
Word fragment b e - - n d 
Completed word b e h i n d 
Comprehension 
question Did your friends offer you a lift? 
Positive Target 
In the unfamiliar street your friend runs up from behind to walk with 
you 
Negative Target 
In the unfamiliar street a mugger runs up from behind and 
threatens you 
Positive Foil 
In the unfamiliar street you think about how much you enjoyed 
your visit 
Negative Foil 
In the unfamiliar street you think about how bored you were that 
evening 
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Physical Threat Item 9 
Title The exercise regime 
Line1 You decide that you must start to exercise more. 
Line2 For the next week you take a little more exercise each day. 
Line3 After several weeks, you are running further and decide to see 
Line4 how far you can push yourself, when you notice your breathing is 
Word fragment l a - o u r - - 
Completed word l a b o u r e d 
Comprehension 
question Have you been exercising for several weeks? 
Positive Target Running further than usual you have to breath harder and deeper 
Negative Target Pushing yourself too hard you cannot get enough air and feel dizzy 
Positive Foil 
Pushing yourself more than usual you feel your running is much 
easier 
Negative Foil You push yourself so hard you strain a muscle and hurt yourself 
 
Physical Threat Item 10 
Title The car park 
Line1 It is late at night and you are in a multi-storey car park 
Line2 
trying to find your car. You have been looking for about ten 
minutes 
Line3 and still cannot find it. You hear a noise behind you 
Line4 and see a shadow of 
Word fragment s o - e t h - - g 
Completed word s o m e t h i n g 
Comprehension 
question Did you find your car right away? 
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Positive Target You see a security person approaching to help you. 
Negative Target You see someone coming towards you looking threatening. 
Positive Foil You see some money on the floor and pick it up. 
Negative Foil 
You see that you have forgotten your ticket and will have to pay a 
fine. 
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APPENDIX I 
Participant Consent Form 
 
CONSENT FORM 
Participant identification number for this trial: 
Title of Project: Clinical Psychology Research Project 
Chief Investigator:   Lorna Shelfer 
 Please initial box: 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet  
dated DATE for the above study and have had the opportunity to 
ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my 
studies at the University of East Anglia or my legal rights being 
affected. 
3. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
___________________________  _________________ ____________________ 
Name of participant  Date  Signature 
 
___________________________  _________________ ____________________ 
Researcher  Date  Signature 
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APPENDIX J 
Mental Health Information Sheet 
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APPENDIX K 
Initial Ethical Approval 
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APPENDIX L 
Ethical Approval For Amendments 
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APPENDIX M 
Flow Diagram For Procedure 
 
Emails sent to potential participants 
Participants respond and are sent information sheet, demographic questionnaire, MANX and S-MCSDS 
Participant completes second rating on VAS 
Heads of schools contacted for consent to contact students. 
Participants not scoring in the low or high anxious range, not fluent in English, with current or previous 
mental health problem, with learning disability or reading impairment or repressive coping style sent 
email thanking them for their time and explaining about exclusion from study 
Participants sent information about how to sign up for 
testing session.  Then sessions alternately allocated to 
experiment 1a, 1b, 2a or 2b. 
Participants return completed questionnaires 
Participant completes BDI, trait scale of STAI and VAS.  
Vulnerable participants diverted to positive mood 
induction condition and counselled appropriately. 
Participant watches appropriate 
positive or anxious film clip 
Participant attends testing session and completes consent form 
Participant completes interpretation bias measure 
Participant completes final rating on VAS 
Participant thanked, paid and debriefed. 
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APPENDIX N 
E-mail to Potential Participants Meeting the Inclusion Criteria 
Hi [###], 
 
Thank you for your interest, and for completing the screening questionnaires. 
 
I'm pleased to tell you that you are eligible to participate in the study. 
 
All you need to do now is go to the following website: 
http://uea-uk.sona-systems.com/ and sign up for an account (if you don't already 
have one) by clicking the link on the left hand side of the page. 
 
When you have your login and password, login to the website and click on the tab 
that says 'studies' at the top of the page.  Click on the link that says 'timeslots 
available' for our study (look for the study title "the effects on comprehension of 
viewing emotional films").   
 
At the bottom of the page click 'view timeslots for this study'.  Choose a timeslot that 
is convenient for you.  You will need a code to be able to sign up for a time slot.   
 
Please enter the code kas4892y 
 
Then click 'sign up'.   
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If you cannot find a suitable time, please contact me to arrange a more convenient 
time.  
 
Any problems, please let me know. 
 
Best wishes 
Lorna Shelfer 
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APPENDIX O 
E-mail to Potential Participants Not Meeting the Inclusion Criteria 
Dear [###] 
 
Thank you for your interest in the above study and for taking the time to complete 
the initial questionnaires. 
 
Unfortunately, we will not be inviting you to attend for the testing session as we now 
have enough participants with a similar profile to yourself for this section of the 
study. 
However, the cognition and emotion research group are running a number of 
studies at present, which you may be eligible for.  If you would be interested in 
participating in other studies then please go to www.uea.ac.uk/med-swp-research 
where you can find out more. 
 
We would like to store the information from your screening questionnaires, along 
with your contact details in order that we may invite you to participate in further 
studies being conducted by the cognition and emotion group over the next year. 
 
Please do let us know if you would prefer not to be invited for future studies. 
 
Best wishes 
 
Lorna Shelfer 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
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APPENDIX P 
Pilot of Cognitive Load Procedure 
 An opportunistic sample of four participants took part in a pilot of part 1 of 
the interpretation bias test with the addition of the cognitive load.  Data regarding 
the number of times the digit string was correctly and incorrectly recalled, along 
with data regarding the number of times the comprehension question was answered 
correctly or incorrectly can be found in table P1 below. 
 
Table P1:  Digit string recall data and comprehension question data for cognitive 
load pilot. 
 Digit string recall Comprehension question 
Participant Correct Incorrect Correct Incorrect 
1 4 16 19 1 
2 20 0 19 1 
3 15 5 20 0 
4 18 2 20 0 
 
Whilst it can be seen that three out of four participants recalled at least 75% of the 
digit strings correctly, one recalled less than 25% correctly.  However, on closer 
inspection of the data for this participant it can be seen that most digit strings contain 
at least two correct digits out of four, and that some of these contain four correct 
digits, transposed to make the response incorrect.  It therefore seems apparent that 
even this participant made a good attempt to remember the digit strings.  It also 
  246
seems clear that all participants were able to attend to both remembering the digit 
strings and processing the content of the vignettes, as all achieved near perfect 
scores on the comprehension questions.  
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APPENDIX Q 
Analyses of High NA Data for Experiment 1a 
Table Q1:  Descriptive statistics for high NA data for the high and low anxious 
participants at times 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 1a. 
Group Time Mean SD N 
1 0.46 0.157 15 
2 0.64 0.107 15 
High anxious 
3 0.51 0.157 15 
1 0.50 0.128 20 
2 0.64 0.187 20 
Low anxious 
3 0.51 0.121 20 
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Table Q2:  Mixed model ANOVA for high NA data in experiment 1a. 
Within-subjects effects 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Time 0.519 2 0.260 13.499 .000** 0.96 
Time x 
Anxiety 
0.006 2 0.003 0.164 .849 0.38 
Error(Time) 1.269 66 0.019    
Between-subjects effects 
Anxiety 0.005 1 0.005 0.344 .561 0.17 
Error 0.480 33 0.015    
*significant at p < .05 
**significant at p < .01 
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APPENDIX R 
Analyses of Low NA Data for Experiment 1a 
Table R1:  Descriptive statistics for low NA data for the high and low anxious 
participants at times 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 1a. 
Group Time Mean SD N 
1 0.56 0.137 15 
2 0.40 0.067 15 
High anxious 
3 0.49 0.117 15 
1 0.52 0.084 20 
2 0.38 0.094 20 
Low anxious 
3 0.51 0.082 20 
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Table R2:  Mixed model ANOVA for low NA data in experiment 1a. 
Within-subjects effects 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Time 0.409 2 0.204 27.214 .000** 0.98 
Time x 
Anxiety 
0.011 2 0.006 0.764 .470 0.66 
Error(Time) 0.496 66 0.008    
Between-subjects effects  
Anxiety 0.005 1 0.005 0.383 .540 0.53 
Error 0.455 33 0.014    
*significant at p < .05 
**significant at p < .01 
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APPENDIX S 
Analyses of Interpretation Bias Data for Experiment 1a 
Table S1:  Descriptive statistics for recognition interpretation bias data for all 
participants in experiment 1a. 
Anxiety Item Test half Mean SD N 
1 2.44 0.466 15 Positive 
target 2 2.56 0.510 15 
1 1.44 0.280 15 Positive foil 
2 1.53 0.367 15 
1 2.61 0.443 15 Negative 
target 2 2.67 0.478 15 
1 1.39 0.308 15 
High 
anxious 
Negative 
foil 2 1.47 0.381 15 
1 2.60 0.201 20 Positive 
target 2 2.85 0.429 20 
1 1.70 0.320 20 Positive foil 
2 1.63 0.342 20 
1 2.65 0.523 20 Negative 
target 2 2.69 0.609 20 
1 1.54 0.375 20 
Low 
anxious 
Negative 
foil 2 1.64 0.383 20 
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Table S2:  Mixed model ANOVA for recognition data for experiment 1a. 
Within-subjects effects 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Test half 0.08 1 0.08 0.71 .405 0.64 
Test half x anxiety group 0.16 1 0.16 1.36 .251 0.76 
Error (test half) 3.81 33 0.12    
Item valence 0.24 1 0.24 0.77 .387 0.66 
Item valence x anxiety group 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 .966 0.00 
Error (item valence) 10.44 33 0.32    
Item type 73.99 1 73.99 467.54 .00** 1.00 
Item type x anxiety group 0.06 1 0.06 0.36 .554 0.51 
Error (item type) 5.22 33 0.16    
Test half x item valence 0.28 1 0.28 2.59 .117 0.85 
Test half x item valence x anxiety 
group 
0.20 1 0.20 1.84 .184 0.80 
Error (test half x item valence) 3.50 33 0.11    
Test half x item type 0.02 1 0.02 0.27 .604 0.46 
Test half x item type x anxiety 
group 
0.45 1 0.45 7.13 .012* 0.94 
Error (test half x item type) 2.01 33 0.06    
Item valence x item type 0.00 1 0.00 0.00 .961 0.00 
Item valence x item type x 
anxiety group 
0.00 1 0.01 0.06 .809 0.24 
Error (item valence x item type) 2.64 33 0.08    
Test half x item valence x item 
type 
0.73 1 0.73 7.44 .010* 0.94 
Test half x item valence x item 
type x anxiety group 
0.01 1 0.01 0.08 .784 0.27 
Error (test half x item valence x 
item type) 3.22 33 0.10 
   
Between-subjects effects 
Anxiety 2.652 1 2.652 4.810 .035* 0.91 
Error 18.20 33 0.55    
*significant at p < .05 
**significant at p < .01 
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TableS3: 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA for target items with item valence and test 
half as the within subjects factors for experiment 1a. 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Item valence 0.11 1 0.11 0.40 .533 0.53 
Error (item valence) 9.81 34 0.29    
Test half 0.05 1 0.05 0.48 .492 0.57 
Error (test half) 3.40 34 0.10    
Valence x test half 0.86 1 0.86 5.47 .025* 0.92 
Error (Valence x test half) 5.38 34 0.16    
*significant at p < .05 
TableS4: 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA for foil items with item valence and test 
half as the within subjects factors for experiment 1a. 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Item valence 0.14 1 0.14 1.44 .239 0.77 
Error (item valence) 3.27 34 0.10    
Test half 0.07 1 0.07 0.81 .376 0.67 
Error (test half) 3.09 34 0.09    
Valence x test half 0.07 1 0.07 1.61 .213 0.79 
Error (Valence x test half) 1.55 34 0.05    
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APPENDIX T 
Analyses of High PA Data for Experiment 1b 
Table T1:  Descriptive statistics for high PA data for the high and low anxious 
participants at times 1, 2 and 3 for experiment 1b. 
Group Time Mean SD N 
1 0.48 0.134 17 
2 0.61 0.139 17 
High anxious 
3 0.46 0.077 17 
1 0.53 0.134 21 
2 0.63 0.131 21 
Low anxious 
3 0.49 0.051 21 
Table T2:  Mixed model ANOVA for high PA data for experiment 1b. 
Within-subjects effects 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Time 0.453 1 0.226 25.109 .000** 0.98 
Time x 
Anxiety 
0.005 2 0.003 0.305 .738 0.48 
Error(Time) 0.649 72 0.009    
Between-subjects effects 
Anxiety 0.031 1 0.031 1.394 .246 0.76 
Error 0.798 36 0.022    
*significant at p < .05 
**significant at p < .01 
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APPENDIX U 
Analyses of Low PA Data for Experiment 1b 
Table U1:  Descriptive statistics for low PA data for the high and low anxious 
participants at times 1, 2 and 3 for experiment 1b. 
Group Time Mean SD N 
1 0.54 0.154 17 
2 0.37 0.118 17 
High anxious 
3 0.51 0.075 17 
1 0.45 0.110 21 
2 0.36 0.124 21 
Low anxious 
3 0.49 0.033 21 
Table U2:  Mixed model ANOVA for low PA data for experiment 1b. 
Within-subjects effects 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Time 0.417 2 0.209 26.320 .000** 0.98 
Time x 
Anxiety 
0.033 2 0.016 2.079 .133 0.82 
Error(Time) 0.571 72 0.008    
Between-subjects effects 
Anxiety 0.044 1 0.044 2.299 .138 0.83 
Error 0.696 36 0.019    
*significant at p < .05 
**significant at p < .01 
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APPENDIX V 
Analyses of Interpretation Bias Data for Experiment 1b 
Table V1:  Descriptive statistics for recognition interpretation bias data for all 
participants in experiment 1b.  Item type distinction not included as no item type 
interactions observed. 
Anxiety Item 
valence 
Test half Mean SD N 
1 2.02 0.337 17 Positive 
2 2.04 0.386 17 
1 2.10 0.348 17 
High anxious 
Negative 
2 2.12 0.373 17 
Low anxious 1 2.61 0.424 21 
 
Positive 
2 2.42 0.436 21 
 1 2.08 0.394 21 
 
Negative 
2 2.02 0.370 21 
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Table V2:  Mixed model ANOVA for recognition data in experiment 1b. 
Within-subjects effects 
Effect Sum of 
squares 
df Mean 
square 
F Sig. Effect 
size 
Test half 0.18 1 0.18 2.49 .123 0.84 
Test half x anxiety group 0.03 1 0.03 0.37 .55 0.52 
Error (test half) 0.03 1 0.03    
Item valence 1.52 1 1.52 4.90 .033* 0.911 
Item valence x anxiety group 2.31 1 2.31 7.46 .010* 0.94 
Error (item valence) 11.16 36 0.31    
Item type 79.59 1 79.59 327.51 .000** 1.0 
Item type x anxiety group 0.16 1 0.16 0.67 .419 0.63 
Error (item type) 8.75 36 0.24    
Test half x item valence 0.38 1 0.38 5.39 .026* 0.92 
Test half x item valence x anxiety 
group 
0.02 1 0.02 0.29 .594 0.47 
Error (test half x item valence) 2.52 36 0.07    
Test half x item type 0.01 1 0.01 0.06 .802 0.24 
Test half x item type x anxiety 
group 
0.05 1 0.05 0.57 .456 0.60 
Error (test half x item type) 3.25 36 0.09    
Item valence x item type 0.16 1 0.16 2.58 .117 0.85 
Item valence x item type x 
anxiety group 
0.00 1 0.00 0.00 .951 0.00 
Error (item valence x item type) 2.24 36 0.06    
Test half x item valence x item 
type 
0.01 1 0.01 0.26 .614 0.45 
Test half x item valence x item 
type x anxiety group 
0.00 1 0.00 0.04 .836 0.20 
Error (test half x item valence x 
item type) 1.92 36 0.05 
   
Between-subjects effects 
Anxiety 0.97 1 0.97 1.3 .264 0.75 
Error 26.95 36 0.75    
*significant at p < .05 
**significant at p < .01 
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APPENDIX W 
Correlations Between Items High and Low in NA from Visual Analogue Scale at 
Times 1, 2 and 3 for Experiment 2a 
Table W1:  Analyses of normality of items high and low in NA at times 1, 2 and 3 in 
experiment 2a. 
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Item Time Statistic df Sig. 
Worried 1 0.941 49 .016* 
 2 0.882 49 .000* 
 3 0.911 49 .001* 
Tense 1 0.902 49 .001* 
 2 0.956 49 .065 
 3 0.958 49 .077 
Calm 1 0.929 49 .006* 
 2 0.977 49 .460 
 3 0.905 49 .001* 
Content 1 0.911 49 .001* 
 2 0.928 49 .005* 
 3 0.926 49 .004* 
*significant at p < .01 
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Table W2:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for items high and low in NA at times 1, 
2 and 3 in experiment 2a. 
    Skew Kurtosis 
Item Time Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
1 0.51 0.18 -0.391 0.340 1.114 0.668 
2 0.48 0.23 0.790* 0.340 4.400* 0.668 
Worried 
3 0.48 0.14 -0.991* 0.340 2.310* 0.668 
1 0.50 0.18 -1.022* 0.340 1.191 0.668 
2 0.52 0.22 0.082 0.340 -0.679 0.668 
Tense 
3 0.53 0.16 -0.543 0.340 1.707* 0.668 
1 0.50 0.17 0.601 0.340 0.769 0.668 
2 0.44 0.20 0.404 0.340 0.158 0.668 
Calm 
3 0.47 0.14 0.721* 0.340 3.404* 0.668 
1 0.55 0.17 0.627 0.340 1.229 0.668 
2 0.51 0.17 0.578 0.340 1.463* 0.668 
Content 
3 0.50 0.12 -0.014 0.340 2.209* 0.668 
*Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
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APPENDIX X 
Normality Checks for the High NA Data at Times 1, 2 and 3 for Experiment 2a 
The high NA data was checked for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test as 
the number of participants was less than 2000 (Field, 2005).  This showed that for 
the high anxious participants, the high NA data were not normally distributed at time 
2 and for the low anxious participants that data was not normally distributed at time 
1 (table X1).  For the high anxious participants, significant skew and kurtosis was 
also found for the high NA data at time 2.  For the low anxious participants, 
significant skew was also found at time 1 (table X2; Wald criterion of skew or 
kurtosis statistic more than twice the standard error).  
Table X1:  Analyses of normality of high NA at times 1, 2 and 3 for experiment 2a. 
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig. 
High anxious 1 0.916 11 .291 
 2 0.844 11 .036* 
 3 0.920 11 .323 
Low anxious 1 0.805 13 .008** 
 2 0.914 13 .207 
 3 0.970 13 .894 
*significant at p < .05 
**significant at p < .01 
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Table X2:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for high NA at times 1, 2 and 3 for 
experiment 2a. 
    Skew Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
1 0.57 0.11 0.237 0.661 -0.139 1.279 
2 0.65 0.21 -1.645* 0.661 3.947* 1.279 
High 
anxious 
3 0.51 0.14 -0.512 0.661 -0.810 1.279 
1 0.44 0.18 -1.486* 0.616 1.860 1.191 
2 0.65 0.18 0.106 0.616 -1.387 1.191 
Low 
anxious 
3 0.58 0.10 0.039 0.616 -0.403 1.191 
*Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
As the data were differentially skewed for the two anxiety groups it was not 
possible to transform it without biasing the data .  Therefore two of three identified 
outliers were changed to the mean plus or minus two standard deviations (Field, 
2005).  The third outlier was not changed as to do so would have decreased the raw 
score further.  The new scores are shown in table X3.   
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Table X3:  Identified outliers and their transformation in high NA data at times 1, 2 
and 3 for experiment 2a. 
Group Time Outlier 
case no. 
Raw 
score 
Mean SD Transformed 
score 
High 
anxious 
2 44 0.12 0.65  0.21 0.23 
1 33 0.13 0.44 0.18 0.13 Low 
anxious 1 49 0.01 0.44 0.18 0.08 
 
The normality tests were re-run but the high NA data at time 1 for the low 
anxious participants was still shown to be non-normal with significant skew.  As 
recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) this process was carried out a further 
two times (tables X4 and X5) but the data still showed significant non-normality, 
skew and kurtosis (tables X6 and X7).   
Table X4:  Identified outliers and their second transformation in high NA data at 
times 1, 2 and 3 for experiment 2a. 
Group Time Outlier 
case no. 
Raw 
score 
Mean SD Transformed 
score 
High 
anxious 
2 44 0.23 0.66 0.18 0.30 
1 33 0.13 0.44 0.17 0.13 Low 
anxious 1 49 0.08 0.44 0.17 0.09 
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Table X5:  Identified outliers and their third transformation in high NA data at times 
1, 2 and 3 for experiment 2a. 
Group Time Outlier 
case no. 
Raw 
score 
Mean SD Transformed 
score 
High 
anxious 
2 44 0.30 0.67 0.17 0.32 
1 33 0.13 0.44 0.17 0.13 Low 
anxious 1 49 0.09 0.44 0.17 0.09 
 
Table X6:  Analyses of normality of high NA at times 1, 2 and 3 following removal 
of outliers for experiment 2a. 
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig. 
1 0.916 11 .291 
2 0.898 11 .177 
High anxious 
3 0.920 11 .323 
1 0.816 13 .011* 
2 0.914 13 .207 
Low anxious 
3 0.970 13 .894 
*significant at p < .05 
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Table X7:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for high NA at times 1, 2 and 3 following 
removal of outliers for experiment 2a. 
    Skew Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
1 0.57 0.11 0.237 0.661 -0.139 1.279 
2 0.66 0.18 -1.180 0.661 2.339 1.279 
High 
anxious 
3 0.51 0.14 -0.512 0.661 -0.810 1.279 
1 0.44 0.17 -1.284* 0.616 1.118 1.191 
2 0.65 0.18 0.106 0.616 -1.387 1.191 
Low 
anxious 
3 0.58 0.10 0.039 0.616 -0.403 1.191 
*Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
 
As this was probably due to the difficulty replacing one of the identified 
outliers with the mean plus or minus two standard deviations a different method 
(replacing the outliers with the next nearest value) was used (table X8).  The 
normality tests were re-run and although the normality test was still significant for 
the low anxious participants at time 1, no significant skew or kurtosis was found 
(tables X9 and X10).  As skew is considered to be the most important statistic when 
assessing normality it was considered appropriate to use a parametric test. 
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Table X8:  Identified outliers and their fourth transformation using the series mean 
method in high NA data at times 1, 2 and 3 for experiment 2a. 
Group Time Outlier case 
no. 
Raw score Nearest score 
High anxious 2 44 0.12 0.54 
1 33 0.13 0.37 Low anxious 
1 49 0.01 0.37 
 
Table X9:  Analyses of normality of high NA at times 1, 2 and 3 following removal 
of outliers using series mean method for experiment 2a. 
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig. 
High anxious 1 0.916 11 .291 
 2 0.909 11 .240 
 3 0.920 11 .323 
Low anxious 1 0.855 13 .033* 
 2 0.914 13 .207 
 3 0.970 13 .894 
*significant at p < .05 
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Table X10:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for high NA at times 1, 2 and 3 following 
removal of outliers using series mean method for experiment 2a. 
    Skew Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
1 0.57 0.11 0.237 0.661 -0.139 1.279 
2 0.69 0.12 0.404 0.661 -1.281 1.279 
High 
anxious 
3 0.51 0.14 -0.512 0.661 -0.810 1.279 
1 0.48 0.09 0.175 0.616 -0.606 1.191 
2 0.65 0.18 0.106 0.616 -1.387 1.191 
Low 
anxious 
3 0.58 0.10 0.039 0.616 -0.403 1.191 
*Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
 
The high NA met the criterion of homogeneity of variance assumption as 
assessed by the Levene statistic (Table X11). 
Table X11:  Levene statistic to assess homogeneity of variance in the high NA data 
in experiment 2a. 
Time Levene 
statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
1 0.874 1 22 .360 
2 1.960 1 22 .175 
3 2.003 1 22 .171 
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APPENDIX Y 
Normality Checks for the Low NA Data at Times 1, 2 and 3 for Experiment 2a 
Table Y1:  Analyses of normality of low NA at times 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 2a. 
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig. 
High anxious 1 0.956 11 .724 
 2 0.960 11 .775 
 3 0.935 11 .463 
Low anxious 1 0.868 13 .050 
 2 0.975 13 .942 
 3 0.938 13 .437 
 
Table Y2:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for low NA at times 1, 2 and 3 in 
experiment 2a. 
    Skew Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
1 0.49 0.08 0.094 .661 1.545 1.279 
2 0.39 0.10 .051 0.661 -0.895 1.279 
High 
anxious 
3 0.51 0.09 0.845 0.661 0.400 1.279 
1 0.58 0.13 1.178 0.616 0.936 1.191 
2 0.40 0.11 0.306 0.616 0.532 1.191 
Low 
anxious 
3 0.47 0.07 -0.746 0.616 0.435 1.191 
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Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
The low NA data met the criterion of homogeneity of variance at times 1, 2 
and 3 as assessed by the Levene statistic (Table Y3). 
 
Table Y3:  Levene statistic to assess homogeneity of variance in the low NA data in 
experiment 2a. 
Time Levene 
statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
1 1.525 1 22 .230 
2 0.002 1 22 .964 
3 0.357 1 22 .556 
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APPENDIX Z 
Normality Checks on the Cognitive Load Accuracy Data for Experiment 2a 
The data was checked for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test as the 
number of participants was less than 2000 (Field, 2005).  No evidence of non-
normality, skew or kurtosis was found. 
 
Table Z1: Normality checks on the cognitive load accuracy data for experiment 2a. 
 Shapiro-Wilk 
Inaccurate digit string recall Statistic df Sig. 
Low anxious group 0.897 13 .120 
High anxious group 0.920 11 .317 
 
TableZ2:  Analysis of skew and kurtosis for the cognitive load accuracy data for 
experiment 2a. 
   Skew Kurtosis 
Inaccurate digit string recall Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Low anxious group 6.23 5.53 1.101 0.616 0.842 1.191 
High anxious group 5.73 4.13 0.248 0.661 -1.023 1.279 
Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
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APPENDIX AA 
Normality Checks on the Interpretation Bias Recognition Data for Experiment 2a 
The data was checked for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test as the 
number of participants was less than 2000 (Field, 2005).  High anxious participants’ 
recognition data for negative foil items in the first half of the test was found to be 
non-normal (table AA1).   
 
Screening for skew and kurtosis also highlighted that for the low anxious 
participants, recognition data for negative targets in the first half of the test, and for 
positive targets in the second half of the test, showed significant skew and kurtosis 
(table AA2).   
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Table AA1:  Analyses of normality of recognition interpretation bias data at times 1, 
2 and 3 for experiment 2a. 
   Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Test half Item Statistic df Sig. 
Positive target 0.909 11 .237 1 
Positive foil 0.954 11 .690 
Positive target 0.938 11 .499 2 
Positive foil 0.876 11 .092 
Negative target 0.942 11 .545 1 
Negative foil 0.819 11 .017* 
Negative target 0.961 11 .787 
High anxious 
2 
Negative foil 0.905 11 .215 
Positive target 0.969 13 .881 1 
Positive foil 0.885 13 .082 
Positive target 0.883 13 .079 2 
Positive foil 0.883 13 0.078 
Negative target 0.896 13 0.118 1 
Negative foil 0.928 13 0.319 
Negative target 0.906 13 0.162 
Low anxious 
2 
Negative foil 0.912 13 0.197 
*significant at p < .05 
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Table AA2:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for recognition interpretation bias data at 
times 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 2a. 
     Skew Kurtosis 
Group Test 
half 
Item Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Positive target 2.61 0.288 -0.019 0.661 -1.680 1.279 1 
Positive foil 1.66 0.287 0.013 0.661 -1.137 1.279 
Positive target 2.63 0.350 -0.536 0.661 0.722 1.279 2 
Positive foil 1.68 0.343 0.370 0.661 -1.380 1.279 
Negative target 2.62 0.627 0.468 0.661 -0.773 1.279 1 
Negative foil 1.54 0.307 -0.823 0.661 -1.030 1.279 
Negative target 2.65 0.515 -0.536 0.661 0.534 1.279 
High 
anxious 
2 
Negative foil 1.61 0.226 -0.393 0.661 -1.013 1.279 
Positive target 2.60 0.416 -0.409 0.616 -0.164 1.191 1 
Positive foil 1.55 0.328 -0.033 0.616 -1.782 1.191 
Positive target 2.72 0.687 -1.382* 0.616 2.200 1.191 2 
Positive foil 1.54 0.524 0.660 0.616 -0.696 1.191 
Negative target 2.61 0.589 -1.364* 0.616 2.780* 1.191 1 
Negative foil 1.44 0.250 0.841 0.616 0.541 1.191 
Negative target 2.28 0.650 -0.774 0.616 -0.468 1.191 
Low 
anxious 
2 
Negative foil 1.45 0.414 0.740 0.616 -0.312 1.191 
*Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
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It was not possible to transform the data as it was differentially skewed 
between the low and high anxious groups.  Three outliers were therefore identified 
and transformed to the mean plus or minus two standard deviations as recommended 
by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), see table AA3.   
Table AA3:  Identified outliers and their transformation in recognition interpretation 
bias data at times 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 2a. 
Group Test 
half 
Item Outlier 
case no. 
Raw 
score 
Mean SD Transformed 
score 
High 
anxious 
2 Positive 
target 
15 1.90 2.63 0.350 1.93 
1 Negative 
target 
43 1.10 2.61 0.589 1.43 Low 
anxious 
2 Positive 
target 
43 1.00 2.72 0.687 1.35 
 
The normality tests were re-run and no evidence of non-normality, skew or 
kurtosis was found (tables AA4 and AA5).   
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Table AA4:  Analyses of normality of recognition interpretation bias data at times 1, 
2 and 3 following removal of outliers in experiment 2a. 
   Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Test half Item Statistic df Sig. 
Positive target 0.909 11 .237 1 
Positive foil 0.954 11 .690 
Positive target 0.942 11 .543 2 
Positive foil 0.876 11 .092 
Negative 
target 
0.942 
11 
.545 
1 
Negative foil 0.819 11 .017* 
Negative 
target 
0.961 
11 
.787 
High anxious 
2 
Negative foil 0.905 11 .215 
Positive target 0.969 13 .881 1 
Positive foil 0.885 13 .082 
Positive target 0.918 13 .234 2 
Positive foil 0.883 13 .078 
Negative 
target 
0.942 
13 
.477 
1 
Negative foil 0.928 13 .319 
Negative 
target 
0.906 
13 
.162 
Low anxious 
2 
Negative foil 0.912 13 .197 
*significant at p < .05 
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Table AA5:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for recognition interpretation bias data at 
times 1, 2 and 3 following removal of outliers in experiment 2a. 
     Skew Kurtosis 
Group Test 
half 
Item Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Positive 
target 
2.61 0.288 -0.019 0.661 -1.680 1.279 1 
Positive 
foil 
1.66 0.287 0.013 0.661 -1.137 1.279 
Positive 
target 
2.63 0.343 -0.456 0.661 0.532 1.279 2 
Positive 
foil 
1.68 0.343 0.370 0.661 -1.380 1.279 
Negative 
target 
2.62 0.627 0.468 0.661 -0.773 1.279 1 
Negative 
foil 
1.54 0.307 -0.823 0.661 -1.030 1.279 
Negative 
target 
2.65 0.515 -0.536 0.661 0.534 1.279 
High 
anxious 
2 
Negative 
foil 
1.61 0.226 -0.393 0.661 -1.013 1.279 
Positive 
target 
2.60 0.416 -0.409 0.616 -0.164 1.191 1 
Positive 
foil 
1.55 0.328 -0.033 0.616 -1.782 1.191 
Positive 
target 
2.74 0.617 -1.010 0.616 0.763 1.191 2 
Positive 
foil 
1.54 0.524 0.660 0.616 -0.696 1.191 
Negative 
target 
2.63 0.522 -0.893 0.616 1.159 1.191 1 
Negative 
foil 
1.44 0.250 0.841 0.616 0.541 1.191 
Negative 
target 
2.28 0.650 -0.774 0.616 -0.468 1.191 
Low 
anxious 
2 
Negative 
foil 
1.45 0.414 0.740 0.616 -0.312 1.191 
Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
  276
The recognition interpretation bias data met the criterion of homogeneity of 
variance assessed by the Levene statistic (table AA6). 
Table AA6:  Levene statistic to assess homogeneity of variance in the recognition 
interpretation bias data in experiment 2a. 
Item Test half Levene 
statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
1 0.874 1 22 .360 Positive 
target 2 3.671 1 22 .068 
1 0.786 1 22 .385 Positive 
foil 2 2.926 1 22 .101 
1 0.815 1 22 .376 Negative 
target 2 1.105 1 22 .305 
1 1.213 1 22 .283 Negative 
foil 2 3.845 1 22 .063 
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APPENDIX AB 
Correlations Between Items High and Low in PA from Visual Analogue Scale at 
Times 1, 2 and 3 for Experiment 2b 
 
Table AB1:  Analyses of normality of items high and low in PA at times 1, 2 and 3 
in experiment 2b. 
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Item Time Statistic df Sig. 
Carefree 1 .941 26 .146 
 2 .975 26 .749 
 3 .917 26 .037* 
Happy 1 .897 26 .014* 
 2 .978 26 .837 
 3 .838 26 .001* 
Low 1 .946 26 .191 
 2 .951 26 .247 
 3 .896 26 .013* 
Sad 1 .861 26 .002* 
 2 .951 26 .242 
 3 .769 26 .000* 
*significant at p < .05 
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Table AB2:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for items high and low in PA at times 1, 
2 and 3 in experiment 2b. 
    Skew Kurtosis 
Item Time Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
1 0.45 0.22 -0.0.42 0.456 0.138 0.887 
2 0.55 0.17 -0.507 0.456 0.449 0.887 
Carefree 
3 0.43 0.13 -0.638 0.456 -0.391 0.887 
1 0.53 0.18 0.482 0.456 1.734* 0.887 
2 0.65 0.19 -0.063 0.456 -0.049 0.887 
Happy 
3 0.51 0.14 1.547* 0.456 4.714* 0.887 
1 0.44 0.19 -0.105 0.456 0.419 0.887 
2 0.39 0.18 -0.338 0.456 -0.203 0.887 
Low 
3 0.48 0.15 -1.168* 0.456 3.378* 0.887 
1 0.48 0.17 -0.995 0.456 1.234 0.887 
2 0.35 0.21 -0.061 0.456 -1.018 0.887 
Sad 
3 0.47 0.13 -1.715* 0.456 6.164* 0.887 
*Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
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APPENDIX AC 
Normality Checks for the High PA Data at Times 1, 2 and 3 for Experiment 2b 
The high PA data was checked for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test as 
the number of participants was less than 2000 (Field, 2005).  This showed that for 
the high anxious participants, the high PA data were not normally distributed at time 
1 (table AC1). 
Table AC1:  Analyses of normality of high PA at times 1, 2 and 3 for experiment 2b. 
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig. 
1 0.848 13 .027* 
2 0.917 13 .231 
High anxious 
3 0.947 13 .553 
1 0.920 13 .248 
2 0.974 13 .940 
Low anxious 
3 0.959 13 .746 
*significant at p < .05 
For the high anxious participants, significant skew was also found for the 
high PA data at time 1 (Wald criterion of skew or kurtosis statistic more than twice 
the standard error), table AC2.   
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Table AC2:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for high PA at times 1, 2 and 3 for 
experiment 2b. 
    Skew Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
1 0.43 0.15 -1.433* 0.616 1.996 1.191 
2 0.56 0.13 -1.201 0.616 2.331 1.191 
High 
anxious 
3 0.44 0.11 -0.172 0.616 -0.299 1.191 
1 0.55 0.18 0.381 0.616 -0.540 1.191 
2 0.65 0.16 -0.032 0.616 -0.638 1.191 
Low 
anxious 
3 0.50 0.12 0.521 0.616 -0.101 1.191 
*Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
As the data were differentially skewed for the two anxiety groups it was not 
possible to transform it without biasing the data.  Therefore two outliers were 
identified and changed to the mean plus or minus two standard deviations (table 
AC3; Field, 2005) and the normality tests re-run, following which no evidence of 
non-normality, skew or kurtosis was found (tables AC4 and AC5). 
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Table AC3:  Identified outliers and their transformation in high PA data at times 1, 2 
and 3 in experiment 2b. 
Group Time Outlier 
case no. 
Raw 
score 
Mean SD Transformed 
score 
1 48 0.07 0.43 0.15 0.33 High 
anxious 2 35 0.24 0.56 0.13 0.50 
 
Table AC4:  Analyses of normality of high PA at times 1, 2 and 3 following removal 
of outliers in experiment 2b. 
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig. 
1 0.929 13 .333 
2 0.949 13 .588 
High anxious 
3 0.947 13 .553 
1 0.920 13 .248 
2 0.974 13 .940 
Low anxious 
3 0.959 13 .746 
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Table AC5:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for high PA at times 1, 2 and 3 following 
removal of outliers in experiment 2b. 
    Skew Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
1 0.46 0.11 -0.931 0.616 1.566 1.191 
2 0.58 0.09 0.232 0.616 -1.005 1.191 
High 
anxious 
3 0.44 0.11 -0.172 0.616 -0.299 1.191 
1 0.55 0.18 0.381 0.616 -0.540 1.191 
2 0.65 0.16 -0.032 0.616 -0.638 1.191 
Low 
anxious 
3 0.50 0.12 0.521 0.616 -0.101 1.191 
 
The high PA data did not meet the criterion of homogeneity of variance at 
time 2 as assessed by the Levene statistic (table AC6) and as a result a more 
conservative alpha level of 0.025 was used (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
 
Table AC6:  Levene statistic to assess homogeneity of variance in the high PA data 
in experiment 2b. 
Time Levene 
statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
1 3.108 1 24 .091 
2 4.857 1 24 .037* 
3 0.005 1 24 .946 
*significant at p < .05 
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APPENDIX AD 
Normality Checks for the Low PA Data at Times 1, 2 and 3 for Experiment 2b 
The low PA data was checked for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test as 
the number of participants was less than 2000 (Field, 2005).  This showed that for 
the low anxious participants, the low PA data were not normally distributed at times 
1 and 3 (table AD1).   
Table AD1:  Analyses of normality of low PA at times 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 2b. 
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig. 
High anxious 1 0.942 13 .488 
 2 0.972 13 .918 
 3 0.912 13 .193 
Low anxious 1 0.842 13 .023* 
 2 0.962 13 .781 
 3 0.799 13 .007* 
*significant at p < .05 
For both the low and the high anxious participants, significant skew and 
kurtosis was also found for the low PA data at time 3 (table AD2; Wald criterion of 
skew or kurtosis statistic more than twice the standard error).   
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Table AD2:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for low PA at times 1, 2 and 3 in 
experiment 2b. 
    Skew Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
1 0.49 0.16 0.270 0.616 -.0266 1.191 
2 0.38 0.19 0.147 0.616 -0.322 1.191 
High 
anxious 
3 0.50 0.10 1.046 0.616 2.715* 1.191 
1 0.43 0.18 -1.062 0.616 0.475 1.191 
2 0.37 0.18 -0.482 0.616 -0.535 1.191 
Low 
anxious 
3 0.46 0.16 -2.021* 0.616 5.122* 1.191 
*Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
As the data were differentially skewed for the two anxiety groups it was not 
possible to transform it without biasing the data.  Therefore four of five identified 
outliers were identified and changed to the mean plus or minus two standard 
deviations (Field, 2005), with the fifth not being changed as to do so would have 
decreased the raw score further (tables AD3 and AD4). 
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Table AD3:  Identified outliers and their transformation in low PA data at times 1, 2 
and 3 in experiment 2b. 
Group Time Outlier 
case no. 
Raw 
score 
Mean SD Transformed 
score 
1 24 0.07 0.43 0.05 0.33 
3 24 0.01 0.46 0.16 0.14 
3 32 0.31 0.46 0.16 0.31 
Low 
anxious 
3 32 0.31 0.46 0.16 0.14 
High 
anxious 
3 35 0.75 0.50 0.10 0.70 
 
Table AD4:  Identified outliers and their second transformation in low PA data at 
times 1, 2 and 3 in experiment 2b. 
Group Time Outlier 
case no. 
Raw 
score 
Mean SD Transformed 
score 
3 24 0.14 0.47 0.13 0.21 Low 
anxious 3 32 0.31 0.47 0.13 0.21 
High 
anxious 
3 35 0.70 0.50 0.09 0.68 
 
The normality tests were re-run and no evidence of non-normality, skew or 
kurtosis was found (tables AD5 and AD6). 
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Table AD5:  Analyses of normality of low PA at times 1, 2 and 3 following second 
removal of outliers in experiment 2b. 
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Time Statistic df Sig. 
High anxious 1 0.942 13 .488 
 2 0.972 13 .918 
 3 0.964 13 .807 
Low anxious 1 0.901 13 .138 
 2 0.962 13 .781 
 3 0.862 13 .040* 
*significant at p < .05 
Table AD6:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for high PA at times 1, 2 and 3 
following second removal of outliers in experiment 2b. 
    Skew Kurtosis 
Group Time Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
1 0.49 0.16 0.270 0.616 -0.266 1.191 
2 0.38 0.19 0.147 0.616 -0.322 1.191 
High 
anxious 
3 0.49 0.09 0.318 0.616 0.836 1.191 
1 0.47 0.12 -0.097 0.616 -0.222 1.191 
2 0.37 0.18 -0.482 0.616 -0.535 1.191 
Low 
anxious 
3 0.46 0.13 -1.109 0.616 0.732 1.191 
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The low PA data did meet the criterion of homogeneity of variance at times 
1, 2 and 3 as assessed by the Levene statistic (table AD7). 
Table AD7:  Levene statistic to assess homogeneity of variance in the low PA data 
in experiment 2b. 
Time Levene 
statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
1 0.740 1 24 .398 
2 0.029 1 24 .865 
3 1.280 1 24 .269 
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APPENDIX AE 
Normality Checks for the Cognitive Load Accuracy Data for Experiment 2b 
Table AE1: Normality checks on the cognitive load accuracy data for experiment 2b. 
  Shapiro-Wilk 
Digit string recall Anxiety group Statistic df Sig. 
Low 0.913 13 .202 Accurate 
High 0.971 13 .907 
Low 0.913 13 .202 Inaccurate 
High 0.971 13 .907 
 
TableAE2:  Analysis of skew and kurtosis for the cognitive load accuracy data for 
experiment 2b. 
    Skew Kurtosis 
Digit string 
recall 
Anxiety group Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Low 15.31 2.98 -0.820 0.616 -0.090 1.191 Accurate 
High 12.31 3.57 0.027 0.616 -0.811 1.191 
Low 4.69 2.98 0.820 0.616 -0.090 1.191 Inaccurate 
High 7.69 3.57 -0.027 0.616 -0.811 1.191 
Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error 
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APPENDIX AF 
Normality Checks on the Interpretation Bias Recognition Data for Experiment 2b 
The data was checked for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test as the 
number of participants was less than 2000 (Field, 2005).  High anxious participants’ 
recognition data for negative foil items in the first half of the test was found to be 
non-normal as was low anxious participant’s recognition data for positive target 
items in the second half of the test (table AF1).   
Screening for skew and kurtosis also highlighted significant skew for the 
high anxious participants’ recognition data for negative foils in the first half of the 
test (table AF2).   
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TableAF1:  Analyses of normality of recognition interpretation bias data in 
experiment 2b. 
   Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Test half Item Statistic df Sig. 
Positive target 0.870 13 .052 1 
Positive foil 0.926 13 .306 
Positive target 0.941 13 .468 2 
Positive foil 0.906 13 .163 
Negative target 0.985 13 .996 1 
Negative foil 0.846 13 .025* 
Negative target 0.956 13 .695 
High anxious 
2 
Negative foil 0.910 13 .183 
Positive target 0.964 13 .814 1 
Positive foil 0.904 13 .154 
Positive target 0.849 13 .027* 2 
Positive foil 0.932 13 .357 
Negative target 0.955 13 .680 1 
Negative foil 0.927 13 .311 
Negative target 0.918 13 .236 
Low anxious 
2 
Negative foil 0.945 13 .530 
*significant at p < .05 
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Table AF2:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for recognition interpretation bias data 
for experiment 2b. 
     Skew Kurtosis 
Group Test 
half 
Item Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Positive 
target 
2.76 0.423 1.228 0.616 1.699 1.191 1 
Positive 
foil 
1.72 0.460 0.818 0.616 1.592 1.191 
Positive 
target 
2.80 0.469 -0.498 0.616 -0.184 1.191 2 
Positive 
foil 
1.60 0.428 1.084 0.616 0.997 1.191 
Negative 
target 
2.60 0.497 -0.145 0.616 -0.108 1.191 1 
Negative 
foil 
1.54 0.463 1.557* 0.616 2.524* 1.191 
Negative 
target 
2.70 0.549 -0.246 0.616 -1.100 1.191 
High 
anxious 
2 
Negative 
foil 
1.65 0.422 0.903 0.616 0.374 1.191 
Positive 
target 
2.74 0.403 -0.188 0.616 -0.734 1.191 1 
Positive 
foil 
1.48 0.196 1.003 0.616 0.808 1.191 
Positive 
target 
2.83 0.368 -1.022 0.616 -0.050 1.191 2 
Positive 
foil 
1.62 0.387 0.382 0.616 -1.003 1.191 
Negative 
target 
2.46 0.487 0.327 0.616 -0.919 1.191 1 
Negative 
foil 
1.39 0.253 0.575 0.616 -0.480 1.191 
Negative 
target 
2.50 0.705 -0.694 0.616 -0.621 1.191 
Low 
anxious 
2 
Negative 
foil 
1.48 0.366 0.593 0.616 -0.527 1.191 
*Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
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It was not possible to transform the data as it was differentially skewed 
between the low and high anxious groups.  One of five identified outliers was 
therefore transformed to the mean plus or minus two standard deviations as 
recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), table AF3.   
Table AF3:  Identified outliers and their transformation in recognition interpretation 
bias data in experiment 2b. 
Group Test 
half 
Item Outlier 
case no. 
Raw 
score 
Mean SD Transformed 
score 
6 1.00 1.54 0.463 1.00 
10 1.10 1.54 0.463 1.10 
29 2.70 1.54 0.463 2.47 
35 1.30 1.54 0.463 1.30 
High 
anxious 
1 Negative 
foil 
47 2.20 1.54 0.463 2.20 
 
Table AF4:  Identified outliers and their second transformation in recognition 
interpretation bias data in experiment 2b. 
Group Test 
half 
Item Outlier 
case no. 
Raw 
score 
Mean SD Transformed 
score 
6 1.00 1.52 0.417 1.00 
10 1.10 1.52 0.417 1.10 
29 2.47 1.52 0.417 2.35 
35 1.30 1.52 0.417 1.30 
High 
anxious 
1 Negative 
foil 
47 2.20 1.52 0.417 2.20 
  293
As this process did not correct the non-normality the process was repeated 
until no evidence of skew or kurtosis (the best method for assessing normality) was 
found (tables AF4, AF5 and AF6). 
 
Table AF5:  Analyses of normality of recognition interpretation bias data following 
removal of outliers in experiment 2b. 
   Shapiro-Wilk 
Group Test half Item Statistic df Sig. 
Positive target 0.870 13 .052 1 
Positive foil 0.926 13 .306 
Positive target 0.941 13 .468 2 
Positive foil 0.906 13 .163 
Negative target 0.985 13 .996 1 
Negative foil 0.885 13 .084 
Negative target 0.956 13 .695 
High anxious 
2 
Negative foil 0.910 13 .183 
Positive target 0.964 13 .814 1 
Positive foil 0.904 13 .154 
Positive target 0.849 13 .027* 2 
Positive foil 0.932 13 .357 
Negative target 0.955 13 .680 1 
Negative foil 0.927 13 .311 
Negative target 0.918 13 .236 
Low anxious 
2 
Negative foil 0.945 13 .530 
*significant at p < .05 
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Table AF6:  Analyses of skew and kurtosis for recognition interpretation bias data at 
times following removal of outliers in experiment 2b. 
     Skew Kurtosis 
Group Test 
half 
Item Mean SD Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Positive 
target 
2.76 0.423 1.228 0.616 1.699 1.191 1 
Positive 
foil 
1.72 0.460 0.818 0.616 1.592 1.191 
Positive 
target 
2.80 0.469 -0.498 0.616 -0.184 1.191 2 
Positive 
foil 
1.60 0.428 1.084 0.616 0.997 1.191 
Negative 
target 
2.60 0.497 -0.145 0.616 -0.108 1.191 1 
Negative 
foil 
1.51 0.395 1.098 0.616 0.763 1.191 
Negative 
target 
2.70 0.549 -0.246 0.616 -1.100 1.191 
High 
anxious 
2 
Negative 
foil 
1.65 0.422 0.903 0.616 0.374 1.191 
Positive 
target 
2.74 0.403 -0.188 0.616 -0.734 1.191 1 
Positive 
foil 
1.48 0.196 1.003 0.616 0.808 1.191 
Positive 
target 
2.83 0.368 -1.022 0.616 -0.050 1.191 2 
Positive 
foil 
1.62 0.387 0.382 0.616 -1.003 1.191 
Negative 
target 
2.46 0.487 0.327 0.616 -0.919 1.191 1 
Negative 
foil 
1.39 0.253 0.575 0.616 -0.480 1.191 
Negative 
target 
2.50 0.705 -0.694 0.616 -0.621 1.191 
Low 
anxious 
2 
Negative 
foil 
1.48 0.366 0.593 0.616 -0.527 1.191 
Skew or kurtosis in the data is indicated by statistics more than twice the standard 
error. 
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The recognition interpretation bias data met the criterion of homogeneity of 
variance assessed by the Levene statistic (table AF7). 
Table AF7:  Levene statistic to assess homogeneity of variance in the recognition 
interpretation bias data in experiment 2b. 
Item Test half Levene 
statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
1 0.011 1 24 .916 Positive 
target 2 0.173 1 24 .682 
1 2.824 1 24 .106 Positive 
foil 2 0.037 1 24 .849 
1 0.017 1 24 .896 Negative 
target 2 0.471 1 24 .499 
1 1.187 1 24 .287 Negative 
foil 2 0.057 1 24 .814 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
